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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
In 2002 werd het wetgevend kader van de financiële rapportering door Belgische 
verenigingen en stichtingen grondig gewijzigd. Voor de overgang van de oorspronkelijke 
situatie, waarbij de VZW-wet van 1921 nauwelijks enige verplichting oplegde op het vlak van 
boekhouding en rapportering, naar de nieuwe situatie waarin het voeren van een dubbele 
boekhouding, het publiek beschikbaar stellen van de daaruit voortvloeiende jaarrekening en 
de externe audit van deze jaarrekening voor de zeer grote verenigingen en stichtingen werd 
verplicht, werd een overgangsperiode van enkele jaren voorzien. Concreet hield dit in dat in 
2007 de eerste jaarrekeningen van verenigingen en stichtingen in grote getale publiek 
beschikbaar werden gesteld via de Balanscentrale van de Nationale Bank van België. Deze 
wetswijziging, het socio-economische belang van de sector en de rijke schat aan nieuwe 
informatie vormen samen de vruchtbare voedingsbodem voor dit doctorale onderzoek. 
De jaarrekeningen van verenigingen en stichtingen bevatten belangrijke informatie voor 
diverse stakeholders. Daarom moet de kwaliteit van de aangeboden informatie 
gegarandeerd worden via het volgen van boekhoudstandaarden. In de eerste studie wordt 
de ‘formele’ kwaliteit van de eerste jaarrekeningen getest aan de hand van een compliance 
index. Via 19 tests wordt nagegaan in welke mate de jaarrekeningen van de verenigingen 
voldoen aan de basiscriteria van de ‘Generally Accepted Accounting Principals’. Uit het 
onderzoek blijkt dat, hoewel de gemiddelde kwaliteit van de jaarrekeningen hoog ligt, er 
toch nog steeds aandachtspunten bestaan voor de rapporterende vereniging, de wetgever 
en de accounting professionals. Vervolgens worden de verschillen in kwaliteit verklaard 
vanuit de ‘Resource Dependence Theory’ en – in mindere mate- vanuit de Institutionele 
Theorie. Er werd onder meer vastgesteld dat afhankelijkheid van subsidies en financiële 
schulden bijdragen tot een betere toepassing van de boekhoud- en 
rapporteringsstandaarden. 
In de tweede studie wordt onderzocht of verenigingen en stichtingen aan winststuring doen 
en, zo ja, of dit wordt beïnvloed door de mate van subsidiëring. Op basis van regressie-
analyse wordt vastgesteld dat het boekhoudkundig resultaat in beperkte mate wordt 
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gestuurd naar het nulpunt en dat dit in bepaalde omstandigheden wordt beïnvloed door de 
mate van subsidiëring. 
In het derde onderzoek wordt de externe audit van de non-profit jaarrekeningen onder de 
loep genomen. Er wordt een model opgesteld voor de verklaring van de hoogte van het 
honorarium van de auditor. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat de complexiteit van de cliënt een 
belangrijke verklarende factor is, consistent met voorgaand onderzoek. De grootte van de 
auditor (en niet noodzakelijk de merknaam van de auditor) en zijn sectorspecialisatie zijn 
mede bepalend voor de hoogte van het ereloon. Risico-factoren en afhankelijkheid van 
subsidies spelen daarentegen nauwelijks een rol.  
In het vierde onderzoek wordt nagegaan of subsidiëring een invloed kan hebben op de 
agency-problemen binnen een non-profit organisatie. Aan de hand van twee soorten 
subsidies wordt empirisch getest of subsidiëring leidt tot een andere verhouding tussen het 
management en de Raad van Bestuur van de organisatie. Hoewel het onderzoek eerder 
exploratief is en de proxy voor de agency-problemen nog verbeterd kan worden, duiden de 
resultaten op de toename van agency-problemen bij de subsidiëring van grote investeringen 
onder de vorm van kapitaalsubsidies. 
Dit proefschrift brengt een nieuwe kijk op diverse aspecten van financiële rapportering door 
non-profit organisaties. Gegeven de Belgische setting waarin subsidies een belangrijke bron 
van inkomsten vormen, werden nieuwe inzichten verworven in de relatie tussen 
overheidssubsidiëring, de boekhouding, financiële rapportering en audit van verenigingen en 
stichtingen.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The legislation on financial accounting and financial reporting for Belgian nonprofit 
organizations changed fundamentally in 2002. To facilitate the switch from the original 
situation – in which the law of 1921 specified nearly any obligations- to the new obligation of 
accrual accounting, public financial reports and external financial audits, a transition period 
of a few years was installed.  Thus, a large number of standardized annual accounts or 
financial statements of nonprofit organizations were made public through the Central 
Balance Sheet Office of the National Bank of Belgium in 2007. The legislative change, the 
social and economic importance of the nonprofit sector and the new and rich set of data 
combined into a rich soil for this doctoral research.  
The annual accounts of nonprofit organizations behold important information for a diverse 
set of stakeholders. Therefore, the quality of the information needs to be guaranteed by 
accounting and reporting standards. In the first study, the ‘formal’ quality of the first annual 
accounts are measured in a compliance index. Using 19 tests, we assess the degree to which 
basic criteria of the ‘Generally Accepted Accounting Principles’ are met. The results show 
that, although the average level of compliance is high, there are some flaws that deserve the 
attention of the reporting organization, the legislator and the accounting professionals. The 
differences in compliance are explained using ‘resource dependence theory’ and – to a 
lesser extent- institutional theory. We conclude that dependence on subsidies and 
dependence on financial debts are linked with higher levels of compliance. The use of an 
external auditor also increases the quality of the financial statements.  
In the second study we assess whether or not nonprofit organizations manage reported 
earnings and if this is influenced by the level of subsidization. Using regression analysis, we 
conclude that profit and loss are managed –to a limited extent- towards zero profit. This 
pattern of earnings management is stronger for heavily subsidized organizations under 
specific circumstances.  
The third study focuses on the external audit of nonprofit financial statements. A model is 
constructed to explain the audit fee. The results show that the complexity of the client is an 
important explanatory factor, consistent with prior research. The size of the auditor (not 
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necessarily the brand name) and his sector specialization help explain the level of the audit 
fee. Risk factors and resource dependence, on the other hand, do not seem to influence 
audit pricing.  
In the final paper, we investigate whether subsidies influence agency problems within 
nonprofit organizations. Using two different types of subsidies, we try to test empirically 
whether subsidies influence the relationship between the management and the board of 
directors of nonprofit organizations. Although the research is exploratory and the proxy for 
the unobservable agency problems might be improved, the results indicate stronger agency 
problems in the case of subsidization of large investments in the form of capital subsidies.  
Overall, this dissertation sheds light on different aspects of nonprofit financial reporting. 
Given the Belgian setting, in which subsidies are an important source of revenue, additional 
insights were gained in the relationship between governmental funding and financial 
accounting, reporting and auditing. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofit accounting, auditing and financial reporting is the focus of this doctoral thesis. At 
the starting point of this research project, Belgian nonprofits underwent a change in 
accounting legislation that provided a unique setting in which research was new, exploratory 
and challenging. In this introduction, we will briefly explain the change in the legislative 
environment, the financial characteristics of the Belgian nonprofits and the research 
questions arising from the combination of both. 
Whereas financial reporting rules and regulations are and have been quite strict for Belgian 
for-profit companies since the introduction of Laws and Royal Decrees in the 70’s and 80’s 
introducing, amongst others, two obligatory standardized reporting formats, the original 
nonprofit legislation of 1921 introduced nearly any accounting and reporting rules.  
This free-of-obligations situation has changed for Belgian nonprofit organizations since the 
introduction of a new Law on 2 May 2002, which changed the original law of 27 June 1921.  
Belgian “large” and “very large” nonprofit organizations1 now have to apply basically the 
same rules as enterprises. This means that they have to use accrual accounting, draw up 
standardized annual accounts (containing balance sheet, income statement and detailed 
notes to the accounts, as well as a social report) and make these annual accounts publicly 
available through the National Bank of Belgium. The public in general, as well as any 
                                                      
1
 Very large nonprofit organizations exceed at least two of the following criteria: (1) balance sheet total of 3.125.000 euro, 
(2) total revenue of 6.250.000 euro, (3) 50 employees expressed ad full-time equivalents. Nonprofit organizations with at 
least 100 full-time equivalent employees are always considered to be very large NFPs. Large NFPs exceed at least 2 of the 
following characteristics: (1) 5 full-time equivalent employees, (2) balance sheet total of 1.000.000 euro, (3) revenues of 
250.000 euro. All other NFP’s are considered to be small. Note that small nonprofit organizations do not have to comply 
with the for-profit rules. For these organisations, there is no obligation for accrual accounting (cash based accounting is still 
sufficient), nor for publication and audit of the annual accounts. 
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governmental department or oversight body, can now easily be informed about the financial 
position of the nonprofit organization.  
Because the original common law (27 June 1921) on nonprofit organizations contained 
nearly any rules on accounting and public reporting, several sector-specific rules have been 
created over time to assure adequate accounting and reporting practices. As a result, about 
75 differing sector-specific regulations can be identified. The new common law 
acknowledges this issue and states in article 27 that nonprofit organizations that are 
submitted to specific laws or governmental regulations on accounting practice are not 
bound by the new common law under the condition that the former are at least equivalent 
to the latter. This concept of equivalence has not contributed to the transparency of the 
obligations for nonprofit organizations. Auditors, accountants and management are 
confronted with a complicated mix of legislations.   
The new common law was not strongly welcomed by the organizations. The original 
transitional measures for existing nonprofits had to be prolonged to give them additional 
time to comply. This means that the first annual accounts according to the new legislation 
have been deposited at the National Bank of Belgium in 2007, after being approved by the 
board of directors and, in the case of very large nonprofit organizations, an external auditor.  
In Belgium, nonprofit organizations have different sources of income. While trading revenue 
and governmental subsidies are the most important sources of revenue for most of the 
nonprofit organizations, donations are – on average- a very modest or even non-existing 
revenue. This is in contrast to the situation in the UK or the US, where most of the earlier 
research on nonprofit accounting has focused on. This dependence on governmental 
subsidies, combined with the legislative changes that have made annual accounts richer on 
information and available to the public, provide a unique setting for empirical accounting 
research.  
The main research questions of this doctoral research are the following: 
• What is the level of quality of the first nonprofit annual accounts and can we explain 
differences in quality? 
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• Do Belgian nonprofits manage their accounting earnings towards zero and is this 
driven by their dependence on subsidies? 
• What are the determinants of nonprofit financial audit fees? Does auditor 
specialization and resource dependence play a role? 
• Are subsidies a source of agency problems? 
These four research questions were addressed in as many papers. The papers can be found 
in chapters 2 to 5.   
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COMPLIANCE WITH REPORTING STANDARDS? 
 
Sandra Verbruggen 
Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel,  research team FAcT 
Stormstraat 2, 1000 Brussels, Belgium 
 
Johan Christiaens 
Ghent University, Department of Accounting and Corporate Finance 
Kuiperskaai 55, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
 
Koen Milis 
Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel 
Stormstraat 2, 1000 Brussels, Belgium 
 
 
 
 
 
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Tom Van Caneghem, Nicolas Marudas, Tom 
Van Puyenbroeck, Erik De Lembre, Tom Groot, Vicente Pina, Christine Van Liedekerke and 
three anonymous reviewers for Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly for their useful 
comments and suggestions. They are also indebted to the participants of the 5th EIASM 
conference, the 12th CIGAR conference and UGent research seminars for helpful comments 
on earlier drafts of the paper. The help of Vinciane Hendrichs and Cecile Buydens at the 
National Bank of Belgium as well as of several master students was invaluable in the process 
of data collection.  
 
  
6 
 
ABSTRACT 
Nonprofit organizations worldwide are confronted with an increasing demand for 
accountability and improved financial transparency. Financial reporting by nonprofit 
organizations is no longer an exception; it has become a rule. The usefulness of a financial 
report to an organization’s stakeholders depends on its quality. The latter is safeguarded by 
reporting standards as well as the commitment of the organization to fully implement these 
standards. Although resource dependence and coercive isomorphism have been used in 
earlier nonprofit research, no empirical research has linked these theories to compliance 
with financial reporting standards. Using a unique setting in which a large number of (very) 
large Belgian nonprofit organizations are confronted with far-reaching changes in financial 
reporting regulations, the effect of resource dependence and coercive isomorphism on 
accounting and financial reporting compliance is documented. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofit organizational behavior has been the subject of extensive research. Quite often, 
resource dependence theory and institutional theory have been used as theoretical 
frameworks to explain several aspects of organizational structure and performance. 
Executive leadership (Heimovics, Herman & Jurkiewicz, 1993), market orientation (Macedo 
& Pinho, 2006) and board involvement  (Hodge & Piccolo, 2005), board size and board 
structure (Stone, Hager & Griffin, 2001) as well as financial vulnerability (Trussel, Greenlee & 
Brady, 2002) have been linked to and explained by dependence of nonprofit organizations 
on external resources. Board strategy (Parker, 2007), knowledge management (Currie & 
Suhomlinova, 2006) and mission endangerment (Dolnicar, Irvine & Lazarevski, 2008) are just 
a few research topics based on institutional theory.  Moreover, both theories have been 
combined to explain differences in strategies between for-profit and nonprofit organizations 
(Schmid, 2001) as well as nonprofit governance (Guo, 2007) and administrative structure 
(Tolbert, 1985). 
To date, little attention has been paid to one aspect of nonprofit behavior: do nonprofit 
organizations comply with financial reporting standards and how might this (non)compliance 
relate to resource dependence and institutionalisation? In this paper, an empirical approach 
is used to measure as well as explain nonprofit organizations’ relative compliance with 
(reformed) financial reporting regulation. Although a Belgian setting is used, the situation is 
similar to other countries in which the nonprofit sector is dealing with an increased call for 
accountability and financial transparency. 
Compliance is necessary to safeguard the quality of financial reports and the usefulness of 
these reports to the stakeholders of the organization who are calling for increased 
accountability (Benjamin, 2008) and improved transparency. In the U.S. for example, one of 
the recommendations of the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector (2005) entails the preparation 
and auditing of financial statements in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) to improve the quality of financial information. Adequate financial 
8 
 
reporting can be an essential element of legitimacy (Meyer, 1983) 2and trustworthiness in a 
growing third sector (Koning Boudewijnstichting, 2008;UN Statistics Division, 2003 ). 
The contribution of this research is twofold. Firstly, the use of resource dependence and 
institutional theory (more specifically coercive isomorphism)  are broadened to an aspect of 
organizational conduct that has not been dealt with before. A contribution is made to 
existing literarure by linking financial reporting compliance to both theories. Secondly, the 
levels of (non-) compliance and their analysis indicate problems and flaws, enabling 
standards setters to provide qualitative standards and/or guidance to the nonprofit sector.  
The remainder of this paper is built up as follows: section 2 gives an overview of previous 
research into financial reporting compliance. The theoretical framework of the research is 
set out in section 3. In section 4 research hypotheses and methodology are explained. The 
empirical framework and data are to be found in section 5, followed by analysis and results 
in section 6. Conclusions and issues for further research end this paper. 
COMPLIANCE WITH ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE REGULATION: PREVIOUS 
RESEARCH  
Defining quality of accounting and financial reporting as well as measuring them has been 
the subject of past research. Given that ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’, financial 
reporting quality can be defined differently for different users, sectors, countries, legislations 
or research agendas. However, two broad methodological approaches can be identified. 
Some authors measure quality of financial reports using one single measure, while others 
capture quality using an index that combines different aspects of disclosure and/or GAAP 
compliance. 
Recent US nonprofit financial reporting research has focused on elements of expense 
misreporting and accruals quality as a ‘single measure’ of quality of financial statements. 
                                                      
2
 Meyer  (1983, p.235) describes accounting structures as myths… The myths are important: they help to hold 
the organisation together with their justifications… legitimate the organisation with the controlling external 
environment. 
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Roberts (2005) and Jones and Roberts (2006) have explored misreporting of expenses of 
joint fundraising and charitable activities. Krishnan, Yetman and Yetman (2006) found 
evidence of understating fundraising and administrative expenses in order to increase 
program expenses and program ratios. Yetman and Yetman (2006) also used accruals quality 
as well as understated fundraising and administrative expenses as a measure of reporting 
quality. Trussel (2003) assessed the likelihood that charitable nonprofit organizations 
manipulate financial information.  In a non-US setting , Jegers and Houtman (1993) based 
their research on the number of logical and arithmetical errors in hospitals’ financial 
statements. 
Using an index to measure compliance with (new) accounting and disclosure standards is a 
time-honoured methodology in public sector accounting research. Ingram and Copeland 
(1981), Ingram (1984), Robbins and Austin (1986) and Allen and Sanders (1994) are examples 
of a first wave of public sector accounting research, focusing on disclosure of financial 
information by public authorities. More recently Krishnan and Schauer (2000) and Pina and 
Torres (2003) employed a similar methodology in nonprofit and international settings.  
Broadening the index from compliance with disclosure requirements to financial reporting 
compliance in general, Christiaens (1999) and Da Costa Carvalho, Camoes, Jorge and 
Fernandez (2007) turned their attention to the implementation of business-like accounting 
principles in the public sector. Their compliance indices include disclosure requirements as 
well as other features related to compliance with newly introduced accounting and reporting 
standards: in addition to elements of disclosure, essential characteristics of financial 
reporting according to accrual accounting are listed.  
In the aforementioned studies both unweighted and weighted indices are used. However, 
Robbins and Austin (1986) and Ingram and DeJong (1987) found no significant differences 
between performance of unweighted and weighted indices.  
Although these studies focus primarily on governmental accounting, the context of changing 
accounting legislation and ‘professionalization’ (Anheier, 2002) are so similar to the current 
modifications in the nonprofit setting that a similar methodology can be considered. The use 
of this methodology allows for a response to two voids in the existing literature. Little 
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research has been performed to provide a general indication of financial accounting and 
reporting compliance of nonprofit organizations (as opposed to single measures of incidental 
or intended misreporting) in the entire third sector (as opposed to a single subsector, quite 
often the health sector). 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper builds on two theories that have been used separately as well as intertwined in 
previous nonprofit research. Oliver (1991), Carpenter and Feroz (2001), Guler, Guillén and 
Macpherson (2002), Greening and Gray (1994) and Guo (2007) have used the convergent 
insights of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and institutional theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to gain insight into several aspects of nonprofit behavior. 
Nonprofit organizations are characterized by their reliance on government funding, private 
donations and fees. This dependence on outside resources makes them vulnerable to both 
changes in the flow of resources and institutional pressures.  
According to resource dependence theorists, organizations are driven to compliance with 
the requirements of strategic resource providers in order to deal with the pressures of 
uncertainty and scarcity in their environment (Froelich, 1999). These resources can be 
material resources (money, human resources), information and social or political support 
(legitimacy). Organizations will survive if they can manage the flow of resources, by 
maintaining autonomy and manage their dependencies on external groups (Hager, 
Galaskiewicz and Larson, 2004; Fernandez, 2008). The degree of dependence increases with 
concentration and importance of the provided resources (Froelich, 1999), which means that 
organizations that depend heavily on one or very few resource providers are likely to 
experience stronger constraining influences from their environment.  
Institutional theory refers to these constraining influences as coercive, mimetic and 
normative isomorphism in order to explain why organizations are driven to similarity. 
Coercive isomorphism stems from pressures on the organization by other organizations on 
which the former depends. Mimetic isomorphism is the process in which organizations deal 
with uncertainty or ambiguity by ‘copying’ other organizations. Normative isomorphism 
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stems from professionalization. Formal education and professional networks lead to the 
spread of insights, models and normative rules. Although all three isomorphic mechanisms 
can influence organizational behavior, the current paper draws largely on coercive 
isomorphism to explain financial reporting compliance. The reasons are threefold. Firstly, 
the new accounting and reporting standards are introduced by the government, identified 
by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as the most direct mechanism of institutional diffusion. 
Secondly, because of the fact that the new legislation has been introduced very recently, 
mimetic and normative isomorphism are likely to follow in a later stage. Lastly, coercive 
isomorphism has been and can be linked to resource dependence in the case of nonprofit 
organizations.  
Coercive isomorphism and resource dependence theory both imply that the choices of an 
organization are limited by external pressures. Resource dependence theory stresses the 
pressures shaped by those who control scarce resources (Oliver, 1991). In the case of 
coercive isomorphism, these pressures stem from the institutional environment that sets 
and enforces the rules. In the case of nonprofit organizations, both loci of power (at least 
partially) coincide, since the government is the institution that sets the rules as well as 
controls important resource flows. Whereas resource dependence focuses on the differing 
strategies of organizations to ensure continuing financing, institutional theory emphasizes 
the fact that organizations tend to adopt similar strategies to ensure their continuation. 
Therefore, resource dependence and institutional theory provide a theoretical background 
to explain nonprofits’ compliance with financial reporting regulation. 
RESEARCH QUESTION, METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION  
Building on resource dependence and coercive isomorphism, this research focuses on 
revealing whether these concepts can provide insight into the efforts made by nonprofit 
organizations to ensure compliance with accounting and financial reporting standards. This 
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leads to the following research question: Can resource dependence and coercive 
isomorphism help us explain the level of compliance with accounting and reporting 
standards in nonprofit organizations? The question comprises two components: measuring 
and explaining the level of compliance.  
The compliance index, presented in Table 2-1, is an instrument to measure compliance with 
new accounting legislation or standards. Characteristics described in Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) as being essential for qualitative financial reporting, are 
embedded in the index. To explain the level of compliance, an empirical setting is used in 
which a large number of nonprofit organizations are confronted with invasive and new 
accounting and reporting legislation. The degree to which these entities are devoted to 
comply with the regulation is essentially the choice of the organizations, since no effective 
monitoring or strict controls are implemented by the government. This unique empirical 
setting allows for testing the effect of resource dependence and institutional theory on 
nonprofit organizational behavior, using regression techniques (similar to e.g. Allen and 
Sanders, 1994; Christiaens, 1999; Giroux and McLelland, 2003). 
 
MEASURING COMPLIANCE: DEFINING A COMPLIANCE INDEX 
In this study, an index is constructed, measuring several aspects of financial reporting 
compliance, based on previous research
3
 (section 2 and appendix). The items in the index 
have not been weighted, since prior research indicated no significant differences in 
performance between weighted and unweighted indices (Robbins and Austin,1986; Ingram 
and DeJong,1987). The index is a quantitative measure of qualitative aspects of financial 
accounting and reporting, referred to in the frameworks of both FASB and IASB (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board and International Accounting Standards Board) as well as in 
several other national accounting regulations. To reach a true and fair view, four 
requirements need to be met: objectivity, quality of information, periodicity and prudence. 
                                                      
3
Reviews on index-based accounting research can be found in Christiaens (1999). 
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These requirements can be achieved using different principles and concepts: accrual basis, 
matching, going concern, consistency, materiality, faithful representation, basis of valuation, 
entity and no offsetting (Stolowy and Lebas, 2006). The index consists of quantifiable 
measures related to these principles and directly observable in financial statements. All 
elements, except for the number of pages, are translated into binary scores. This results in 
an overall score of compliance, ranging from 0 to 19 with a higher score indicating a higher 
degree of compliance. The composition of the index can be found in Table 2-1. In this table, 
references are provided to previous research using the same or similar constructs to 
measure financial reporting compliance.  
Timeliness is tested on the timeframe required by Belgian legislation. Reliability of the 
financial statements depends on the skills of the preparer as well as the approval of an 
unbiased outside professional. Therefore, two checks have been provided: are the financial 
statements approved by an external auditor and has an external accountant4 been involved 
in preparing the statements. Comparability is based on the requirements to provide 
accounting policies and last year’s figures in the financial statements. Relevance relates to 
the level of detail of the financial statements. Completeness is based on testing three 
disclosure requirements as well as evidence of full application of accrual accounting. The 
principles of matching, entity, classification and mechanical accuracy all test the 
meticulousness of switching from cash accounting to accrual accounting. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
4
 There is no information available on the accounting skills (education, training) of internal staff. If the 
organization uses the services of an external accountant, his/her name can be mentioned on the financial 
statements. This ensures the user of the statements of the involvement of a professional. 
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Principle Measure   
Timeliness 
(periodicity) 
Timely approval by 
the board 
 
According to Belgian law, financial statements 
need to be approved within 6 months after the 
end of the accounting period. Both dates are 
available in the financial statements. 
Within 6 months = 1, Later = 0 
Christiaens (1999); 
Owusu-Ansah &  
Leventis (2006); 
Dixon et al. (1991) 
Timely handover 
at the National 
Bank of Belgium 
 
According to Belgian law, financial statements 
need to be made public (= handed over to the 
National Bank) within 30 days after the approval 
by the board. Both dates are available in the 
financial statements. 
Within 30 days = 1, Later = 0 
 
Made public 
within 7 months 
after end of 
accounting year 
 
If previous measures are interpreted less strictly, 
the financial statements need to be made public 
within 7 months after the end of the accounting 
period.  
(E.g. 4 months for approval by the board + 2 
months for publication  score 1 on first 
measure, 0 on second measure and 1 on this 
measure.) 
Within 7 months = 1, Later = 0 
 
Reliability 
(quality of 
information) 
Approval by an 
external auditor 
An unqualified audit report is considered to be a 
clear sign of reliability (faithful representation) 
and is coded as 1. All other reports (qualified, 
adverse, disclaimer) are scored 0. 
Krishnan & Schauer 
(2000); Robbins & 
Austin(1986); Giroux & 
McLelland (2003) 
Use of an external 
accountant 
Since nonprofit organizations have never before 
been obliged to use accrual accounting 
techniques and may not have skilled staff, the 
use of an accountant is an attempt to increase 
reliability of financial statements. 
Yes= 1, No = 0 
Giroux and McLelland 
(2003) assess certificate 
of achievement 
Comparability 
(consistency) 
Balance sheet of 
previous year 
reported 
Legislative requirement 
Yes= 1, No= 0 
Krishnan & Schauer 
(2000); Ingram & 
Copeland (1981); 
Christiaens (1999), Pina 
and Torres (2003) 
Disclosure of 
accounting policies 
Legislative requirement 
Yes= 1, No = 0 
 
Relevance 
(materiality) 
Complete scheme 
used necessarily or 
voluntarily 
according to legal 
criteria 
 
Legal criteria (total assets, total revenues and 
number of personnel) were used to assess 
whether the nonprofit organization uses the 
complete scheme of financial statements 
voluntarily (1) or is obliged to (0). If the scheme is 
used voluntarily, the organization is willing to 
provide far more detailed financial statements 
than required by law. 
Krishnan & Schauer 
(2000) 
Number of pages Is an indicator of the quantity of the information 
provided by the nonprofit organization. The 
percentiles of the number of pages are used to 
award a score of 0 (organizations ranked in the 
lowest 20%), 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 or 1 (highest 20%) 
Dixon et al. (1991) 
Euro or thousands 
of euro: 
mentioned 
correctly on first 
page? 
Financial statements are either in euro or in 
thousands of euro and this is mentioned on the 
first page. This has been checked using the 
statements of the next year as well as the 
auditors’ report. Correct = 1, Incorrect = 0 
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Completeness 
(accrual basis and 
quality of 
information) 
‘Typical’ in accrual 
accounting is the 
presence of 
debtors and 
creditors 
 
If all debtors and creditors are zero, then this 
item is scored 0. If at least one debtor or creditor 
is different from zero, this item is scored 1. 
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Ingram (1984); Da 
Costa Carvalho et al. 
(2007), Pina &Torres 
(2003) 
Disclosure of 
social report  
 
Legal requirement if the number of staff exceeds 
20. 
(not)Required and disclosed = 1 
Required and not disclosed = 0 
Not required and not disclosed = 1 
 
Disclosure of audit 
report 
Legal requirement if an external auditor has been 
appointed. 
Same coding as the social report 
Krishnan & Schauer 
(2000); Giroux & 
McLelland (2003) 
Is there qualitative 
information about 
provisions in the 
notes 
 
Whether or not this information is provided is at 
the discretion of the organization. 
Yes= 1 
No = 0 
No but no provisions in balance sheet = 1 
Christiaens (1999), Da 
Costa Carvalho et al. 
(2007) 
Matching 
 
Presence of 
accrued/deferred 
charges/income in 
balance sheet 
These accounts are considered to be a typical 
characteristic of accrual accounting. 
Yes=1 
No = 0 
Christiaens (1999), Da 
Costa Carvalho et al. 
(2007) 
Entity 
 
Presence of ‘Funds 
of the 
organization’ in 
the balance sheet 
(comparable to 
‘capital’) 
 
Switching from cash accounting to double entry 
accounting requires valuation of the assets, 
liabilities and as a result also the ‘funds of the 
organization’. 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
 
Classification 
(accrual 
accounting, no 
offsetting) 
Sign of debtors, 
creditors, cash and 
cash equivalent 
has to be positive. 
 
Correctness of accounting data in the balance 
sheet according to Belgian GAAP. 
Yes = correct = 1 
No = incorrect = 0 
Christiaens (1999), 
Ingram & Copeland 
(1981) 
Presence of 
retained profit OR 
retained loss (not 
both) 
 
Correctness of accounting data in the balance 
sheet according to Belgian GAAP 
Yes = correct = 1 
No = incorrect = 0 
 
Mechanical 
accuracy 
(quality of 
information) 
Twenty tests on 
logical and 
arithmetical errors 
are conducted 
 
Testing of totals and subtotals in balance sheet 
and income statement; match between 
information in the notes, the balance sheet and 
the income statement. 
No errors = 1 
At least one error = 0 
Christiaens (1999), 
Jegers & Houtman 
(1993); Weets & Jegers 
(2000) 
TABLE 2-1. COMPOSITION OF THE COMPLIANCE INDEX 
 
EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: DEFINING HYPOTHESES 
Using resource dependence theory and coercive isomorphism, we hypothesize that 
organizations which depend heavily on government funding will be more willing to make the 
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necessary efforts to comply with new rules and make sure that their financial reporting is up 
to a high standard. If nonprofit organizations believe that the flow of governmental funds is 
conditional on conformity with the new accounting regulations, this is a form of pressure on 
the organizations to comply and adjust their structure and activities to be able to do so. 
H1. The level of compliance will be higher when nonprofit organizations are depending 
more heavily on governmental resources.  
Nonprofit organizations can be financed by financial debts. Given their nonprofit 
characteristics, these organizations often attempt to negotiate below-market interest rates. 
In order to obtain financial loans (and particularly at beneficial conditions), organizations 
have to be able to present reliable financial information.  Financial institutions are 
professional users of financial statements. They have the knowledge, the ability, the 
experience as well as the custom to scrutinize financial statements before making 
investment decisions. Leverage has been used in previous research, for example by Robbins 
and Austin for governments (1986), by Jegers and Houtman for hospitals (1993) as well as by 
Yetman and Yetman for nonprofit organizations (2006). 
H2. The level of compliance will be higher when nonprofit organizations are depending 
more heavily on debt-financing by financial institutions.  
Previous research has resulted in mixed evidence on the effect of financial information on 
private donations to nonprofit organizations. The effect of efficiency ratios on donor 
decisions has been studied by several authors. Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) as well as 
Posnett and Sandler (1989) document the effect of ‘price’ (low price is high efficiency) on 
donations. They assume donors use an accounting ratio out of the latest available financial 
statements to judge the organization’s efficiency. Tinkelman (1998) concludes that 
accounting/efficiency ratios affect the contribution decision of large donors, not of small 
individual donors. He argues that in the case of small donors, ‘gifts may often be made on 
impulse, or after a very cursory decision process’ (p. 379).  Parsons (2007) focuses on 
summarized financial accounting information and concludes that some donors are more 
likely to respond positively to a fundraising campaign when favorable financial accounting 
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information is provided. Overall, the proof of usefulness of financial information to donors 
and their decision making process is not overwhelming. 
Building on resource dependence, a positive relationship between the importance of public 
donations and the willingness of nonprofits to comply with financial accounting and 
reporting standards can be expected. In the research by Schokkaert and Van Ootegem (1998, 
p. 23) for example, Flemish donors indicated in a survey that the following statements are 
important when making a donation decision: ‘organizations need to provide feed-back on 
what they accomplished with the money they raised’ and ‘I would like to know exactly what 
happened with the money they raised’. However, even within the confines of resource 
dependence, there are reasons why such as relationship might be absent in this case. In this 
paper’s empirical setting the private donors are confronted with ‘raw’ (i.e. no efficiency 
ratios or graphical and summarized information, just balance sheet and income statement) 
accounting information for the very first time. The probability that potential donors will use 
this rather complex information to decide on donations, will be lower than in cases where 
ready-to-use information is provided to them. Furthermore, these financial statements lack 
information on the programs provided by the organization and merely contain financial 
information.  
Although we suspect a resource dependence relationship, it is hypothesized that compliance 
with financial reporting standards is not important to organizations that rely on private 
donations due to the fact that the public in general needs different information. The 
hypothesis is therefore formulated as follows:  
H3. The level of compliance will not be higher when nonprofit organizations are depending 
more heavily on financing by donations of the public in general. 
We hypothesize that external audits are a form of coercive isomorphism. When financial 
statements are required to be audited by an external, professional audit firm, the 
government enforces compliance with their new accounting regulation. In its final report to 
the U.S. Congress in June 2005 the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector (2005) stated that ‘having 
financial statements prepared and audited in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles and auditing standards improves the quality of financial information 
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available to governing boards, government officials, and the public (p.5)’ Although it may 
seem obvious that external auditing increases the level of quality of financial reporting, this 
is not necessarily the case. Although an external auditor needs to assure that the content of 
the financial statements gives a true and fair view of the organization’s financial status and 
result, it is still the board of directors who is responsible for the financial statement that is 
made public. We do not only test the quality of the content of the report (such as the entity 
principle, the use of accrual accounting) which is checked by the auditor. We also assess 
formal aspects of compliance such as timeliness, disclosure of financial policies, disclosure of 
the social report and audit report, which probably are not influenced by the auditor. 
H4. The level of compliance will be higher when nonprofit organizations’ financial 
statements  are subject to an external audit. 
In addition to the resource dependence and coercive isomorphism explanation, three 
control variables concerning ‘professionalism’ are taken up in the study. This is primarily 
based on previous research (Jegers & Houtman, 1993; Christiaens, 1999; Giroux and 
McLelland, 2003; Da Costa Carvalho et al, 2007) and adds ‘being able to’ comply to the 
hypotheses of ‘being forced into’ compliance.  
Firstly, most studies take the size of the company, government or organization into account, 
hypothesizing that compliance is positively associated with size. It can be suggested that 
large organizations have the necessary resources in terms of finance, knowledge and 
experience to ensure qualitative financial reporting. Size can be measured in different ways: 
total assets (or the natural logarithm of total assets), total revenue (Krishnan & Schauer, 
2000) or staff number (Da Costa Carvalho et al., 2007).  
Next to the size of the individual organization, the size of the ‘group’ to which the 
organization belongs can be of importance. In some cases, nonprofit organizations have the 
same address, share the same board members or have connected administrative, financial, 
logistic or human resources services, although they are legally separate organizations. When 
this is the case, organizations are called ‘affiliated organizations’ (mentioned in the financial 
statements). When organizations work closely together, the size of the individual legal 
entities may be less important to explain compliance than the scale of the group.  
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Secondly, since the board has to approve the financial statements before they are made 
public, the knowledge and experience of the members on ‘doing business’ and on financial 
reporting may be crucial to the quality of the reports. A more professional or experienced 
board may also have impact on the attitude towards financial reporting obligations and the 
consequences of below-standard financial administration, decision-making and reporting. 
This level of professionalism is proxied by the fact that the board holds at least one 
‘institutional’ member (i.e. another organization or company). It is expected that size (of the 
organization and of the group) as well as ‘professional’ board members will have a positive 
effect on compliance levels.  
 
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
BACKGROUND  
Recent changes in the Belgian accounting regulation for nonprofit organizations provide a 
unique setting for compliance research. Whereas financial reporting rules and regulations 
have been reformed and harmonized quite strictly for Belgian for-profit companies since the 
late 70’s, the original Nonprofit legislation of 1921 introduced less specified and only general 
accounting and reporting rules. Only in specific circumstances nonprofit organizations were 
obligated to disclose financial reports. This free-of-obligations situation has changed 
significantly for Belgian nonprofits since the introduction of a new Law on 2 May 2002 
(Belgisch Staatsblad). The situation evolved from a heterogeneous and rather unclear 
regulation to the obligation to use accrual accounting, draw up standardized financial 
statements and make them publicly available. The public in general, as well as any bank, 
sponsor, governmental department or oversight body, can now be informed about the 
financial position of nonprofit organizations.  
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Compliance is basically a choice and a responsibility of the organization. Financial statements 
are only subject to mandatory external audit in the case of very large organizations and 
governmental oversight is limited to the mere fact that financial statements are made 
public. There is no assessment of their quality. Therefore, the efforts made to comply are at 
the discretion of the organization.  
The financial statements are publicly available in a PDF-format. To be useful for statistical 
analysis, the relevant information was keyed into statistical software (manually). Because of 
possible input-problems that might have an influence on the element of accuracy, several 
checks were performed, covering all items of all non-compliant cases. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
At the end of August 2007, two months after the official deadline to deposit the financial 
statements at the National Bank, 943 full scheme nonprofit financial statements were 
available. 
5
The variance in size of the organizations that filed a full scheme of financial 
statements is immense. Balance sheet totals range from 65 thousand euro to over 1 billion 
euro. The number of employees varies from zero to over 8000.  
For a small number of organizations it was not clear whether the statements were in euro or 
thousands of euros.
6
 The one percent highest and one percent lowest balance sheet totals 
and revenue amounts were omitted from the study. This was also the case for the one 
percent highest number of staff (not one percent lowest, since a large number of 
organizations reports no staff at all) since analysis revealed probable errors in the data. 
                                                      
5 There are two schemes of standardized financial statements: the abbreviated scheme (obligatory for large 
nonprofit organizations, voluntary for small nonprofit organizations) and the full scheme (obligatory for very 
large nonprofit organizations, voluntary for large and small nonprofit organizations. Only the full scheme of 
statements contains the necessary data to calculate the independent variables. At the time of data collection, 
the following  numbers of financial statements were available: 943 full scheme statements, 3083 abbreviated 
and 516 unstandardized schemes were available. After winsorizing the dataset of full schemes, 565 
organizations are very large, 330 are large and 30 were either small or did not report the necessary data to 
determine the size of the organization. 
6
 Checks have been performed using 2006 audit reports and 2007 financial statements. 
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Furthermore, small organizations (i.e. not meeting the legal criteria for (very) large 
organizations) were omitted from the analysis. This decreases the number of cases from 943 
to 895 (very) large organizations.  
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS : LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE 
An index was developed to test whether or not basic GAAP are applied by the nonprofit 
organization and whether or not disclosure is at a level that ensures usefulness of the 
financial statements. As discussed earlier, the index consists of 19 tests to assess the level of 
timeliness, reliability, comparability, relevance, completeness, entity, matching, classification 
and mechanical accuracy of the accounting and financial reporting process. 
 N° of items 
tested 
Min/max 
score for the 
item 
Mean Median 
Timeliness 3 1 / 3 2.60 3 
Reliability 2 0 / 2 0.78 1 
Comparability 2 0 / 2 1.51 2 
Relevance 3 0 / 3 1.88 2 
Completeness 4 1 / 4 3.50 4 
Matching 1 0 / 1 0.93 1 
Entity 1 0 / 1 0.72 1 
Classification 2 1 / 2 1.99 2 
Mechanical accuracy 1 0 / 1 0.67 1 
TABLE 2-2. SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF THE COMPLIANCE INDEX  
Table 2-2 summarizes the results on each part of the index. For every item, the numbers of 
tests as well as the minimal, maximal, mean and median scores are presented. The spread of 
scores is for most tests equal to the number of tests, indicating that there are organizations 
that do not comply with any of the items as well as organizations that are fully compliant. It 
can be noted that reliability and relevance are the only two principles for which more than 
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half of the organizations do not meet all of the criteria. Other principles such as 
classification, matching and completeness result in a better score. 
Item Percentage with score 0 Percentage with score 1 
Timeliness Time1 1.5 98.5 
 Time2 34.2 65.8 
 Time3 4.0 96.0 
Reliability Reliab1 30.9 69.1 
 Reliab2 91.2 8.8 
Comparability Compa1 9.7 90.3 
 Compa2 39.0 61.0 
Relevance Relev1 63.1 36.9 
 Relev2 n/a n/a 
 Relev3 3.5 96.5 
Completeness Compl1 1.6 98.4 
 Compl2 0.8 99.2 
 Compl3 12.0 88.0 
 Compl4 35.3 64.7 
Matching Match 7.2 92.8 
Entity Entity 27.7 72.3 
Classification Class1 0.6 99.4 
 Class2 0.9 99.1 
Mechanical acc. Acc1 32.6 67.4 
TABLE 2-3. DETAILS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMPLIANCE INDEX 
A more detailed analysis of the compliance index is put forward in Table 2-3. It can be noted 
that almost 40 percent of financial statements do not contain information on accounting 
procedures or accounting policies. About the same percentage (35 percent) does not 
disclose the reasons for provisions, when these appear on the balance sheet. Also very 
remarkable is the fact that nearly 28 percent of or
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organization’ (comparable to equity funding in companies). A possible explanation is the fact 
that none of the different sector-specific regulations, in place before the new common law 
regulations, demanded such information to be disclosed (Christiaens, Vanhee, Verbruggen & 
Milis, 2008). Almost one out of three financial statements has not been audited or has a 
qualified opinion/disclaimer. In an assessment of reliability, this comes down to the 
conclusion that doubts can be expressed on the reliability of the financial statements. The 
item of ‘mechanical accuracy’ consists of 20 tests aiming to assess the logical and 
arithmetical coherence of the financial statements. A score of 1 indicates that the 
organization complies with all accuracy tests, whereas financial statements containing at 
least 1 logical or arithmetical error were scored zero. The results in Table 2-3 indicate that 
one out of three financial statements contains at least 1 ‘mechanical’ error. 
 
FIGURE 2-1. GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF COMPLIANCE INDEX SCORES 
The overall compliance index score (Figure 2-1) ranges from 8.75 to 18.5 (note that the 
maximum score is 19), with a median of 14.75, a mean of 14.59 and resembles a normal 
distribution. The average adequacy of financial statements is rather high, but there is quite 
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important variance in the level of compliance with the different elements of the index (cf. 
supra).  
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS: EXPLAINING THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE 
 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Ordinary least squares regression is used to explain the level of compliance with accounting 
and financial reporting requirements. The dependent variable (the score on the compliance 
index) is explained by the variables described below and put forward in the hypotheses in 
section 4. The full model is specified as follows: 
Compliance index = β0 + β1 SUBS + β2 DEBTS + β3 PUBLIC + β4 AUDIT + β5 SIZE + β6 GROUP 
+β7 BOARD + ε 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
To test the hypotheses related to resource dependence and coercive isomorphism, three 
variables are defined: dependence on governmental resources (subsidies as a percentage of 
total revenue: SUBS); dependence on financial loans (financial debts as a percentage of total 
assets: DEBTS) and the dependence on donations by the public (donations as a percentage 
of total revenue: PUBLIC). The impact of audit (hypothesis four) is measured by the 
presence/absence of an external auditor (AUDIT). To control for the effects of size, two 
variables are introduced in the model: SIZE represents the natural logarithm of revenue of 
the organization (Krishnan & Schauer, 2000); GROUP is the number of affiliated 
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organizations7 and is a proxy for the size-effect of the group. Whether or not there are 
institutional members of the board (companies, governmental institutions) is represented by 
the variable BOARD.8 All variables are computed using financial statement data that are 
publicly available. 
 Variable   Mean Median St.dev. Min/ 
Max 
%  
of 
0/1 
Expect. 
H1 Dependence 
subsidies 
SUBS Subsidies/total 
revenue (%) 
40.6 23.0 38.8 0.0 / 
100.0 
 + 
H2 dependence 
financial 
debts  
DEBTS Financial 
debts/total 
assets (%) 
15.5 4.7 21.2 0.0 / 
130.0 
 + 
H3 Dependence 
donations   
PUBLIC Donations/total 
revenue (%) 
17.0 0.0 37.6 0.0/  
100.0 
 0 
H4 Use of 
auditor 
AUDIT No (0), Yes (1)     17.3 / 
82.7 
+ 
 Size of the 
organization 
SIZE LN(total 
revenue) 
15.5 15.5 1.1 12.5 / 
19.3 
 + 
 Group size GROUP Number of 
related 
organizations 
7
 
1.6 0.0 3.2 0.0 /  
21.0 
 + 
 Institutional 
members on 
the board  
BOARD Presence of 
organizations 
/corporations in 
the board (No=0, 
Yes=1) 
    96.2 / 
3.8 
+ 
TABLE 2-4.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND EXPECTED CORRELATION WITH 
COMPLIANCE LEVEL 
Table 2-4 summarizes the characteristics of the independent variables as well as their 
expected correlation with the compliance index. Nonprofit organizations rely more heavily 
on the government as a source of financing than on private donations (on average 40 
                                                      
7
 Affiliated organizations are legal entities (for-profit as well as nonprofit) that are tied to the organization in 
one of the following ways: ownership, same address, connected administrative/financial/logistic/human 
resources services. The names of these organizations are listed in the financial statements. 
8
 The names of board members are listed in the financial statements.  
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percent versus 17 percent of total revenue). On average, 15.5 percent of total assets is 
financed by financial loans. More than 80 percent of financial statements have been audited 
by an external auditor. The average size of a group of organizations is 2.6 (i.e. the 
organization itself + 1.6 others), but this can increase up to 22 entities. In only 3.8 percent of 
cases, another organization/corporation is represented in the board. It is expected that all of 
the variables have a positive relationship with the degree of compliance. However, doubts 
can be expressed on the usefulness of financial statements for individual donors. If the 
statements are not read by donors, there is no pressing necessity for organizations to file 
compliant financial statements. 
 
CORRELATIONS AND REGRESSION RESULTS   
Pearson correlation coefficients are shown in Table 2-5. All pair wise correlations (including 
Spearman rho, which are not tabulated) are below 0.5, indicating that problems of multi-
collinearity are not likely to occur. All correlations between the compliance index and the 
main as well as control variables are positive, as expected. 
 Index Subs Debts Public Audit Size Group Board 
Index 1        
subs .138** 1       
debts .172** .165** 1      
Public .101**  .084* .111** 1     
Audit .349** -.066 .119**  .034 1    
Size .150** -.069* -.028  .010 .446** 1   
Group .228** -.117** -.076*  .103** .191** .116** 1  
Board .116** -.086** -.053  .004 .045 .049 .081* 1 
TABLE 2-5. PEARSON CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND COMPLIANCE INDEX  
(SIGNIFICANCE AT .01 (**) AND .05 (*) LEVEL, 2-TAILED) 
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Table 2-6 summarizes the results of the linear models designed to explain the level of 
compliance with accounting and reporting legislation. In the first four models, each 
hypothesis is tested separately, adding the control variables. Each of the main variables 
(SUBS, DEBT, PUBLIC and AUDIT) is significant in explaining the variance in the compliance 
index. In all models, except for the one where audit is taken into account, the control 
variables are all significant. Once AUDIT is taken up in the model, SIZE is no longer 
significant.  
The full model is listed in the last column (coefficients as well as standardized coefficients). It 
can be noticed that the effect of public donations is no longer significant, nor is the size of 
the individual organization when the other variables are introduced. The remaining five 
explanatory variables are significant (in the hypothesized direction). The F-value of the full 
model is significant at p<0.001, indicating that the model is well-specified. The adjusted R² of 
0.201 (R² is 0.207) is satisfactory. None of the multi-collinearity tests reveal problems. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Standardized 
Coeff. 
H1. SUBS 0.008 ***    0.008 *** .183 *** 
H2. DEBT  1.354 ***   0.727 ** .097 ** 
H3. PUBLIC   0.300 **  0.186  .043 
H4. AUDIT    1.416 *** 1.337 *** .307 *** 
Size (ln of 
revenue) 
0.197 *** 0.187 *** 0.192 *** -0.008 0.000 .000 
Group 0.118 *** 0.113 *** 0.103 *** 0.083 *** 0.097 *** .186 *** 
Board 0.931 ** 0.886 ** 0.811 ** 0.788 ** 0.948 *** .116 *** 
Constant 11.084 *** 11.341 *** 11.45 *** 13.47 *** 12.92 ***  
R² adj. 10.8 % 10.4 % 7.8 % 15.7 % 20.1 % 20.1% 
N 737 738 739 739 736 736 
TABLE 2-6. LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS  
(where p<0.05 is *, p< 0.01 is ** and p<0.001 is ***) 
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The full model confirms all four hypotheses, underlining the presence and importance of 
coercive isomorphism and resource dependence. The results indicate that organizations 
which are highly dependent on governmental subsidies are presenting more adequate 
financial reports. The coefficient of the subsidies variable is positive (with p < 0.001) in all 
reported models. This is fully in line with the first hypothesis and documents the influence of 
dependence on the government on financial reporting compliance. 
The findings also show that the presence of financial debts is significant in explaining the 
level of compliance in all models. Nonprofit organizations that depend on financial debts are 
more inclined to comply with accounting and reporting standards. This confirms the second 
hypothesis that, due to dependence on financial institutions that scrutinize financial reports, 
organizations are driven to a high level of financial reporting compliance.  
Dependence on public donations is not significant in explaining the level of compliance in the 
full linear model. This is in line with hypothesis 3 but contradictory to some of the previous 
literature on the effect of financial information on donations.  
As hypothesized (H4), audited financial statements display significantly higher levels of 
compliance. This validates the idea of coercive isomorphism having an influence on the 
willingness of nonprofit organizations to comply with new accounting legislation.  
The average level of reporting adequacy is higher for nonprofit organizations that are part of 
a larger group. Note that the size of the organization itself is not significant.  
Having institutional members on the board of directors has a positive influence on reporting 
adequacy. This control variable was introduced as a measure of ‘professionalism’ of the 
organizations. This result is similar to the conclusions of Christiaens’ study on public sector 
accounting reform (1999).  
Overall, the statistical analysis of the data demonstrates that dependence on governmental 
resources and financial loans urges the organizations to assure the quality of their financial 
reports. Dependence on donations from the public at large does not seem to have the same 
influence. 
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ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Although the use of indices is a longstanding tradition in compliance and disclosure research, 
a one-fits-all index has not yet been developed. So far, different indices have been used to 
effectively mirror the research question and empirical setting. To circumvent this issue, 
elements of earlier indices have been combined. To make sure that the construction of the 
index does not influence the conclusions on the main hypotheses built around resource 
dependence, several robustness checks have been performed resulting in the same 
conclusions on all hypotheses.  
Since audit is part of the compliance index as well as one of the explanatory variables, a 
robustness test has been performed on an index that excluded the audit-test. Audit is still a 
significant and positive explanatory factor. Although audit is part of the original index as well 
as an independent variable, it must be stressed that different concepts were used. In the 
index two items were tested: 1) is the statement approved by an auditor and 2) is the audit 
report attached to the statement. These are elements of reliability and completeness. There 
is no one-on-one match with the independent variable: was an external auditor involved. 
When this is the case, the audit-tests in the index can be zero, one or two. 
The combination of tests included in the index has been changed, omitting tests with an 
‘administrative’ nature (such as mechanical accuracy or euro versus thousands of euro). The 
index was limited to 12 and 15 tests. None of the combinations gave rise to different 
conclusions regarding the hypotheses. We also ran regression tests on the separate items in 
the compliance index. Hypothesis 1 was confirmed in 5 tests (reliability, relevance, 
completeness, entity and accuracy). Hypothesis 2 was confirmed for reliability, 
comparability, relevance and entity. Audit was a significant factor in reliability, comparability 
and matching. The fact that audit was not a significant factor in all separate regressions 
shows that hypothesis 4 is not an obvious statement or tautology.  
A robustness test has also been performed on the measure for dependence on public 
donations. Instead of a continuous variable, dummy variables have been used taking 5 
percent, 20 percent and 50 percent of donations in total revenue as cut-off points. This 
30 
 
analysis is inspired by the distribution of the factor ‘PUBLIC’ (over half of the organizations 
do not receive donations). In neither case, the results for donations changed. Also, size has 
been proxied by total assets, total revenue and total expenses. All variables lead to the same 
conclusions on the effect of size. Lastly, building on previous research, measures of financial 
distress (Chang and Tuckman, 1991) (operating margin, presence of accumulated losses and 
resource concentration index) were added to the linear model. Neither of these measures 
was significant in explaining the level of compliance. 
CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study uses resource dependence theory and the concept of coercive isomorphism (as a 
part of institutional theory) to explain nonprofit organizations’ compliance with accounting 
and reporting standards.  
Nonprofit organizations depend on outside sources of funding to assure their survival. The 
choices and conduct of the organization are bound by the pressure to ensure legitimacy and 
financial or material support. Accounting and reporting compliance can be analyzed as a 
mean to safeguard the flow of resources to the organization. When organizations are 
convinced that governmental subsidies, public donations or financial loans are linked with or 
depend upon financial reporting compliance, they will make the necessary efforts to ensure 
that compliance. The government is an important source of funding as well as the enforcer 
of the rules. In the latter role, they can ‘coerce’ compliance by obligations such as external 
audits of financial statements. 
An empirical approach is applied to measure and explain financial reporting compliance in a 
setting in which an important number of Belgian (very) large nonprofit organizations are 
confronted with far-reaching legislative changes. With no or very little external and 
governmental control over financial statements’ quality, the degree of compliance with the 
newly introduced regulations is essentially at the discretion of the organizations.  
It is hypothesized and empirically confirmed that organizations that rely on governmental 
resources and financial loans are more strongly inclined to comply. This is completely in line 
with resource dependence theory.  
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Dependence on donations from the public is not significantly influencing reporting 
compliance. This may be due to a lack of interest in financial information by private donors. 
Previous research shows mixed results on that matter. Early research by Weisbrod and 
Dominguez (1986) and Posnett and Sandler (1989) provides evidence that donors use 
accounting ratios to judge organizational efficiency and decide on whether or not to make a 
contribution. These results were fine-tuned by Tinkelman (1998), who argues that 
accounting ratios are useful to large donors, not to small individual donors. A recent study by 
Parsons indicates that ‘some donors’ make use of summarized financial accounting 
information. The current result may be explained by the fact that the Belgian public is not 
yet used to nonprofit financial statements as well as to the fact that these are ‘raw’ 
accounting data which are not presented in easy-to-understand efficiency ratios.  
In general, the hypotheses built on resource dependence hold. This is also the case for the 
coercive isomorphism hypothesis: external audit of financial statements positively influences 
the level of compliance with new financial reporting standards. However, we need to 
address the limitation of our measure of coercive isomorphism. The variable AUDIT does not 
only capture organizations that are obligated to have their financial statements audited, but 
also organizations that voluntarily hire an external auditor. We are not able to distinguish 
coerced audit (through the new common law or through pre-existing sectoral legislation) 
from voluntary audit. In that sense, the variable AUDIT may not only capture coercive 
isomorphism, but also resource dependence or even other forms of isomorphism. The 
theoretical difference between the two lies in the fact that coercive isomorphism explains 
why organizations are similar whereas resource dependence explains why organizations 
maintain different strategies (in this case voluntary audit to be more compliant) in order to 
preserve funding. 
Our results lead to issues that need to be addressed in the near future. Firstly, only (very) 
large Belgian organizations filing a full scheme of financial statements have been analyzed. 
This means that the index can also be applied to the extensive dataset of large nonprofits 
filing an abbreviated scheme, which can then be compared to measure the effects of 
differences in size, financial strength and staff.  Secondly, further research might reveal 
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whether or not the form of presenting financial data might be influencing the effect on 
donation decisions. Does the donor react the same way to ‘raw’ accounting data (balance 
sheet, income statement) as he/she does to easy to understand efficiency ratios? The same 
argument can be made for ‘culture’ as an explanatory variable. Most research on donations 
has been performed in the U.S. and the U.K., where the attitude towards the nonprofit 
sector and donations as well as the involvement of the government in the sector might be 
different from countries such as Belgium. Thirdly, the effect of audit as such has been 
documented in this research. However, no specification has been made on audit fee, audit 
quality or industry specialization. Finally, since the changes in accounting legislation are very 
recent, no empirical evidence can be found on two other aspects of isomorphism. In the 
future, normative as well as mimetic isomorphism may start to play an important role in 
explaining financial reporting compliance. 
Despite the limitations, this study offers a contribution to the existing literature in two ways. 
Firstly, resource dependence and institutional theory have been proven important in an area 
of organizational conduct that has not been studied before. Although both theories have 
been used to explain different aspects of organizational conduct and management, such as 
several characteristics of the board (Heimovics et al., 1993; Hodge and Piccolo, 2005; Parker, 
2007), governance (Guo, 2007), strategy (Schmid, 2001), financial vulnerability (Hager et al., 
2004), no studies were found explaining financial accounting and reporting compliance. 
Secondly, the use of an index as a measure of financial reporting compliance is introduced in 
the nonprofit setting, providing a more general indication of financial accounting and 
reporting compliance (as opposed to a single measure of incidental or intended 
misreporting) that can be applied in the entire third sector (as opposed to specific 
subsectors such as health). Financial reporting quality is a major concern in the quest for 
increased accountability and therefore worth measuring.  
Moreover, this study enables standard setters to analyze flaws and provide qualitative 
standards and/or guidance to the nonprofit sector. The use of the index has made it 
abundantly clear that an important number of financial statements lack quality. The details 
of the index can guide standard setters, professional accountants, managers and staff of 
33 
 
organizations to avoid quality issues in the future. Furthermore, the findings also indicate 
that current financial statements are not useful to donors. Follow-up research can look into 
the type of information that is needed for donors –if any-  in order to support their donation 
decision. Given the growing importance of the third sector and the ever-increasing call for 
financial accountability and transparency, the quality of financial statements has to be 
monitored, nurtured and controlled. 
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1981 Ingram & 
Copeland 
 x 17 UW Public sector -
municipalities 
(US) 
Identification of main areas of noncompliance (index), causes (questionnaire) 
and potential corrective actions. 
1984 Ingram  x 8 / 12 UW Public sector – 
states (US) 
Mapping the extent to which states follow accounting practices and report on 
them. 
Explain the level of compliance: urbanization (+), political competition (+), 
newspaper circulation (-), auditor (+) 
1986 Robbins & 
Austin 
 x 27 W and UW Public sector – 
cities (US) 
Identification of the extent of disclosure. 
Explaining the level of disclosure: city government form (-), long-term debt per 
capita (+) and intergovernmental revenue (-). 
No significant difference in the explanatory power of both indices (W versus 
UW). 
1991 Dixon et al.  x 52 UW Universities Identification of reporting practices (financial + non-financial) 
1993 Jegers & 
Houtman 
x x  UW Nonprofit 
sector - 
hospitals 
Number of numerical and logical errors in hospitals’ financial statements. Size 
increases compliance. 
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1999 Christiaens x x 66 UW Public sector – 
Municipalities 
(Belgium) 
Identification of cross-sectional differences in compliance with new accounting 
regulation. Experience, consultants’ support, level of education, training of the 
employee and size of the municipality are positively related to compliance. 
2000 Krishnan & 
Schauer 
 x 8 UW Nonprofit 
Sector 
(US(health and 
welfare) 
 
The score on the compliance index is used as an audit quality measure.  
1) Reporting by the organizations is inconsistent. 
2) Size of the audit firm (+), client size (+), financial health (+), client wealth (-) 
and participation in a peer-review process (+) impact audit quality. 
2000 Weets & 
Jegers 
x  216 UW Private sector- 
Belgium 
The index consists of 216 tests for mechanical accuracy. Compliance increases 
with the size of the auditor. 
2003 Giroux & 
McLelland 
 x 3 UW Public sector – 
cities (US) 
The index consists of three factors: a certificate of achievement, a big 6 audit and 
unqualified audit opinion. Disclosure increases with size and financial viability 
and depends on the management structure of the city. 
2003 Pina & Torres x x   Public sector - 
international 
International comparison of the content of financial statements submitted by 
central governments (linked to their accounting system: cash versus accrual 
accounting in annual accounts and budgets) 
2007 Da Costa 
Carvalho et al. 
x  26 UW Public sector – 
municipalities 
(Portugal) 
Adoption of accounting practices (budgetary, financial and cost accounting) is 
listed in an index. Determinants of compliance are: size (-), budgetary surplus (+), 
grants received (+), urban (+) versus rural, number of staff (+) and average 
district compliance (+). 
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ABSTRACT 
Prior  research has documented the existence of earnings management in for-profit settings. 
Nonprofit organizations are thought to pay less attention to the bottom line of the income 
statement. Earnings management research in nonprofit settings has therefore focused on the 
manipulation of expenses in order to improve efficiency ratios or taxable income, not reported 
earnings per se. Considering a different institutional setting characterized by the absence of 
such ratios and the presence of important governmental subsidies, management of the actual 
bottom line is explored and analyzed in the light of the importance of governmental subsidies. 
The results of our analysis suggest that organizations drive their results towards zero profit and 
that this is intensified by increased governmental funding under specific circumstances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Earnings management is an important area of accounting research. Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) 
often cited definition sets the tone for several papers on earnings management.‘Earnings 
management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers’ (Healy & Wahlen, 1999, p.365). There is an ongoing flow of 
literature on companies’ earnings management. Motives for earnings management that have 
been documented over the years include manipulation of stock markets, decrease in tax levels, 
avoidance of political costs and preservation of CEO reputation.  
Companies use two techniques to manage reported earnings, i.e. ‘real’ earnings management 
and accounting manipulation. Among the real earnings management techniques are: selling 
price cuts, just-in-time adoption, R&D budget cuts, etc. (Kinney and Wempe, 2004; Mande, File 
& Kwak, 2000, Roychowdhury, 2006). These techniques are more costly for the firm than 
making use of discretion in accounting and financial reporting legislation in order to adjust 
reported numbers. Therefore, researchers have directed their attention to the use of 
accounting accruals as a tool for earnings management.  
Recently, the scope of earnings management research has broadened out to include the 
nonprofit and public sector. Although Healy and Wahlen (1999) use ‘companies’ in their 
definition, neither motives nor techniques suggest that earnings management is limited to for-
profit organizations. On the contrary, since economic performance is increasingly monitored by 
a society that demands accountability, earnings management may well be of importance in the 
nonprofit sector. Moreover, the growing economic importance of that sector (Marée, 
Gijselinckx, Loose, Rijpens & Franchois, 2008 ; U.N. Statistics Division, 2003) implies that an 
evaluation of financial reporting quality is relevant to numerous donors, governmental agencies, 
tax authorities, staff members and volunteers as well as accounting standard setters. The 
reliability of nonprofit financial reports is important. For instance, notwithstanding the results in 
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chapter 2, some prior research indicates that donors use financial information in their decision 
to make donations to an organization (e.g. Parsons, 2003 and 2007; Tinkelman, 1999; Weisbrod 
& Dominguez, 1986).  
Although earnings management research in nonprofit organizations is relatively scarce in 
comparison to that concerning for-profit entities, a number of authors have clearly documented 
its existence. Nonprofit organizations are reported to adjust accounting numbers for several 
reasons: improving their efficiency ratios (Jones & Roberts, 2006; Keating, Parsons & Roberts, 
2008; Khumawala, Parsons & Gordon, 2005; Krishnan, Yetman & Yetman, 2006;), avoiding taxes 
(Hofmann, 2007; Omer & Yetman, 2003, 2007) and avoiding small losses (Ballantine, Forker & 
Greenwoord, 2007; Leone & Van Horn, 2002).  
Three factors distinguish this study from previous research. First, in contrast to the majority of 
former nonprofit studies, we focus on reported income, rather than efficiency ratios or taxable 
income. This implies that we look directly at the ‘bottom line’. We contend that nonprofit 
organizations use accounting discretion to manage results towards zero profit. Second, whereas 
most of the research is done using U.S. data, where private donations are a main source of 
income to nonprofit organizations, we use data from (Belgian) nonprofits that are highly 
subsidized by the government. Therefore, the effect of subsidization on earnings management 
is considered. Finally, while earlier studies in this field have focused on the issue within a 
specific sector, we use data from organizations in the nonprofit sector at large. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss prior 
literature on nonprofit earnings management. Next, testable hypotheses are developed, 
followed by an explanation of the methodology. The last sections contain the description of the 
data, results of the analyses and conclusions. 
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PRIOR RESEARCH: EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: WHY 
AND HOW? 
In contrast to the significant amount of research on earnings management by companies, 
studies on nonprofit organizations are few. At first glance, motivations for earnings 
management are less important in a nonprofit setting. Whereas businesses strive for earnings in 
order to distribute them to their shareholders, nonprofit organizations’ first priority consists in 
providing programs and services that are of public benefit. Profits – or more accurately 
surpluses- might not be much more than a side effect and are retained by the organization in 
order to provide for future programs. In previous research, several reasons for nonprofits’ 
earnings management are documented. Nonprofit organizations seem to modify reported 
expenses and results in order to demonstrate higher efficiency ratios, to reduce taxable income 
and to report small or zero profits. In the U.S., nonprofit organizations’ efficiency is expressed in 
terms of ratios. Expenses are classified as either fundraising, administrative or program 
expenses. Donors aspire to ‘good use’ of their money, which is substantiated by a high program 
ratio, i.e. the percentage of total expenses categorized as program expenses, when deciding 
upon donating money (Callen 1994; Greenlee & Brown, 1999; Weisbrod & Dominguez 1986). 
The importance of the program ratio has driven nonprofit organizations to shift expenses from 
one category to another (Khumawala et al., 2005; Jones and Roberts, 2006; Krishnan et al., 
2006; Keating et al., 2008). Although nonprofit organizations usually can rely on a tax-exempt 
status, some of their income may still be taxable. In Hofmann’s study (2007), associations are 
considered to shift expenses towards their unrelated business income in order to reduce their 
tax. Omer and Yetman (2003 and 2007) conclude that nonprofit organizations misreport taxable 
income by overstating taxable expenses. Finally, some authors find evidence that nonprofit 
organizations manage reported earnings to a range just above zero. Leone and Van Horn (2002) 
show that nonprofit hospitals have reasons for managing their reported earnings so as to 
produce a small profit. Ballantine et al. (2007) substantiate their hypothesis that English 
National Health Service Trusts use accounting flexibility (discretionary accruals) to achieve zero 
(or small) profit.  
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In summary, evidence of nonprofit organizations’ attempts to manage reported financial 
numbers is limited but convincing. However, prior research has mainly been dealing with 
expense classification and taxes. When reported earnings are studied, data are limited to one 
specific sector. In this paper, management of reported earnings towards zero profit is discussed 
for organizations in the nonprofit sector at large. Moreover, the level of governmental financial 
aid is considered to be an incentive for this type of earnings management. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Nonprofit organizations cannot actively pursue profit in order to redistribute it to the owners 
and are expected to spend their revenue on programs and services. Therefore, it can be 
expected that the distribution of surpluses/losses will be centered around zero, even in the 
absence of accounting manipulation. There are, however, reasons to assume that nonprofit 
organizations also manage the reported results towards zero profit in a way that makes use of 
flexibility in accounting standards. Moreover, nonprofit organizations might be more inclined to 
manage earnings when important governmental funding is at stake. To substantiate these 
hypotheses, we refer to previous research on the relationship between funding (subsidies, debt 
financing and donations) and financial reporting (earnings, earnings management and 
compliance) by nonprofit organizations. In addition, and given the dataset at hand, we refer to 
analyses by the Belgian Court of Audit of the subsidization process in different areas of the 
nonprofit sector.  
 
FUNDING AS  A REASON FOR EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
As Anheier, Toepler and Sokolowski (1997, p. 203) point out: ‘public sector dependent 
organizations tend to find such government funding inadequate, see their dependence as 
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problematic, are fearful of bureaucratization, feel political pressure, lament a lack of political 
concept and diagnose political insecurity.’ These authors also conclude that state-dependent 
organizations are less likely to introduce austerity measures in the event of financial problems 
than their fee-dependent counterparts. The former are more likely to try to increase funding by 
making ‘appropriate contacts at the right political level’ (p. 203). This indicates that state-
dependent organizations are well aware of the importance of government funding and are 
prepared to go a long way to ensure continuing financing. Verbruggen, Christiaens and Milis 
(2011) conclude that formal compliance with financial reporting standards increases with 
dependence on governmental subsidies and financial debts, indicating a willingness to meet the 
demands of the most important source of funding.  
Prior research (Bouwens et al., 2004; Frank, Salkever and Mitchell, 1990) has further shown that 
nonprofit organizations can have incentives to manage earnings to preserve or obtain funding. 
Bouwens et al. (2004) show that Dutch nonprofit hospitals manage earnings upwards both in 
the year prior to and the year in which additional funding is received in the form of financial 
debt. They argue that ‘managers also have incentives to manage the books in order to attract 
new or additional funding in the (nearby) future, that is both to obtain external funding and to 
obtain it under favourable conditions’ (Bouwens et al., 2004, p.9). Frank et al. (1990) report a 
negative correlation between (lagged) reported income and the level of donations. This 
indicates that donors take reported earnings into account when deciding on donations and are 
less inclined to donate money to profitable organizations. These research results indicate that 
nonprofit organizations can be motivated to engage in earnings management in order to receive 
additional funding. In the case of financial debts, it is clearly important to show positive results 
and financial strength in order to convince financial institutions of creditworthiness. Therefore, 
it can be expected that earnings are managed upwards. When trying to increase donations, 
theory and evidence suggest that earnings should be managed downwards in order to show the 
need for funds.  
50 
 
The ‘optimal’ level of earnings and thus the direction of earnings management is less clear when 
we investigate subsidies as a source of funding. There are reasons for upwards as well as 
downwards management. We argue that, as in the case of additional debt financing, reporting a 
loss can damage the reputation of the nonprofit organization in the eyes of subsidizing 
governments. The question might arise whether or not it is economically and/or socially 
desirable to subsidize an organization that reports losses. In the absence of and/or in 
combination with other performance indicators, governments turn to income statements to 
evaluate the organization’s financial status during the decision process. Taking this into account, 
heavily subsidized organizations may be inclined to manage losses upwards in order to maintain 
governmental funding.  
Nonprofit organizations might not only be avoiding losses, they may also benefit from 
downsizing reported profits. Governments (whether local, national or supranational) will 
monitor the results of organizations applying for or receiving subsidies, on the level of program 
services provided as well as on a financial level and may be less keen to start or continue 
subsidizing organizations with large profits. As in the case of private and corporate donations 
(Frank et al., 1990), the level of subsidies might vary inversely with reported earnings. When 
they do, nonprofits can be inclined to manage earnings downwards. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBSIDIES AND EARNINGS 
The paper draws on Belgian data for empirical analysis of the hypotheses. In order to 
complement and support the theoretical expectations explained in the previous section, we 
shed light on the practice of grant application, decision-making and follow-up through 
comments made by the Belgian Court of Audit. This court exercises external control over the 
budgetary, accounting and financial operations of the Federal State, the Communities, the 
Regions, the Provinces and the public service institutions depending upon them. This evidence 
51 
 
shows that profitability is indeed explicitly considered by Belgian authorities in order to decide 
upon whether and by how much to subsidize nonprofit organizations in various sectors. 
Moreover, in line with our remarks on the appropriate direction of earnings management, some 
specific examples indicate that nonprofit organizations in point of fact receive conflicting signals 
about the relation between profit and subsidies. In the auditor’s report to the Flemish 
Parliament on the subsidization of the arts sector (Vlaams Parlement,2006,p. 8) , we read that 
‘the absence of correct and uniform annual accounts hamper the level of control over other 
conditions for subsidization such as the required minimum percentage of own income and the 
accumulation of reserves.’ As for these reserves, the report also mentions (p. 32) that ‘the 
annual growth in reserves cannot be higher than ten percent of the subsidies for that year or the 
amount of own income if this is less than ten percent of the subsidies. Accumulated reserves 
cannot be higher than 20 percent of the average working expenses of the previous three years.’ 
In a similar audit report concerning nonprofit organizations in the tourism sector (Vlaams 
Parlement, 2010, p. 18) the Court stated that ‘the annual accounts of an organization can be 
relevant in assessing the financial strength of the applicant or in judging accumulated profits 
and revenue from subsidies’. The same report specifically indicates that: ‘subsidies can only be 
diminished or taken back in the event of profit.’(p. 23). In the report on large subsidies by the 
Flemish Community (Vlaams Parlement, 1999, p. 19) we find that ‘the lack of transparency 
concerning the existence of other revenue for the nonprofit organization is a major issue. The 
legislation on whether or not other sources of revenue and the accumulation of reserves is 
allowed is unclear.’ Evidence in the sector of social work suggests that profitability ratios are 
taken into account when analyzing applications for subsidies. Profits that are lower than one 
percent of revenue are deemed negative signals, losses are ‘red lights’ in the decision-making 
process of subsidization (Naert and Tack, 2009, p.35).  
Thus, the institutionally driven evidence confirms that (i) annual accounts are taken into 
consideration when an organization applies for subsidies, that (ii) high accumulated reserves 
and profits can hamper the approval of subsidies or even trigger the withdrawal of approved 
subsidies while (iii) on the other hand losses are considered as ‘warning signs’. Organizations 
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may take  a ‘better safe than sorry’ attitude towards reporting profit when confronted with 
confusing or unclear signals by the government concerning the relation between profitability 
and subsidization. 
Overall, prior research has identified reasons for upwards as well as downwards earnings 
management in nonprofit organizations in the light of additional funding. Combined with the 
arguments for the effect of governmental subsidies as a reason for earnings management, the 
following hypotheses are stated:  
H1. Drive towards zero hypothesis: Nonprofit organizations manage earnings upwards when 
pre-managed earnings are negative and vice versa. 
H2. Goverment funding hypothesis: Earnings management towards zero profit increases with 
the importance of governmental funding as a source of revenue. 
To measure the importance of government funding, the percentage of subsidies in total 
operating income is used. 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
The hypotheses are tested using a set of Belgian nonprofit organizations. The arguments in 
favor of using these data are threefold: (i) these organizations have been confronted by 
increased accounting and reporting requirements since 2006, leading to the use of accrual 
accounting and the public availability of standardized financial statements; (ii) an important 
number of organizations are heavily subsidized, providing a possible rationale for earnings 
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management not tested so far and (iii) the nonprofit sector is of considerable importance in 
Belgium.   
The 2006 accounting reform resulted in the fact that  very large Belgian nonprofit organizations 
needed to switch to accrual accounting and draw up a full scheme of standardized financial 
statements. For large organizations, accrual accounting and the short scheme of financial 
statements was made mandatory, while small nonprofit organizations are still allowed to use 
cash accounting and their statements are not publicly available.  
To be able to calculate all the necessary variables, a full scheme financial statement is needed. 
In September 2007, a list of all full scheme filers was provided by the National Bank of Belgium. 
The full scheme financial statements of 925 nonprofit organizations were keyed in for 2006
9
. 
The same list of organizations was used to gather data for 2007 and 2008.  Out of the 925 
organizations, four are excluded from the analysis due to missing data on the sector, 21 have at 
least one missing financial statement or were liquidated during the investigated time period and 
59 were excluded due to missing data within the financial statements. Thus, data of 841 
organizations were used over a three-year period, which is 68 percent of all full scheme filers in 
2006. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The majority of current (corporate) earnings management studies focus on the use of discretion 
in accounting as a tool for earnings management. In these studies, three methodologies can be 
identified: the distribution of reported earnings, models of specific accruals and models that 
                                                      
9
 The currently available number of full scheme financial statements for 2006 is 1.243. There are 4.346 short 
schemes for 2006. 
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focus on aggregate accruals
10
. In the last case, the Jones (1991) model is most often used, which 
splits accruals into a non-discretionary and a discretionary part. The existence of discretionary 
accruals is viewed as a proof of earnings management. Leone and Van Horn (2002) examined 
the use of two specific accruals (third party allowances and doubtful debtors) as a means of 
reporting zero profit in nonprofit hospitals. These authors also used the Jones (1991) model as a 
robustness check. Ballantine et al. (2007) and Bouwens et al. (2004) use Burgstahler and 
Dichev’s (1997) distribution techniques as well as discretionary accruals models. In the current 
paper, a specific accrual as well as aggregated accruals are used to analyze the prevalence of 
earnings management.  
First, we test whether a specific accrual is used as a tool for earnings management. The accrual 
under investigation in this paper, depreciation, is specific in the sense that one single item in the 
income statement is investigated as opposed to an aggregation of different accruals. The 
depreciation accrual is, however, not specific to a subsector, such as hospitals or universities. 
The choice of depreciation is based on the fact that it is widely used in all sectors, it is subject to 
some accounting discretion and it can be of sufficient importance to influence reported income. 
The importance of depreciable fixed assets in nonprofit financial statements is relatively high. In 
the sample used, they average 44.7 percent of total assets. Since parallels can be made with the 
balance sheet of public sector bodies, the findings of Van der Zahn and Pilcher (2008) and 
Stalebrink (2007) are relevant in defending the use of depreciation as a manageable accrual. 
Van der Zahn and Pilcher (2008) find that local governments reporting higher deficits and 
surpluses had higher levels of unexpected depreciation. They also document a significant 
positive association between unexpected depreciation and the level of capital contributions. 
Stalebrink’s (2007) findings indicate that discretion in write-offs and depreciation is used to 
report small surpluses. Sundgren and Johansson (2004) report on the use of depreciation to 
                                                      
10
 Accruals are defined as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in non-cash current liabilities 
minus the depreciation expense. 
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alter reported results by non-public Finnish firms. The setting of that paper is similar to the 
current study, since these firms were recently confronted with an accounting reform that made 
audit and public financial statements obligatory. In order to identify unexpected depreciation, 
the methodology of Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) is applied. The unexpected (discretionary) 
component of depreciation for period t is defined as 
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Second, in accordance with Bouwens et al. (2004), Leone and Van Horn (2002) and Ballantine et 
al. (2007), an aggregate accruals model is used based on the Jones (1991) model. For the Jones 
model, the following ordinary least squares regression model is used to estimate accruals as a 
function of the change in the level of activity (change in revenue) and the level of plant, 
property and equipment. Accruals are defined as the change in operating assets minus the 
change in operating liabilities to account for changes in working capital and minus non-cash 
expenses such as depreciation and provisions. Due to the short time period and small sample 
size,  abnormal or discretionary accruals are estimated within the sample, similar to Leone and 
Van Horn (2002) and defined as the error terms of the following regression: 
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ACit = total accruals for organization i in year t 
REVit = revenues in year t – revenues in year t-1 for organization i 
PPEit= gross depreciable assets for organization i in year t 
TAi,t-1= Total assets for organization i in year t-1 
 
As discussed earlier, the Jones model has been used extensively in for-profit earnings 
management research. To assess whether or not the model is appropriate for use in nonprofit 
settings, the nature and importance of the accounts need to be analyzed.  Inventory is of little 
importance in an average nonprofit financial statement (in the sample, inventory ranges from 
zero to 43 percent of total assets, with an average of less than one percent). However, the 
valuation of inventory can be more difficult in nonprofit organizations and therefore more 
susceptible to earnings management. Accounts receivable (on average 19 percent of total 
assets) originate from ‘commercial’ activities of the organization as well as from subsidies. In 
both cases, they are susceptible to earnings management. Commercial accounts receivable are 
subject to doubtful debt expenses, similar to for-profit companies. For accounts receivable that 
originate from subsidies one needs to assess whether or not the subsidy can be recognised as 
revenue and can be entered in the balance sheet as account receivable. In several Belgian 
hospitals, for example, this issue has frequently given rise to qualified audit opinions. Similarly, 
the recognition of revenue from subsidies can influence accrued and deferred income accounts 
and therefore accruals.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
DESCRIPTIVES ON THE ORGANIZATIONS IN  THE SAMPLE 
The analysis is based on a sample of 841 organizations that filed a full scheme of financial 
statements in 2006, 2007 and 2008. The organizations are active in 20 different subsectors 
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according to the ‘traditional’ NACE-BEL classification. However, according to the, arguably more 
appropriate, classification of the satellite accounts for the Belgian nonprofit sector (Pacolet et 
al., 2001; Marée et al., 2008) six different areas of activities can be discerned: Culture, sports 
and recreation (14 organizations), education and research (201), health care (57), social services 
(436), law, advocacy and politics (52) and other areas of activity (81). 
11
  
In ‘000 euro Mean Standard 
deviation 
Perc.25 Median Perc. 75 N 
Total assets 14 810 34 975 2 905 5 771 12 324 2 523 
Total op. revenue 11 434 24 072 3 580 5 861 10 078 2 523 
Total subsidies 3 616 7 200 0 1 129 4 879 2 523 
Profit/loss 381 1 800 5 101 317 2 523 
In % Mean Standard 
deviation 
Perc.25 Median Perc.75 N 
Subsidies as 
percentage of 
operating revenues 
42.79  38.86 0.00 32.57 83.76 2 523 
Donations as a 
percentage of 
operating revenues 
  2.97  13.56 0.00 0.00  0.19 2 523 
TABLE 3-1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE ORGANIZATIONS (POOLED) 
Descriptive statistics for the pooled data are summarized in Table 3-1. Mean total assets (mean 
total revenue) amount to 14.8 (11.4) million euro. The organizations are considerably 
subsidized, as is evidenced by the mean subsidies of 3.6 million euro representing on average 
42.8 percent of total operating revenue. It can be noticed that the medians are much lower than 
the means, indicating skewed distributions. In 74.0 percent of the cases, subsidies are granted 
                                                      
11
 Satellite accounts are a comprehensive statistical system to describe the activities of the nonprofit sector. They 
are proposed by the UN Statistics division in collaboration with Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Studies.  
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to the organization and in 63.6 percent of all cases, donations are less than 1 percent of total 
operating revenue (not tabulated). The main sources of funding are therefore subsidies and self-
generated revenue.  
Further details on the organizations on a sector-by-sector basis are shown in Table 3-2. There 
are substantial differences in average size of the organizations. Mean and median total assets 
tend to be high in health care, advocacy and ‘other’ organizations. Average profitability, 
expressed as result divided by total assets, ranges from 2.40 percent in education/ research to 
4.57 percent in ‘other activities’. Mean dependence on subsidies ranges from 4.37 percent 
(other activities) to 72.33 percent (education/ research). Overall, dependence on donations is 
low, ranging from 0.09 percent in health care to 9.59 percent in law, advocacy and politics. The 
percentage of selected working capital accounts and depreciable assets in total assets are 
shown in panel B of Table 3-2. Although there are sector differences, the overall picture is quite 
similar: depreciable assets and accounts receivable are an important part of total assets, 
whereas inventory is negligible. The differences in the characteristics of the balance sheet and 
income statement can give rise to differences in earnings management techniques. This analysis 
is provided in the next section. 
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 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6 
PANEL A   
N 42 603 171 1308 156 243 
total assets (000 euro) 
Mean 
Median 
Standard deviation 
 
13 297 
7 448 
14 010 
 
9 687 
4 326 
25 990 
 
33 307 
10 708 
62 130 
 
8 855 
5 352 
14 870 
 
24 735 
12 822 
33 210 
 
40 451 
14 184 
72 110 
Mean total operating revenue (000 euro) 
Mean 
Median 
Standard deviation 
 
11 567 
7 161 
12 780 
 
8 605 
6 026 
20 010 
 
38 218 
15 045 
61 010 
 
8 129 
5 065 
12 850 
 
17 059 
8 707 
27 280 
 
13 762 
7 034 
20 530 
Mean Profit/loss  
(000 euro)/  (% of total assets) 
Mean 
Median 
Standard deviation 
 
 
386 / 3.0 
30 / 0.3 
184 / 16 
 
 
172 / 2.4 
106 / 2.5 
179 / 19 
 
 
1017/4.0 
317 / 3.2 
2022/4.6 
 
 
186 / 2.5 
85 / 1.9 
608 / 5.7 
 
 
991 / 2.6 
143 / 1.5 
3303 / 17 
 
 
1107/4.6 
146 / 1.4 
3459/12 
PANEL B  
Subsidies as % of total operating revenue 
Mean 
Median  
Standard deviation 
 
41.91 
46.39 
35.95 
 
72.33 
87.54 
31.90 
 
15.98 
.00 
28.48 
 
42.38 
29.31 
36.46 
 
21.42 
.64 
31.08 
 
4.37 
.00 
12.72 
Donations as % of total operating 
revenue 
Mean 
Median 
Standard deviation 
 
 
6.95 
.00 
22.52 
 
 
1.97 
.00 
9.47 
 
 
.09 
.00 
.54 
 
 
2.93 
.00 
13.92 
 
 
9.59 
.00 
23.44 
 
 
2.74 
.00 
13.01 
Gross depreciable assets as % of total 
assets 
Mean 
Median 
Standard deviation 
 
 
40.98 
21.77 
40.32 
 
 
64.19 
69.84 
25.42 
 
 
32.82 
31.98 
21.63 
 
 
52.82 
58.72 
29.20 
 
 
17.80 
8.57 
21.99 
 
 
21.33 
7.37 
30.12 
Inventory as % of total assets 
Mean 
Median 
Standard deviation 
 
.24 
.10 
.33 
 
.38 
.03 
.85 
 
.77 
.07 
1.63 
 
.89 
.09 
2.89 
 
.55 
.00 
5.93 
 
.63 
.00 
2.66 
Accounts receivable as % of total assets 
Mean 
Median 
Standard deviation 
 
31.69 
17.50 
33.49 
 
11.42 
7.38 
14.54 
 
35.74 
30.82 
21.01 
 
18.58 
11.39 
18.43 
 
21.70 
17.07 
20.59 
 
22.17 
8.17 
26.13 
TABLE 3-2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE ORGANIZATIONS PER SECTOR  
(Sectors are defined as: 1. Culture, sports and recreation, 2. Education and research, 3. Health 
care, 4. Social Services, 5. Law, advocacy and politics, 6. Other activities) 
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UNEXPECTED DEPRECIATION (UDEP)  AND DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS (DA): 
DESCRIPTIVES 
As explained, the presence of earnings management is tested using two accruals measures. 
Accruals according to the Jones model are estimated within sample per sector in order to take 
differences between sectors into account. Due to the fact that this analysis requires 2-year 
lagged data, the number of observations of UDEP and DA is limited to one-year data, in casu 841 
organizations. The data are winsorized at mean value +/-  three standard deviations in order to 
mitigate outlier effects. 
Table 3-3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for both earnings management measures. For 
the sample as a whole, the mean and median unexpected depreciation expenses are slightly 
positive (0.0003 and 0.0009 respectively). In the entire sample, 58.3 percent of unexpected 
depreciation is positive (downwards earnings management). In 3.7 percent of cases, unexpected 
depreciation is zero due to the absence of depreciable fixed assets. Mann-Whitney U-tests (not 
tabulated) indicate that mean unexpected depreciation is significantly higher in the sector of  
education/research when compared to social services, health care and advocacy, law and 
politics. The same tests (not tabulated) also show that the mean rank of gross depreciable fixed 
assets in total assets is higher in education/research than in all other sectors. This might indicate 
that the importance of these assets in the balance sheet gives rise to earnings management 
through depreciation expenses. Furthermore, since positive unexpected depreciation is a 
measure of downwards earnings management, the high mean ranks can suggest a higher 
instance of downwards earnings management, which is supported by the data in Table 3-3 
(approximately 71 percent downwards earnings management in this sector).  
Mean and median discretionary accruals are slightly negative in the entire sample. T-tests show 
that average discretionary accruals do not significantly differ from zero, with the exception of 
the education/research sector. This appears inconsistent with the general assumption in linear 
regression that error terms are zero on average but can be explained by the absence of a 
constant factor in the regression (Eisenhauer, 2003). Once again, the dominance of downwards 
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earnings management in this sector when compared to all other sectors is apparent from the 
univariate data in Table 3-3 (panel B).  
Panel A 
Entire sample 
Mean 
(median) 
Standard 
deviation 
% upwards 
earnings 
management 
%downward
s earnings 
managemen
t 
% equal to 
zero 
Number 
Unexpected 
depreciation 
(UDEP) 
.0003 
( .0009) 
0,01093 38.0% 58.3% 3.7% 841 
Discretionary 
accruals Jones 
model (DA) 
-0.0099 
(-0.0091) 
0,1125 42.7% 57.3% 0% 841 
 
Panel B 
Per sector 
(N, year 2008) 
 
Sector 1 
 
(14) 
 
Sector 2 
 
(201) 
 
Sector 3 
 
(57) 
 
Sector 4 
 
(436) 
 
Sector 5 
 
(52) 
 
Sector 6 
 
(81) 
Mean UDEP 
Median UDEP 
Stand.dev. 
% upwards 
%downwards 
% zero 
.0003 
.0001 
.0176 
42.9 
50.0 
 7.1 
.0016 
.0025 
.0125 
27.4 
70.6 
2.0 
-.0014 
-.0006 
.01078 
59.6 
36.8 
3.5 
-.0001 
.0009 
.0099 
38.3 
60.1 
1.6 
-.0020 
.0000 
.0108 
48.1 
42.3 
9.6 
.0015 
.0000 
.0109 
40.7 
44.4 
14.8 
Mean DA 
Median 
Stand.dev. 
% upwards 
%downwards 
.0389 
.0075 
.2372 
50.0 
50.0 
-.0198 
-.0220 
.0831 
27.4 
72.6 
-.0067 
-.0017 
.0851 
49.1 
50.9 
-.0049 
-.0056 
.0998 
53.2 
46.8 
-.0065 
.0122 
.1583 
59.6 
40.4 
-.0249 
-.0057 
.1744 
42.0 
58.0 
TABLE 3-3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON UNEXPECTED DEPRECIATION AND DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
(WINSORIZED) 
(1. Culture, sports and recreation, 2. Education and research, 3. Health care, 4. Social Services, 5. 
Law, advocacy and politics, 6. Other activities) 
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UNEXPECTED DEPRECIATION, DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS AND SUBSIDIES: THE DRIVE 
TOWARDS ZERO PROFIT? 
To test whether accruals are used to manage earnings upwards when pre-managed earnings are 
negative (and vice versa), two methods are used. Firstly, the characteristics of the distribution of 
reported earnings will be compared to those of the distributions of unmanaged earnings, i.e. 
earnings before unexpected depreciation (EBUDEP, reported earnings plus unexpected 
depreciation) and earnings before discretionary accruals (EBDA, reported earnings minus 
discretionary accruals). Secondly, regression analysis is used, similar to Leone and Van Horn 
(2002). Due to the observed differences in the univariate analysis of the earnings management 
measures, the analysis is conducted separately for the education/research sector on one hand 
and all other sectors on the other hand. 
In Table 3-4, the characteristics of reported earnings and unmanaged earnings are summarized. 
The differences between reported earnings and EBUDEP are very small. The differences 
between reported earnings and EBDA, however, seem to confirm the first hypothesis. The mean 
and median of managed earnings (0.0283 and 0.0236) are closer to zero than those of 
unmanaged earnings (0.0390 and 0.0278). Furthermore, the boundaries of the first and third 
quartile of managed earnings are closer to zero than the boundary for EBDA (0.000 versus -
0.0157 and 0.0464 versus 0.082). All of these elements indicate a shift towards zero for 
reported earnings when compared to unmanaged earnings. 
 Reported earnings/ 
lagged total assets (TA) 
EBUDEP= earnings before 
unexpected 
depreciation/lagged TA 
EBDA= earnings before 
discretionary accruals / 
lagged TA 
Mean .0283 .0280 .0390 
Median .0236 .0200 .0278 
Variance .013 .013 .024 
Q1 .0000 -.0010 -.0157 
Q3 .0464 .0482 .0802 
TABLE 3-4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON MANAGED (REPORTED) AND UNMANAGED (EBUDEP AND EBDA) EARNINGS 
(WINSORIZED) 
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For the two earnings measures, separate regressions are used. To test the first hypothesis, 
EBUDEP and EBDA are introduced into the models. In order to test for the effect of subsidization 
on earnings management (hypothesis 2), the interaction terms EBUDEP*SUBS and EBDA*SUBS 
are used. To control for earnings management in the light of other sources of revenue (Bouwens 
et al., 2004, Frank et al., 1990), the dummy variables DONAT and NEWLOAN are added to the 
model. They have the value one when donations are a source of revenue and when new 
financial loans are contracted. In the case of donations, a dummy variable is used to deal with 
the highly skewed distribution of the continuous variable (percentage of donations in total 
revenue) which leads to outlier problems. In view of the fact that Kothari, Leone and Wasley 
(2005) have shown that discretionary accruals are positively correlated with prior year earnings, 
lagged earnings are added to the model. Finally,  lagged discretionary accruals and unexpected 
depreciation are added to the model to deal with (likely) autocorrelation. 
ε++++
++++=
−−
titititi
tititititi
NEWLOANaDONATaSUBSEBUDEPa
SUBSaUDEPaEARNINGSaEBUDEPaaUDEPa
,7,6,,5
,41,31,2,10,
*
)(
 
ε++++
++++=
−−
titititi
tititititi
NEWLOANbDONATbSUBSEBDAb
SUBSbDAbEARNINGSbEBDAbbDAb
,7,6,,5
,41,31,2,10,
*
)(
 
With: 
UDEPt = Unexpected Depreciation  
EBUDEPt = Earnings t/TA t-1 + Unexpected Depreciationt 
EARNINGS t-1= Reported earnings t-1/Total assets t-2  
SUBS i,t = subsidies as percentage of total operating revenue 
DONATi,t= donations as percentage of total operating revenue: 0 when equal to 0, 1 otherwise 
NEWLOANi,t = 1 when new financial loan in year t, 0 otherwise 
DAt = discretionary accruals in year t  
EBDAt = Earnings t/TA t-1 – discretionary accruals t 
Subscripts i, t = organization i in year t 
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Since hypothesis 1 is formulated symmetrically and  the signs of unmanaged earnings as well as 
of earnings management measures are important, we split the sample into groups according to 
the unmanaged result. In the case of unexpected depreciation, the sample is split into a group 
where EBUDEP is positive and one where EBUDEP is negative.  
Since we expect downwards (upwards) earnings management in the group with positive 
(negative) unmanaged results and the sign of unexpected depreciation is positive (negative) in 
the case of downwards (upwards) earnings management, we expect the sign of coefficient a1 to 
be positive in both groups when hypothesis 1 holds. To analyse whether earnings management 
towards zero profit increases with the importance of subsidies as a source of revenue, the 
interaction term EBUDEP*SUBS is incorporated into the analysis. When hypothesis 2 holds, we 
expect a5 to be positive in both subsamples.  
The analysis for discretionary accruals is similar to the analysis for unexpected depreciation. We 
split the sample into positive and negative unmanaged results (EBDA) in order to test H1. If the 
hypothesis holds, we expect coefficients b1 to be negative. In the case of unmanaged losses, we 
expect upwards earnings management, which is measured by positive discretionary accruals 
and vice versa. Similarly, we expect the coefficient of the interaction term (b5) to be negative.  
The expected signs of the coefficients for the control variable DONAT are positive for UDEP and 
negative for DA when it is consistent with downwards earnings management. Since Bouwens et 
al. (2004) report upwards earnings management in the case of additional financing, we expect 
the sign of the control variable NEWLOAN to be negative in the case of unexpected depreciation 
and positive in the case of discretionary accruals. Finally, we expect the sign of lagged 
discretionary accruals and lagged unexpected discretionary accruals to be negative, due to the 
reversal of accruals (DeFond and Park, 2001) and the sign of the coefficients for lagged earnings 
to be positive in the case of discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) and negative for 
unexpected depreciation.  
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Since the univariate data show that the earnings management patterns are different in the 
sector of education/research, this sector is excluded from the global analysis and a separate 
analysis is made for this sector.   
Before performing the regressions described above, we analyze the correlation coefficients for 
the variables. The Spearman correlations for the unexpected depreciation analysis are shown in 
Table 3-5, the correlations for discretionary accruals in Table 3-6. As expected, the correlation 
between UDEP and EBUDEP is positive (with one exception). However, correlations are low and 
not significant. The correlation between UDEP and EBUDEP*SUBS is positive as expected, with 
the exception of the education/research sector, for which a dominance of downwards earnings 
management was already apparent. Once again, correlations are weak. The high Spearman 
correlations between EBUDEP and SUBS on the one hand and the interaction term on the other 
hand, show that multicollinearity may be present in the regression analyses. 
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 UDEP EBUDEP EARN 
t-1 
UDEP 
t-1 
SUBS EBUDEP 
*SUBS 
DONAT NEW 
LOAN 
UDEP  .007 (a) 
-.050 (b) 
.058 (c) 
.099 (d) 
-.156** 
-.022 
-.161 
-.291 
.120* 
.033 
.096 
.091 
.034 
-.069 
.139 
.082 
.028 
.059 
.060 
-.004 
.012 
.007 
.111 
.000 
.027 
-.074 
.047 
-.217 
EBUDEP   .389** 
-.145 
.496** 
-.121 
-.047 
-.153 
-.054 
-.022 
.062 
-.032 
-.138 
.025 
.446** 
.331** 
.762** 
.581** 
.034 
-.014 
-.244** 
.042 
-.072 
.080 
-.122 
.196 
EARNt-1    -.079 
-.123 
-.171* 
-.199 
.023 
.058 
.105 
-.151 
.174** 
-.120 
.500** 
.114 
-.049 
.002 
-.148 
.201 
-.100 
.044 
-.090 
.388* 
UDEPt-1     .003 
.101 
.113 
.162 
.007 
-.136 
.048 
-.187 
.012 
-.011 
.086 
-.134 
-.018 
-.177* 
.088 
-.068 
SUBS      .856** 
-.901** 
.384** 
-.662** 
.446** 
.350** 
.208** 
.255 
.014 
.145 
.245** 
.306 
EBUDEP* 
SUBS 
      .377 
-.277** 
-.147 
.073 
-.005 
-.072 
.066 
-.130 
DONAT        -.043 
.127 
.024 
-.029 
TABLE 3-5. SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (UNEXPECTED DEPRECIATION) FOR 4 SUBSAMPLES 
EBUDEP positive and sector is not education/research (a), EBUDEP negative and sector is not 
education/research (b), EBUDEP positive and sector is education/research (c), EBUDEP negative 
and sector is education/research (d). Significance (two-tailed) at 0.05 level (**) and 0.10 level 
(*).  
The correlation coefficients of EBDA and DA (Table 3-6) are highly significant in the expected 
(negative) direction. This is also the case for the interaction term, although the correlation is 
much stronger in the education sector than in all others. Once again, high correlations between 
SUBS and EBDAxSUBS indicate the danger of multicollinearity. 
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 DA EBDA EARN 
t-1 
DA 
t-1 
SUBS EBDA 
*SUBS 
DONAT NEW 
LOAN 
DA  -.594** (a) 
-.536** (b) 
-.506**(c) 
-.339**(d) 
.054 
.107 
.102 
-.006 
-.073 
-.068 
.212** 
-.077 
.104* 
.000 
.003 
.186 
-.086 
-.139 
-.384** 
-.405** 
.112* 
.009 
.011 
-.159 
.114* 
-.101 
.066 
-.160 
EBDA   .183** 
-.042 
.377** 
.043 
.014 
.084 
-.107 
.260 
-.068 
.059 
-.075 
.010 
.304** 
.240** 
.732** 
.678** 
-.111* 
-.024 
-.110* 
.211 
-.201** 
.068 
-.106 
.196 
EARNt-1    .129** 
.010 
.053 
.192 
.074 
-.006 
.083 
-.190 
.165** 
-.019 
.398 
.199 
-.078 
.020 
-.128 
.188 
-.072 
-.051 
.032 
-.015 
DAt-1     .081 
-.056 
.101 
-.198 
.051 
.079 
-.018 
.314 
.077 
.065 
.055 
.087 
.102* 
.117 
.041 
-.144 
SUBS      .857** 
-.902** 
.460** 
-.572 
.454** 
.335** 
.226** 
.050 
.102* 
-.021 
.098 
.272* 
EBDA* 
SUBS 
      .336** 
-.285** 
-.019 
.234* 
.029 
-.005 
.000 
-.068 
DONAT        .118* 
-.019 
.018 
.108 
TABLE 3-6. SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS) FOR 2 SUBSAMPLES 
EBDA positive and sector is not education/research (a), EBDA negative and sector is not 
education/research (b), EBDA positive and sector is education/research (c), EBDA negative and 
sector is education/research. Significance (two-tailed) at 0.05 level (**) and 0.10 level (*) 
 
The results of the OLS regression analyses on UDEP are shown in Table 3-7. First, it is important 
to explain that the regression of the UDEP-model for all sectors excluding education/research 
(when EBUDEP is positive) is not well specified. The F-value of the model is not significant (at 
the 0.05 level) and the adjusted R² is zero. Table 3-7 shows 5 regressions: all sectors excluding 
education and research and the regression for the education and research sector. Regressions 
(a) and (b) have low explanatory power, but are well-specified. In these models, there is some 
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evidence to support the first hypothesis that earnings are managed towards zero (evidenced by 
the positive parameter of EBUDEP). There is no convincing evidence that this is intensified with 
the degree of subsidization. However, the models (b), (d) and (e) deal with multicollinearity, as 
is shown by the high variance inflation factors (VIF). These VIFs are up to 6.2, which is higher 
that the common cut-off value of five. Therefore, the sign and significance of the coefficients 
may be distorted. To deal with this, the models are adjusted using the interaction variable 
EBUDEPxSUBSLARG. In these models, SUBSLARG takes the value one when SUBS is larger than 
the sector median value and zero otherwise.  
The results of these models are summarized in Table 3-8. Once again, model (c) is not well-
specified. We therefore must conclude that we are not able to explain the level of unexpected 
depreciation in the case of positive unmanaged results. When unmanaged results are negative 
(b), there is some support for the hypothesis that earnings are managed upwards, but this is not 
influenced by the level of subsidization. In the sector of education and research, the model is 
not well-specified when unmanaged earnings are negative. Depreciation is used to manage 
earnings downwards only when there are high levels of subsidization. 
The conclusion for unexpected depreciation is therefore that univariate data show that 
unexpected depreciation has very low mean values and is -on average- not sufficient to 
significantly change reported earnings. This is confirmed by the small differences in the 
distribution characteristics of unmanaged results (EBUDEP) and reported earnings. 
Furthermore, the multivariate analysis shows that the models have very low explanatory power 
and the support for the hypotheses is very limited. This analysis is consistent with the findings of 
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) for companies but inconsistent with the results of Van der 
Zahn and Pilcher (2008) for local governments.  
The results of the regression analysis for discretionary accruals are summarized in Table 3.9. 
Since the univariate results show a much higher instance of downwards earnings management 
in this sector relative to the other sectors, we have performed a separate regression analysis on 
DA for this sector. First, it is important to notice that the explanatory power of these models is 
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much higher than in the case of unexpected depreciation (up to 61 percent) and that the results 
for all sectors except education/research are not driven by multicollinearity. Since this was the 
case in the sector of education/research (not tabulated), we have used the interaction term 
EBDAxSUBSLARG in all models to ensure that collinearity does not drive the results. 
In all regressions the negative coefficients for EBDA confirm the first hypothesis that earnings 
are managed towards zero profit. As for the influence of subsidies, the results are consistent 
with the second hypothesis in the entire sample and in the sample of positive unmanaged 
results. However, the coefficient of the interaction term is not significantly different from zero 
in the case of unmanaged losses and is even positive in the negative EBDA subsample of 
education/research. Therefore, we have only partial support for the second hypothesis: 
subsidies seem to intensify downwards earnings management and do not affect the intensity of 
upwards earnings management except for the sector of education/research in which upwards 
earnings management is weaker in case of higher subsidies. 
The coefficients of the control variables of lagged discretionary accruals (Leone and Van Horn, 
2002) are consistent with prior research. This is also the case for lagged earnings (Kothari et al., 
2005) except for the sector of education in which they are not significant. The coefficients of 
donations and new loans are not significantly different from zero, which is not consistent with 
prior research by Bouwens et al. (2004). This may be explained by the fact that donations as 
well as financial loans are not important sources of funding in this sample of organizations.  
Overall, the support for earnings management towards zero profit is more convincing when it is 
measured by aggregate discretionary accruals. This type of earnings management is intensified 
with higher levels of subsidization, but only when unmanaged earnings are positive.
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 Expected Regression UDEP(a) 
All sectors, excluding 
education/research 
All EBUDEP 
Regression UDEP(b) 
All sectors, excluding 
education/research 
NEGATIVE EBUDEP 
Regression UDEP(c) 
All sectors, excluding 
education/research 
POSITIVE EBUDEP 
Regression UDEP(d) 
Sector  
education/research 
NEGATIVE EBUDEP 
Regression UDEP(e) 
Sector  
education/research  
POSITIVE EBUDEP 
  Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value 
Constant  -.000   -.025 -.003   -.578 .001 1.339 -.014 -2.094**  .009  2.886** 
EBUDEP +  .019  2.654**  .040  1.796* .004 .451 -.190 -3.121** -.063 -2.183** 
EARNINGS - -.007 -1.555  .013    .994 -.009 -1.859 -.006   -.354 -.033 -3.320** 
UDEPt-1 - -.055 -1.503 -.004   -.048 -.047 -1.175 -.455 -2.769** -.120 -1.808* 
SUBS  -.002 -1.394 -.005 -1.108 .001 .434  .037  2.978** -.011 -2.178** 
EBUDEPxSUBS +  .034  2.016**  .064  1.137 .002 .077  .419  3.198** .153  3.105** 
DONAT +  .000    .403  .002  1.161 -.001 -.579 -.001   -.195 .001    .614 
NEWLOAN -  .000  -.419 -.002   -.870 .000 -.038 -.008 -1.756* .001    .335 
N  640 
.042 
4.960*** 
1.940 
188 
.088 
2.576*** 
6.211 
452 
.000 
.750  
2.550 
41 
.332 
3.835** 
6.026 
160 
.059 
2.433** 
5.760 
R² adjusted 
F-value 
VIF max  
TABLE 3-7. REGRESSION ANALYSES ON UNEXPECTED DEPRECIATION.  
(where p<0.05 is *, p<0.01 is ** and p<0.001 is ***) 
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 Expected Regression UDEP(a) 
All sectors, excluding 
education/research 
All EBUDEP 
Regression UDEP(b) 
All sectors, excluding 
education/research 
NEGATIVE EBUDEP 
Regression UDEP(c) 
All sectors, excluding 
education/research 
POSITIVE EBUDEP 
Regression UDEP(d) 
Sector  
education/research 
NEGATIVE EBUDEP 
Regression UDEP(e) 
Sector  
education/research  
POSITIVE EBUDEP 
  Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value 
Constant  .000 .609 .000 .119 .002 1.903* .001 .170 .005 2.717** 
EBUDEP + .013 1.955* .043 1.990** .000 .032 -.019 -.420 -.019 -1.008 
EARNINGS - -.008 -1.720* .013 1.038 -.010 -1.984** .002 .107 -.030 -3.089** 
UDEPt-1 - -.058 -1.594 -.023 -.285 -.048 -1.188 -.536 -2.778** -.085 -1.299 
SUBSLARG  -.002 -2.524** -.003 -1.438 -.001 -.505 .001 .076 -.002 -1.007 
EBUDEPxSUBSLARG + .034 3.235** .028 .970 .013 .861 .002 .035 .073 2.642** 
DONAT + .001 .604 .002 1.139 .000 -.269 .001 .217 .001 .363 
NEWLOAN - -.001 -.577 -.002 -.874 .000 -.091 -.007 -1.299 .000 .001 
N  640 
.054 
6.227*** 
1.869 
188 
.110 
4.285** 
3.136 
452 
.000 
.797 
2.009 
41 
.104 
1.666 
2.628 
160 
.048 
2.140** 
2.996 
R² adjusted 
F-value 
VIF max  
TABLE 3-8. REGRESSION ANALYSES ON UNEXPECTED DEPRECIATION: ADJUSTED INTERACTION TERM  
(where p<0.05 is *, p<0.01 is ** and p<0.001 is ***) 
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 Exp Regression DA(f) 
All sectors, excluding 
education/research 
All EBDA 
Regression DA(g) 
All sectors, excluding 
education/research 
NEGATIVE EBDA 
Regression DA(h) 
All sectors, excluding 
education/research 
POSITIVE EBDA 
Regression DA(i) 
Sector  
education/research 
NEGATIVE EBDA 
Regression DA(j) 
Sector  
education/research  
POSITIVE EBDA 
  Coeff. T-value Coeff. T-value Coeff. T-value Coeff. T-value Coeff. T-value 
Constant   .003       .638  .007    .686 -.009   -1.113 .066  1.889* -.017 -2.137** 
EBDA - -.609 -21.701*** -.705 -8.587*** -.546 -13.938*** -.337 -2.013* -.200 -3.362** 
EARNINGS +  .153    4.308***  .178  2.440**  .150    3.565***  .071    .419 .111 2.909** 
DAt-1 - -.119  -4.477*** -.080 -1.952* -.138   -3.909*** -.278 -1.999* .074 1.279 
SUBSLARG   .003     .420 -.013   -.997  .019    1.936   .056  1.206 .035 3.150** 
EBDAxSUBSLARG  -.143   -3.282** -.141 -1.298 -.229 - 3.473**  .535 2.108*** -.437 -5.019*** 
DONAT -  .007    1.101  .001    .102  .009   1 .032 -.066 -1.832* -.013 -1.582 
NEWLOAN +  .002     .269 -.007   -.618  .006       .742 -.064 -1.860* -.003 -.408 
N 
R² adjusted 
F-value 
VIF max 
 640 
.611 
144.187*** 
1.834 
229 
.514 
35.515*** 
3.369 
411 
.520 
64.354*** 
2.280 
40 
.306 
3.459** 
2.565 
161 
.412 
17.030*** 
3.057 
TABLE 3-9. REGRESSION ANALYSES ON DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
(where p<0.05 is *, p<0.01 is ** and p<0.001 is ***) 
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CONCLUSION 
SUMMARY 
In the current paper, we explored earnings management in the Belgian nonprofit sector, 
divided into six subsectors according to satellite accounts. Based on previous research into 
the interaction between funding (subsidies, financial debts, donations) and financial 
reporting (compliance, earnings management) and into the practices regarding subsidies in 
Belgium, we investigated nonprofit entities’ earnings management towards zero profit and 
the interaction with the level of subsidies.  
Using a specific accrual (depreciation) as well as an aggregate accruals model (Jones, 1991), 
we try to triangulate evidence while accounting for possible differences between sectors. 
Overall, the evidence for depreciation as a tool for earnings management is unconvincing. 
The results of the Jones model are much stronger. 
The bivariate evidence suggests that earnings management occurs in different nonprofit 
subsectors. However, the sector of education/research is significantly different from the 
others: downwards earnings management is far more dominant. The composition and 
subsidization of the sector might explain the difference in results. The sector largely consists 
of schools which are very heavily subsidized, since education  is ‘free of expense’ in Belgium, 
meaning that tuition fees are zero or very low in comparison to other countries such as the 
United Kingdom or the United States. These subsidies largely depend on the number of 
students, the cost of staff and the cost of infrastructure. The subsidies are therefore based 
on expenses. Given this ‘cost plus’ way of subsidization as well as the near-zero likelihood of 
bankruptcy, there are no or only very limited incentives for schools to manage earnings 
upwards.  Furthermore, schools have a strong tradition of using and reporting budgets 
rather than financial statements. Therefore, schools may not benefit from upwards earnings 
management.  
The characteristics of managed and unmanaged earnings as well as the multivariate analysis 
based on discretionary accruals show strong evidence of earnings management towards zero 
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profit. The comparison of reported and unmanaged results shows that the former is more 
centred around zero profit. Furthermore, regression analysis shows that earnings are 
managed downwards when premanaged earnings are positive and vice-versa.  
When analyzing the effect of subsidies on this earnings management pattern, we conclude 
that there is evidence that downwards earnings management in the case of unmanaged 
profits is accelerated by high levels of subsidization, whereas there is no such evidence for 
effects on upwards earnings management in the case of unmanaged losses. In the sector of 
education and research, upwards earnings management is slowed down in case of high 
levels of subsidization.  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCHOLARSHIP 
Since earnings management studies are few in the nonprofit sector, this study contributes to 
the emerging field of research. First, the cross-sector approach shows that, while earnings 
management seems prevalent in the entire sector, the level, direction and means of 
earnings management can differ sector-by-sector. Second, to our knowledge, this is the first 
research paper that links earnings management with the level of subsidization.  
APPLIED IMPLICATIONS 
There are also some practical implications to this study. First, it is important for subsidizing 
governments to have information about how nonprofit entities react to information on the 
relationship between profit and subsidies, which is often unclear and confusing. Clearly, it is 
important for governments to specify how the statements are used in the process of 
deliberating about subsidization. Furthermore, it is important for governments and standard 
setters to identify opportunities and reasons for earnings management when analyzing 
regulations for subsidization parallel to accounting standards’ flexibility and interpretation. 
Lastly, follow-up research is needed when new types of subsidies are introduced. Recently, 
the subsidization regulations in Belgian education have changed. It is important for the 
government to analyse whether this new type and level of subsidies increase efficiency in 
education as well as whether it changes earnings management practices.  
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LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Overall, the paper provides evidence that earnings management is prevalent in different 
nonprofit subsectors. Since the current sample did not allow for such an analysis, further 
research can investigate whether there are sector-specific accruals that are more 
appropriate than the depreciation expense used in this study. Although we have made an 
attempt to use several subsectors in order to measure the extent of earnings management 
beyond the scope of a specific subsector, the results indicate that specific sector research is 
still needed to get more insight in the use of specific accruals. The institutional evidence 
shows that, although the overall problem regarding the unclear relationship between 
reported profit and subsidies is unclear, a sector-by-sector analysis may provide a more 
tailored and stronger analysis of earnings management motives. Furthermore, when larger 
samples with varying subsidization levels and subsidization types are at hand, a sector- and 
subsidy-specific analysis may also teach us whether specific rules concerning subsidies give 
rise to different forms of earnings management. Furthermore, it may be interesting to 
analyse whether a ‘competition’ for subsidies influences the degree and direction of 
earnings management. Finally, we see opportunities in follow-up research that combines 
efficiency measurement (e.g. data envelopment analysis) and earnings management 
measures. It may be the case that earnings management is used as a signal of efficiency 
(consistent with for-profit entities signalling information through earnings management, e.g. 
Sun and Rath, 2008) or to cover up inefficiencies. 
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ABSTRACT 
In contrast to the extant research on audit fees of for-profit companies, literature on non-
profit audit fees is scant. In this paper, audit fee determinants of previous research are 
tested in a nonprofit market that is characterized by a relatively low dominance of Big4 
auditors, low litigation risk, small nonprofit entities, high levels of subsidization and recent 
legislative reforms. Using OLS on a sample of nonprofit entities, we find that some known 
determinants such as auditor size and client complexity hold their ground. However, our 
findings on client profitability and auditor specialization show that refinements of audit fee 
models need to incorporate audit market characteristics, agency problems and signaling. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Following the influential work by Simunic (1980), a vast amount of research has explored the 
determinants of audit fees. The scope of this research ranges from the threat of oligopolistic 
markets (Johnson, Walker, & Westergaard, 1995; Pearson & Trompeter, 1994) and fee 
premiums for the large audit firms (Palmrose, 1986), to the practice of low-balling (Craswell 
& Francis, 1999; Simon & Francis, 1988), the prevalence of non-audit services and related 
auditor independence problems (Ashbaugh, LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003; Davis, Ricchiute, & 
Trompeter, 1993; Ezzamel, Gwilliam, & Holland, 2002), the price effect of industry 
specialization (Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995; Cullinan, 1998; Ferguson, Francis, & Stokes, 
2003) and the role of internal audit (Felix, Gramling, & Maletta, 2001) and governance 
mechanisms (O'Sullivan & Diacon, 2002). 
Whereas most of the studies focused on the private sector and particularly on listed 
companies, the growing demand for accountability in the public and nonprofit sector set a 
new stream of research in motion. Auditing in the public sector has been on the research 
agenda since the 1980’s (Rubin, 1988; Baber, Brooks, & Ricks, 1987; Ward, Elder, & Kattelus, 
1994; Basioudis & Ellwood, 2005; Clatworthy, Mellett, & Peel, 2002). Nonprofit organizations 
seem to be the next in line to be confronted with stringent financial reporting regulation and 
the obligation of external auditing of these reports. Studies on audit fees in universities 
(Mellett, Peel, & Karbhari, 2007) and charities (Beattie, Goodacre, Pratt, & Stevenson, 2001) 
in the UK, identified determinants of audit fees in these specific submarkets and compared 
the fees for these organizations with their for-profit counterparts. A recent study of 125 very 
large nonprofit organizations in the US expands these results by investigating the effect of 
resource dependence, internal control and governance mechanisms, as well as by leaving 
the boundaries of a specific subsector (Vermeer, Raghunandan, & Forgione, 2009).  
In this paper, we investigate audit fees of nonprofit organizations in a specific setting. 
External audit has only recently (2006) been made mandatory for very large Belgian 
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nonprofit organizations12. This obligation is part of an extensive reform of accounting and 
reporting requirements for Belgian nonprofits. As such, audit clients as well as auditors are 
facing new challenges: (i) new accounting legislation; (ii) new standardized financial 
statements that are inspired by, but significantly different from, for-profits’ format of the 
financial statements; and (iii) a relatively new audit environment.  
In this paper, we want to address two research questions. First, we want to develop a model 
for non-profit audit fees and determine whether known determinants of audit fees in the 
for-profit sector are also reflected in nonprofit audit fees. As Tate (2007) points out, even in 
a well-established, mature audit market, there are significant differences between external 
auditing in a nonprofit and a for-profit setting. Dissimilarities in organizational structure, 
culture, goals, financial concerns, stakeholders and risk imply diversity in the way audit 
clients and auditors experience the audit process. Second, we want to investigate whether 
dependence on government fees is related to audit fees. Since Belgian nonprofit 
organizations are heavily subsidized and the government has made financial reporting and 
financial auditing mandatory, the question arises whether subsidization increases audit 
complexity and demand for audit quality which can both be reflected in the audit fee. 
This paper differs from previous research in four ways. First, since the Belgian audit market 
in general is not characterized by a dominance of BIG4 auditors (Weets & Jegers, 1997; 
Willekens & Achmadi, 2003; Van Caneghem, 2010), we use continuous measures of auditor 
size combined with the more traditional BIG4 – Non-BIG4 dichotomy. Second, since 
differences between an audit of a nonprofit organization and one in a for-profit company are 
presumably large (cf. supra, Tate 2007), we check whether auditor specialization in the 
nonprofit sector affects audit fees. Thus, we contribute to that field of the literature. Third, 
whereas previous studies used several proxies for audit effort, we extend the traditional 
measures with information on the characteristics of the audit firm (number of staff, 
                                                      
12
 Nonprofit organizations are defined as very large when two or more of the following criteria are surpassed: 
number of staff (50 full time equivalents), Total revenues (6250000 euro) and total assets (3125000 euro) or 
when more than 100 full time equivalents are employed.  
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percentages of junior auditors, and average fee per hour) as a proxy for the cost of 
performing an audit. This coincides with what Hay, Knechel and Wong (2006, p. 146) 
describe as a ‘production-based specification of the audit fee model’. Fourth, similar to 
Vermeer et al. (2009), we use measures of resource dependence. We view the level of 
resource dependence as a determinant from the demand-side of audit services, adding to 
that line of research (e.g. (Knechel & Willekens, 2006)). In contrast to Vermeer et al. (2009), 
we are able to test for dependence on public donations as well as governmental funding 
(through grants or subsidies).  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains an overview of the literature on audit fee 
determinants, followed by hypotheses in section 3. The data collection and methodology are 
explained in section 4. Next, the results of the OLS regression are discussed and the paper 
ends with a conclusion and issues for further research.  
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON AUDIT FEE DETERMINANTS 
There is a large body of literature on audit fee determinants. The original audit fee model of 
Simunic (1980) has been extended over time with several experimental variables added by 
as many authors. In general, three main groups of determinants can be identified: audit 
client, auditor and audit engagement characteristics. In this brief literature review, we rely 
heavily on the meta-analysis by Hay et al. (2006), adding research results of the period 
following their analysis and focusing on nonprofit findings. Although we focus primarily on 
auditor characteristics in this paper, the literature on other explanatory variables is 
discussed in order to identify the effects of possible control variables. 
 
AUDIT  CLIENT CHARACTERISTICS 
The size of the client influences the effort required by the auditor and thus the audit fee. 
Almost all previous studies find a (nonlinear) positive relation between client size (measured 
86 
 
as the natural logarithm of total assets, total sales or total staff) and the audit fee (generally 
transformed to its natural logarithm). Overall, size of the client is the most important 
explanatory factor in previous research (Hay et al., 2006, p.164). In the nonprofit sector 
studies, Mellett et al. (2007) and Beattie et al. (2001) found a positive association between 
total revenue of the organization and the level of the audit fee, whereas Vermeer et al. 
(2009) found the same result for total assets as a measure of client size. The complexity of 
the engagement is not only determined by the size of the client, but also by its 
organizational structure and its scope of activities. Often used determinants include the 
number of subsidiaries, the number of locations, the presence/importance of foreign 
activities, the number of business segments or industries. In the nonprofit sector, the 
number of trading subsidiaries (Beattie et al., 2001) is positively associated with the audit 
fee level. Evidence on other proxies for complexity such as number of trading outlets, 
number of branches and overseas activities is, however, mixed. In the United States, the 
complexity of a single audit has a positive impact on audit fees (Vermeer et al., 2009). 13 
Inventories and debtors have been used as a proxy for the extra audit effort required for 
particular assets. In the nonprofit studies by Mellett et al. (2007) and Beattie et al. (2001), a 
positive relationship was identified between the importance of inventories in total assets 
and audit fees. Vermeer (2009) found a positive correlation between the combined 
importance of accounts receivable and inventory and nonprofit clients’ audit fees. In their 
meta-study, Hay et al. (2006, p.170) identify all three measures as important drivers of audit 
fees, but favor the combined measure of inventories and receivables over the separate 
measures.  
Some characteristics of the audit client influence the level of the inherent audit risk and 
therefore the effort and price associated with the financial audit. Measures of profitability 
(either a dummy variable for the existence of a loss or the continuous measure of net 
income divided by total assets), leverage (debts divided by total assets) and liquidity (current 
                                                      
13
 In the United States, a single audit is a financial and compliance audit performed in organizations that 
expend at least 500,000 dollar of Federal grants. 
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ratio , quick ratio or similar) are applied as measures of audit risk. Overall results on 
profitability are mixed, which according to Hay et al. (2006, p.170) may be due to a nonlinear 
relationship between loss and risk. In the nonprofit sector, profitability is not significantly 
linked with audit fees (Mellett et al., 2007), whereas leverage is not significantly (Mellett et 
al, 2007) or positively (Vermeer et al., 2009, Basioudis et al., 2005) associated with audit 
fees. Higher liquidity ratios coincide with lower audit fees (Vermeer et al., 2009) as can be 
expected. The evidence on the relationship between the level of internal control / corporate 
governance and audit fees is mixed (Hay et al., 2006). Knechel and Willekens (2006) analyze 
audit fees from a ‘demand’ perspective and differentiate internal control according to its 
mandated/voluntary status. They find that there is a negative association between internal 
control and audit fees if internal controls are mandated, whereas there is a positive 
relationship between the demand for external audit services for companies with high levels 
of voluntary internal control and governance mechanisms. 
 
AUDITOR CHARACTERISTICS 
Typically, three aspects related to the auditor are incorporated in audit fee studies: audit 
quality, auditor tenure and location. Auditor size and auditor specialization are often used as 
proxies for audit quality.  
The BIGN (4,5,6 or 8 depending on the timing of the study) versus Non-BIGN dichotomy 
yields convincing results in favor of a brand name premium in the majority of studies (Hay et 
al., 2006, p.176). In the nonprofit studies, Vermeer et al. (2009) find a positive relationship 
between BIG4 firms and audit fees. In a similar vein, the UK-studies of Mellett et al. (2007) 
and Basioudis et al.(2005) show that BIGN auditors charge higher fees than second-tier or 
mid-tier auditors. Beattie et al. (2001) do not find a significant difference between BIG6 and 
Non-BIG6 auditors for grantmaking charities, whereas there is a brand name premium for 
fundraising charities. These authors use a resource dependence argument to explain the 
findings: fundraisers need to convince the public of their trustworthiness, which may be 
signalled by the use of a BIG6 auditor. This enables BIG6 auditors to make use of a better 
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bargaining position and to charge higher fees. The findings of Tate (2007, p.58) that BIG5 
audited nonprofit organizations rely more heavily on contributions, whereas Non-BIG5 audit 
clients rely more heavily on government grants seem to confirm this explanation.  
The effect of auditor specialization on audit fees is unclear. Previous studies yield mixed 
results, which may be due to a problem of operationalization of this concept (Neal & Riley, 
2004). Two broad views on specialization are used: the market share analysis and the 
portfolio share analysis. In a market share view, a specialist is the audit firm that is the 
market leader in a sector, or the holder of a market share above a certain cut-off point 
relative to market concentration. A continuous variable based on the actual market share 
has also been employed. These measures have been used in the nonprofit audit fee 
literature by Tate (2007), Beattie et al. (2001) and Basioudis et al. (2005). Whereas Beattie et 
al. (2001) find some evidence for a Non-BIG6 specialist premium, Basioudis et al. (2005) do 
not find a statistically significant relationship between auditor specialization and audit fees. 
In the portfolio analysis, specialists are identified by analyzing the number of audit 
engagements (audit fees) in a specific sector, relative to the total number of engagements 
(total audit fees) of the audit firm. To our knowledge, this analysis has not been applied to 
nonprofit audits. A combination of a market share measure and a portfolio measure of 
specialization is recommended by Neal & Riley (2004, p. 175): ‘Therefore, in many studies, 
researchers may be best served if they can capture both attributes of auditor specialization.’ 
An often cited reason to change auditor is to obtain a lower audit fee (see Tate, 2007 for 
evidence based on nonprofits). Two measures are commonly used for auditor tenure: a 
recent auditor switch (dummy) and the actual duration of the current auditor tenure. Hay et 
al. (2006) find better results for the dummy variable than for the continuous measure and 
therefore favor the use of a switch-dummy. Basioudis et al. (2005) are the only authors using 
a tenure variable in the nonprofit studies. They find no statistically significant relationship 
between an auditor switch within the last three years and the audit fee. 
The location of the audit firm may explain higher ‘production costs’ and therefore higher 
audit fees. In all nonprofit UK studies (Mellett et al., 2007; Beattie et al., 2001 and Basioudis 
et al., 2005), London based auditors charge higher audit fees.  
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AUDIT ENGAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS  
Some characteristics of the audit engagement can be helpful in explaining audit fee levels. 
Audit firms are confronted with seasonal effects in the demands for their services. The ‘busy 
season’ in audit engagements is related to the fact that for the majority of audit clients, the 
end of the accounting period coincides with the end of the calendar year. Hay et al. (2006) 
find mixed evidence on the effect of a busy season audit, depending on the country under 
investigation and the time frame. In the nonprofit study by Beattie et al. (2001), no 
statistically significant relationship was found. To measure the level of difficulty of an audit, 
two proxies are often used: the existence of an important time lag between the end of the 
accounting period and the date of the audit report (positive relationship with audit fees is 
reported in the meta-analysis by Hay et al (2006)) and the issuance of an audit opinion that 
is different from unqualified. The latter variable is marked as a ‘less important driver for 
audit fees’ by Hay et al. (2006, p. 178). In previous nonprofit studies, the report lag was not 
found to have a statistically significant correlation with audit fees by Beattie et al. (2001). 
The type of the audit opinion has, to our knowledge, not yet been studied for nonprofit 
entities. Finally, the relationship between the fees for audit services and nonaudit services 
has received a great deal of attention. The relationship between both fees is a priori 
ambiguous. On the one hand, a negative relationship can be expected due to cross-
subsidization or spill-overs of knowledge. On the other hand, audit clients looking for 
nonaudit services might be more complex or troubled organizations, resulting in a positive 
relationship between audit and nonaudit fees. According to Hay et al. (2006), the overall 
research results are strongly positive and significant. In the nonprofit studies, Beattie et al. 
(2001) also find a strong positive relationship. Basioudis et al. (2005), however, report a 
(marginally) significant negative relationship. 
The results of previous research are summarized in Table 4-1 . The different determinants of 
audit fees are listed in the first column, followed by their expected relationship with audit 
fees. The results of the meta-analysis by Hay et al (2006) are then followed by the results of 
the nonprofit audit fee studies. 
 
90 
 
Determinant Expect. Meta-analysis  
by Hay et al. 
(2006) 
Nonprofit studies 
Basioudis et al. 
(2005) 
Beattie et al. (2001) 
Mellett et al. (2007) 
Vermeer et al. (2009) 
Audit client    
Size  + + + 
Complexity: several measures such as 
number of subsidiaries, number of 
segments, number of industries, foreign 
activities etc.  
Inventories/debtors 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
+ for many 
measures 
 
 
+ 
Trading subsidiaries:+ 
Single audit: + 
Other measures: NS 
 
+ 
Audit risk:  
Profitability 
Leverage 
Liquidity 
Internal control 
Governance 
 
Resource dependence: 
fundraising (1) versus grantmaking (0) 
donation income 
trading income 
 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
? 
 
Negative (Mixed) 
Positive 
Negative 
Mixed 
Mixed 
 
NS 
+  and NS 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
 
+ 
NS 
+ and NS 
Auditor    
Audit quality: 
Big’N’ auditor 
 
 
 
 
Specialization 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
mixed 
 
Evidence in support of 
a Big’N’ premium, but 
with some variation 
(compared to whom? 
In which nonprofits?) 
Weak support for 
NonBig ‘N’ specialist 
premium or non-
significant results 
 
Auditor tenure 
Expensive (metropolitan) location 
 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
 
NS 
+ 
Audit engagement    
Busy season + mixed NS 
Report lag + + NS 
Opinion (other than qualified) + ‘less important’ NS 
Non-audit services ? + mixed 
TABLE 4-1. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FORMER RESEARCH ON THE DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES. 
 (Positive (negative) relationships are marked with ‘+’ (‘-‘), whereas statistically insignificant 
relationships are marked ‘NS’) 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the results and focus of earlier research, we want to address two research questions. 
First, we want to develop a model for non-profit audit fees and determine whether known 
determinants of audit fees in the for-profit sector are also reflected in non-profit audit fees. 
Apart from taking audit client characteristics and audit engagements characteristics into 
account, we focus on the auditor (size, specialization and structure). This analysis 
complements earlier research due to (i) the difference between a for-profit and a nonprofit 
audit (Tate et al., 2007) and (ii) the differences in audit market characteristics such as BIG4 
dominance, litigation risk, client size and commercial risk between earlier nonprofit 
research(in the UK and the US, Beattie et al., 2001, Mellett et al., 2007 and Vermeer et al., 
2009) and the current paper (Belgium).  
Second, we want to investigate whether dependence on government fees is related to audit 
fees. Since Belgian nonprofit organizations are heavily subsidized and the government has 
made financial reporting and financial auditing mandatory, the question arises whether 
subsidization increases audit complexity and demand for audit quality which can both be 
reflected in the audit fee. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
As in most other studies, we test the effect of the size (brand name) of the auditor on the 
audit fee level. The Belgian audit market is characterized by a moderate market share of the 
BIG4 auditors (Weets & Jegers, 1997; Willekens & Achmadi, 2003; Van Caneghem, 2010). 
Furthermore, the traditional view (DeAngelo, 1981) that the difference between BIG4 and 
NonBIG4 firms captures differences in audit quality , does not hold in Belgium (Sercu, Vander 
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Bauwhede, & Willekens, 2002; Vander Bauwhede & Willekens, 2004). Therefore, we test the 
effect of auditor size on audit fees using the traditional BIG4 – NonBIG4 dichotomy as well as 
a distinction between large and small auditors based on their number of audit staff.  We 
state that: 
H1. Large audit firms receive audit fee premiums 
The Belgian nonprofit sector has recently undergone legislatory changes that affect 
accounting and reporting practices. Although there is a law that has made accrual 
accounting and external auditing mandatory for all very large Belgian nonprofit 
organizations, heterogeneity still exists due to different sector regulations (Christiaens, 
Vanhee, Verbruggen, & Milis, 2008). This heterogeneity results in ambiguity on the role of 
the external auditor (Christiaens, Dierick, Reheul, Van Caneghem, Vanhee, & Verbruggen, 
2011). Combined with the organizational differences (such as the existence of important 
grants and donations, the absence of shareholders, the presence of volunteers) and the 
impact of these differences on the audit process, the audit of a nonprofit organization may 
necessitate other kinds of competences and experiences with respect to a for-profit 
enterprise’s audit. Therefore, specialization may be an important factor in the audit fee 
determination process.  
As discussed in the previous section, research on the link between specialization and audit 
fee levels has resulted in mixed evidence. Theoretically, specialization can have a positive as 
well as a negative impact on audit fees. A positive effect may result from the premium that a 
client is willing to pay for the audit quality or the signalling effect of hiring a specialist 
auditor. On the other hand, specialization may induce experience effects for the auditor, 
resulting in lower fees (Cairney & Young, 2006). Since Belgian nonprofit organizations 
represent a relatively small audit market (in 2007, 1748 audits were performed) and the 
Belgian audit market in general is not characterized by a large dominance of BIG4 auditors 
(Willekens & Achmadi, 2003), portfolio shares as well as market shares will be relatively low. 
Therefore, using cut-off values to determine which auditor is (and is not) a nonprofit sector 
specialist can lead to under- or over-estimation of the degree of specialization. Thus, similar 
93 
 
to Beattie et al. (2001) we use continuous instead of dichotomous variables to measure 
sectorspecialization.  
In former empirical research, the price effect of specialization has shown to be negative as 
well as positive. Experience effects give rise to a decrease in the expense per client and 
therefore in the audit fee of the client (Cullinan, 1998; Low, 2004). As Cairney and Young 
(2006, p. 50) stipulate: ‘auditor specialization provides a cost-based competitive advantage 
because the cost of developing expertise is spread over more clients’. Furthermore, since we 
are dealing with a new market, auditors may try to gain sufficient market share by asking 
lower audit fees. This will enable them to reach experience effects in the future. Wang, 
Sewon & Iqbal (2009) conclude that in the Chinese emerging markets, second-tier firms 
developed industry expertise in order to gain economies of scale and reduce service fees as 
a strategy to win future clients looking for low-priced audits. Similarly, we would expect to 
see a negative relationship between specialization and audit fees.  
However, empirical research has also shown (Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995; Cullinan, 
1998; Mayhew & Wilkins, 2003; Ward, Elder, & Kattelus, 1994) that a market specialist is 
rewarded by a fee premium. Clients may be willing to pay more for a specialist that delivers 
higher audit quality (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Krishnan, 2003; Maletta & Cartwright, 
1996) (Maletta & Cartwright, 1996). This may be an important signal to shareholders or, 
more generally, stakeholders. For example, Knechel, Naiker, & Pacheco (2007) show that 
firms switching to a specialist auditor experience significant positive abnormal returns. For 
nonprofits -given the absence of shareholders- banks, governments and donors are 
addressed as sources of revenue and funding. The question arises whether or not nonprofit 
entities are interested in paying higher fees for a specialist auditor in order to signal quality 
to these stakeholders. Furthermore, Craswell et al. (1995), Casterella, Frances, Lewis, & 
Walker (2004) as well as Carson & Fargher (2007) report that the occurrence of fee 
premiums depends on client size. Since the nonprofit sector is often characterized by 
relatively small organizations when compared to for-profit sectors, the likelihood of 
specialization fee premiums is lower. In conclusion, it seems less likely that the degree of 
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willingness of nonprofit organizations to pay a market share specialist premium is as high as 
that of the listed companies to which most of the former research relates. 
Overall, the arguments for specialist price discounts seem stronger than the reasons to pay a 
specialist price premium. We hypothesize that the correlation between specialization and 
audit fees in this new nonprofit market is negative. Therefore, we state that 
H2. The degree of nonprofit sector specialization is negatively related to audit fees. 
The audit fee of a client is determined by the number of audit hours, the composition of the 
audit team and the cost per audit hour. We gathered data that allows to use the 
composition of the audit firm as an explanatory factor in a ‘production cost’ analysis of audit 
pricing. Given the fact that seniority/expertise gives rise to higher wages and therefore 
higher costs, we hypothesize that 
H3. The audit fee per client is negatively related to the percentage of junior auditors in 
the total staff of the audit firm. 
Hypothesis 4 deals with resource dependence. Former research on this topic has resulted in 
mixed evidence. Vermeer et al. (2009) find no statistically significant relationship between 
donation income (as a percentage of total income) and audit fees, whereas Beattie et al. 
(2001) show that fundraising nonprofits pay higher audit fees than their grantmaking 
counterparts. Belgian nonprofit organizations are characterized by an important 
dependence on governmental grants and are much less depending on donations. Former 
research (Verbruggen, Christiaens, & Milis, 2011) has shown that compliance with 
accounting and reporting standards increases with dependence on grants. Also, survey data 
on Belgian nonprofits (Christiaens, Dierick, Reheul, Van Caneghem, Vanhee, & Verbruggen, 
2011) show that 55 percent of the respondents indicate that external auditing of the 
financial statements is useful to justify governmental grants. These respondents also indicate 
that the financial audit performed by an external auditor is different from and 
complementary to an audit by subsidizing governments. Furthermore, from a supply-side 
view, auditing grants may require additional audit efforts. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H4. Dependence on governmental subsidies is positively related to audit fees. 
95 
 
RESEARCH METHOD, DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND DATA COLLECTION 
Our approach for analyzing audit fees is based on OLS regressions, consistent with previous 
research. In all regressions presented in this paper, the dependent variable is the natural log 
of audit fees. The independent variables are described in Table 4-2 and briefly explained 
below.  
As in the literature review, we situate the variables in three categories: audit client, audit 
firm and audit engagement characteristics. Characteristics that measure the complexity and 
risk attributed to the client are defined similarly to previous research: total assets (in the 
natural log form, LNTA) and the percentage of stock and accounts receivable in total assets 
(ARINV) measure the complexity of the client and are expected to be positively related to 
audit fees. Profitability (PROFITAB), leverage (LEVERAGE) and the current ratio (LNCURRENT) 
measure the risk associated with the financial situation of the audit client. The current ratio 
is transformed into its natural log to mitigate outlier effects and reduce the skewness of the 
distribution.14 Dependence on subsidies (PERCSUBS) is expected to be positively related to 
audit fees, as explained in hypothesis 4. Donations (DONAT) are added to the model as a 
control variable (Beattie et al. (2001), Vermeer et al. (2009)). Due to the extreme skewness 
of this variable (80 percent of organizations do not receive donations), it is transformed into 
a dummy variable (one when donations are received, zero otherwise). Other dummy 
variables are added to the model to control for sector-specific characteristics. Six subsectors 
are identified: Culture, sports and recreation (1), education and research (2), health care (3), 
social services (4), advocacy (5) and other (6).  
 
 
 
                                                      
14
 Skewness is reduced from 41.466 in the distribution of CURRENT to 2.017 in the distribution of LNCURRENT. 
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Determinant Hypoth. 
/Control 
Definition  Expectation 
Audit client    
LNTA C Natural log of total assets  + 
ARINV C (Accounts receivable+ inventory)/Total assets + 
PROFITAB 
LEVERAGE 
LNCURRENT 
PERCSUBS 
DONAT 
 
SECTOR 
C 
C 
C 
H4 
C 
 
C 
Net profit of the period/Total assets 
Total debt/Total assets 
Current assets/Current liabilities (nat.log) 
Grants/total operating revenue 
Dummy variable to indicate the presence of 
donations 
Dummy variables to indicate the subsector to 
which the nonprofit organization belongs 
- 
+ 
- 
+ 
? 
 
? 
Auditor    
BIG4 H1 Dummy variable: 1 when the auditor is a Big 4 
firm, 0 otherwise 
+ 
LNSTAFF H1 Natural log of the number of staff of the audit 
firm 
+ 
LARGE H1 Dummy variable: 1 when LNSTAFF of the 
auditor is larger than the median value, zero 
otherwise 
+ 
LN_ENGAG H2 Natural log of the number of audit 
engagements in the nonprofit sector 
- 
FEE_HOUR 
 
C 
 
Average fee per audit hour, calculated as total 
audit fee of the audit firm/number of audit 
hours performed (on yearly basis) 
+ 
 
JUNIOR H3 Percentage of junior auditors in total staff of 
the audit firm 
- 
Audit engagement    
DELAY C Number of days between end of the 
accounting period and date of the audit report 
+ 
UNQUALIFIED C Dummy variable: 1 when unqualified auditors’ 
report, 0 otherwise 
- 
TABLE 4-2. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
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The characteristics of the auditor are also summarized in Table 4-2: the influence of brand 
name and auditor size is measured by the BIG4-dummy variable (BIG4) as well as by a 
continuous measure of auditor size (LNSTAFF). The variable LNSTAFF is also expressed as a 
dummy variable LARGE in which audit firms with LNSTAFF larger than the median value are  
assigned the value one, the others have the value zero. As such, the variable LARGE captures 
all BIG4 firms as well as the large(st) Non-BIG4 auditors. 
Auditor specialization is measured as the natural log of the number of 
engagements(LN_ENGAG) of the audit firm in the nonprofit sector. This variable captures 
the experience of the auditor in the sector and is a market share approach to specialization. 
Since we want to measure the experience effect that arizes from an increasing number of 
audit engagements, we take the natural logarithm of the number of engagements. The 
learning curve is typically expressed as : An=aN
b, with An= the effort required to produce the 
last nth unit, a= the effort needed for the production of the first unit, N= the cumulative 
number of units produced and b= the learning exponent. This relationship can also be 
expressed as LN(An) = LN(a)+bLN(N). Therefore, the number of engagements is transformed 
into its natural log. The slope of this learning curve, b, can be estimated by OLS. Usually, the 
slope of the learning curve is interpreted as the constant percentage decrease in effort every 
time output is doubled.  
Given the fact that we assume a negative correlation between the number of engagements 
and the audit fee, a portfolio approach to specialization seems less suitable. In the portfolio 
measure, an increasing number of nonprofit audit engagements at a lower audit fee would 
fade out the effect of auditor specialization. Furthermore, the nonprofit sector is a very 
small sector when compared to all other for-profit sectors in the total portfolio of the audit 
firm. However, given the fact that Neal and Riley (2004) suggest the use of either a 
combination of market share and portfolio share or a weighed measure of 
sectorspecialization, we introduce a weighed measure as a sensitivity test. The weighed 
measure is the natural log of the number of engagements multiplied by the percentage of 
nonprofit audit fees in total audit firm revenue. 
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The final two auditor-related variables are FEE_HOUR and JUNIOR. The first variable is a 
measure of the average fee that the audit firm bills per hour. The second variable is the 
percentage of junior auditors in the audit firm. Both variables are linked to a production 
function approach to the audit fee and are proxies for the fee per hour charged to a specific 
client and the composition of the audit team. The last panel of Table 4-2 summarizes the 
audit engagement characteristics. Audit complexity has been measured in previous research 
by the time gap between the end of the accounting year and the date of the audit report 
(DELAY) and the type of auditors’ report. A late auditors’ report or a report that is anything 
other than unqualified, is a proxy for a difficult audit process. In this paper, the dummy 
variable UNQUALIFIED takes the value one when the report is unqualified. Therefore, we 
expect a negative relationship with the audit fee.  
All Belgian audit firms need to report audit fees, number of staff and number of billed hours 
to the Institute of Auditors (IBR, Instituut van de Bedrijfsrevisoren). At the time of the data 
collection, data for 2006 and 2007 were available, as well as the majority of data for 2008. In 
these collected  data, nonprofit clients were identified. In the three-year period for which 
data are available, the number of missing data was at a minimum in 2007. Therefore, data 
for that year are used in the analysis. When data for 2007 were missing in the auditor’s 
reporting to the Institute, the most recent available data (2008 or 2006) were used. To 
calculate portfolio shares, missing audit fees were replaced by the average of the audit fee in 
2006 and 2008.  
In 2007, the auditors reported 1748 nonprofit audit engagements (political parties, social 
insurance entities and pension funds were not defined as nonprofits due to the absence of 
mandatory financial statements or the financial nature of their activities). The financial data 
for the audited organizations were retrieved from the BELFIRST database and from the 
website of the National Bank of Belgium. The data on the audit engagement and sectors 
were retrieved from the National Bank of Belgium. For 382 organizations, the audit fee was 
not reported and for 11 organizations the sector could not be determined. In 462 cases, the 
financial statements did not allow to calculate dependence on subsidies or donations, 
reducing the number of usable cases to 893. Thereof, 151 (16.9 percent) were audited by a 
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BIG4 auditor, 742 (83.1 percent) by a non-BIG4 auditor. In 146 cases, the auditor’s report 
was not made public and in 7 cases we did not have sufficient data to determine the auditor 
characteristics. This reduced the number of usable cases to 740. For none of the BIG4 
auditors, an average fee per audit hour was disclosed by the audit firm in their report to the 
Institute of auditors. An overview of the number of cases is presented in Table 4-3.  
 Total BIG4 Non-BIG4 
Total number of audits 1748 284  
(16.2%) 
1464  
(83.8%) 
-Fee unknown -382 - 38 - 344 
- Sector unknown -11 - 1 - 10 
-missing data financial 
statements 
-462 - 94 - 368 
Number  
(client characteristics) 
893 151  742  
-missing data on audit 
engagement (unqualified/delay) 
-146 -40 -106 
-missing data on auditor 
characteristics 
-7 -0 -7 
Number 
(client/auditor/engagement) 
 740 111 
(15.0%) 
629  
(85.0%) 
-missing data on average audit 
fee/hour 
-200 -111 -89 
Number with fee/hour in the 
analysis 
540 0 540 
TABLE 4-3. NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4-4 for the continuous variables used in the audit 
fee models. Two variables were winsorized at the five percent (profitability, fee per hour) 
and one percent (leverage, delay) level to mitigate the disturbing effects of outliers in the 
regression analysis. The current ratio was transformed to its natural log to deal with a high 
level of skewness and (this was also the case in Basioudis & Elwood, 2005). The average 
audit fee is 5257.74 euro. The average total assets of the audit clients is 17.8 million euro, 
but the distribution is heavily skewed. The average audit client has a leverage of 49 percent 
and profit is three percent of total assets. Dependence on subsidies ranges from zero to 100 
percent, with an average of 33 percent. Dependence on donations (not tabulated) is only 
one percent on average and 80 percent of organizations do not receive donations. The 
auditor characteristics in Table 4-4 are based on the number of audit engagements. 
Therefore, an auditor performing 20 audits in the sample of 740 organizations will be taken 
into consideration as many times in this table. 
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FEE 471.00 100150.00 2150.00 5671.75 5257.74 3302.50 6.21 65.37 
LNFEE 6.15 11.51 7.67 8.64 8.21 .77 .64 .82 
TA (000) 8.4 1235708 2208.04 11774.21 17790.75 6059.92 13.14 234.29 
LNTA 9.03 20.93 14.61 16.28 15.48 1.47 .046 .97 
ARINV .00 .99 .068 .29 .21 .20 1.58 2.24 
LEVERAGE 
wins.1% 
.03 1.24 .27 .67 .49 .27 .484 -.371 
PROFITAB.  
Wins.5% 
-.06 .15 .0052 .061 .0356 .05 .48 .204 
LNCURRENT -1.71 6.72 .309 1.29 .91 .93 1.50 5.48 
PERCSUBS .00 1.00 .006 .83 .46 .37 -.019 -1.56 
DELAY 
Wins.1% 
57 261 113 157 135.53 34.96 .13 1.20 
LNSTAFF .00 6.17 1.04 3.32 2.51 1.83 .71 -.51 
JUNIOR .00 .82 .25 .64 .45 .25 -.34 -.96 
FEE_HOUR 
Win5% 
37.71 118.97 64.55 92.20 77.60 18.16 -.122 -.195 
LN_ENGAG .00 4.86 2.08 3.99 2.98 1.19 -.43 -.48 
LN_PORTF -2.81 4.93 -.24 1.63 .42 1.56 -.39 -.32 
TABLE 4-4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON CONTINUOUS VARIABLES USED IN THE AUDIT FEE MODELS FOR 740 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS  
The descriptives for the audit firms (one datapoint for each audit firm) are presented in 
Table 4-5. The data are shown for all audit firms as well as for BIG4 and Non-BIG4 firms 
separately. The number of audit engagements (not tabulated) in the nonprofit sector varies 
from one to 61 in Non-BIG4 audit firms and from 11 to 129 for the BIG4 auditors. The mean 
percentage of nonprofit audit fees in total audit fees (not tabulated) is 8.87 percent and 0.12 
percent for Non-BIG4 and BIG4 respectively. The audit fee per hour is clearly influenced by 
outliers (ranges from 27 to 1753 euro per hour) and was therefore winsorized at the 5% level 
at both tails of the distribution. This variable is only available for Non-BIG4 auditors. Overall, 
the data suggest large differences in characteristics between BIG4 and Non-BIG4 firms.  
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LNSTAFF 
BIG4 (n=4) 
Non-BIG4 (n=130) 
 
5.69 
.00 
 
6.17 
4.55 
 
5.97 
1.24 
 
.22 
1.01 
 
-.61 
.84 
 
-2.41 
.26 
LN_ENGAG 
BIG4 
Non-BIG4 
 
2.40 
.00 
 
4.86 
4.11 
 
3.95 
1.61 
 
1.08 
1.61 
 
-1.54 
.24 
 
2.72 
-.53 
LN_PORTF 
BIG4 
Non-BIG4 
 
-2.88 
-1.89 
 
-1.47 
4.93 
 
-2.28 
1.29 
 
.60 
1.17 
 
.99 
.37 
 
1.40 
.32 
FEE_HOUR (WIN5%)  
Non-BIG4 
 
37.71 
 
118.97 
 
75.41 
 
19.72 
 
.21 
 
-.17 
JUNIOR 
BIG4 
Non-BIG4 
 
.37 
.00 
 
.82 
.80 
 
.67 
.34 
 
.20 
.25 
 
-1.83 
-.13 
 
3.44 
-1.30 
TABLE 4-5. DESCRIPTIVES ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ALL AUDIT FIRMS ACTIVE IN THE 740 NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS (SAMPLE) 
 
BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
All Spearman correlation coefficients are shown in Table 4-6. When analyzing the bivariate 
correlation between the audit fee (natural log) and the characteristics of the audit client and 
the audit engagement, we notice that the correlation with total assets (natural log), the size 
of the auditor (dichotomous (.194) as well as continuous (.285)) and the health care sector 
(sector 3) as well as sector 6 (which is the most business-like nonprofit subsector) are high 
and positive. On the other hand, the subsector of education and research (sector 2) seems to 
pay lower audit fees. This may be explained by the fact that this sector has consistently 
worked with public tenders. Consistent with our expectations, the correlation between an 
unqualified report and the audit fee is negative. Contrary to our expectations, the 
correlation between dependence on subsidies and the audit fee is negative when we do not 
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control for other factors (most importantly the sector). This is also the case for LN_ENGAG 
and JUNIOR. These correlations, however, may be explained by the size of the auditor. 
When analyzing the characteristics of the auditor, it becomes obvious that there are very 
high correlations between BIG4/LNSTAFF on the hand and almost all auditor characteristics 
on the other hand. The high correlation between BIG4/LNSTAFF and the natural log of the 
number of nonprofit audit engagements (LN_ENGAG) as well as the percentage of junior 
auditors in the firm indicates that combining the BIG4 dummy/LNSTAFF with the other 
auditor characteristics in a single regression, might induce collinearity problems. This is an 
important argument to make separate regressions according to the size of the audit firms.
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LNTA .537 1                   
ARINV .041 -.221 1                  
PROFITAB -.040 -.131 .049 1                 
LEVERAGE .001 -.132 .306 -.188 1                
LNCURR -.010 .060 -.314 .265 -.646 1               
PERCSUBS -.197 -.184 -.095 .049 -.014 .124 1              
DONAT .024 .026 -.124 -.079 -.055 .058 .213 1             
SECT1 -.016 -.091 .041 -.074 .021 -.030 -.070 -.048 1            
SECT2 -.214 -.071 -.182 .112 -.006 .198 .494 -.001 -.125 1           
SECT3 .273 .292 .209 -.019 .056 -.032 -.081 -.106 -.054 -.220 1          
SECT4 -.041 -.105 .032 -.081 -.118 -.151 -.178 .221 -.132 -.540 -.232 1         
SECT5 -.037 -.050 -.018 .046 -.063 .070 -.064 -.068 -.051 -.207 -.089 -.218 1        
SECT6 .158 .049 .041 -.003 .167 -.066 -.294 -.146 -.055 -.226 -.097 -.238 -.091 1       
BIG4 .194 .184 .042 -.041 .072 -.087 -.102 -.059 -.029 -.085 .059 -.104 .049 .171 1      
LNSTAFF .285 .230 .092 -.029 .029 -.083 -.160 -.053 -.065 -.091 .059 -.089 .061 .173 .620 1     
LN_ENGAG .060 .089 .086 -.012 .093 -.053 .005 -.043 -.098 .017 .017 -.138 .046 .096 .592 .729 1    
FEE_HOUR .111 .009 .083 -.024 .104 -.082 -.115 -.019 -.016 .014 .014 .038 -.006 .106 . .276 .249 1   
JUNIOR .125 .090 .047 -.037 .012 -.089 -.110 -.084 -.027 .025 .025 -.019 -.009 .116 .589 .557 .453 -.033 1  
DELAY .052 .050 .068 -.084 .096 -.083 -.040 -.029 -.117 .087 .087 -.018 -.148 .079 .106 .146 .156 .002 .119 1 
UNQUAL -.146 -.082 -.069 .059 -.158 .131 .035 .005 .057 -.211 -.211 .065 .020 -.062 .045 -.029 .039 .053 .004 -.135 
TABLE 4-6. SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN ALL VARIABLES (TWO-SIDED, SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS AT 5% LEVEL ARE BOLDED)
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MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES 
Since all auditor-size variables correlate strongly with variables measuring auditor 
characteristics (percentage of juniors, fee per hour) and with the specialization measure, we 
perform separate regressions to test the relationship of these variables with audit fees. In a 
first set of regressions, hypothesis 1 is tested (auditor size) on different combinations: BIG4 
versus Non-BIG4, BIG4 versus large Non-BIG4 auditors, large Non-BIG4 versus small Non-
Big4 auditors and large versus small auditors.  
The full OLS model is stated as follows (with the definition of variables as in Table 4-2 and 
SIZE is either the BIG4 variable or the LARGE variable) 
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The results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 4-7. The sector of education and 
research was used as the reference sector for the analysis. The adjusted R² of the different 
models ranges from .367 to .435, which is satisfactory but lower than in similar for-profit 
firms research (Beattie (2000) reports R² around 60 percent). The results show strong 
support for hypothesis 1. In the full sample, the audit fees of larger auditors, whether 
measured by BIG4/NonBIG4, LARGE/SMALL or continuously by LNSTAFF, are always 
significantly higher than the fees of the smaller audit firms. In model 2, BIG4 auditors are 
compared to large Non-BIG4 auditors. Here, the fee premium for the B4 auditor is only 
marginally significant. Although in most research, BIG4 premiums are documented, this 
result is consistent with results reported by Van Caneghem (2010) in the Belgian audit 
market (for-profit organizations). Finally, in model 3, only Non-BIG4 auditors are analyzed. 
Once again, larger auditors have significantly higher fees than their smaller counterparts. In 
summary, the first hypothesis is largely supported by the data. However, the size of the 
auditor seems more relevant than the BIG4 brand name.  
Client characteristics were tested in all models. Complexity of the client is positively 
associated with the level of the audit fee: total assets (ln) as well as the percentage of 
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accounts receivable and inventory in total assets have consistent and highly significant 
coefficients in all models. When assessing audit risk, we conclude that leverage nor liquidity 
help to explain audit fee levels. Contrary to our expectations, profitability is positively 
associated with the audit fee (at the 10 percent level). This is different from previous 
nonprofit research, where the variable was not significant. Furthermore, the effect seems to 
be driven by the smaller auditors (profitability is not significant when the sample only 
consists of larger auditors). Whereas Hay et al. (2006) suggest that mixed results may be due 
to a non-linear relationship (in which a reduction in profitability does not have the same 
impact when the company was already making a loss versus reporting a small profit), our 
results suggest that market characteristics may (also) drive the relationship. A nonprofit 
organization is allowed to report a profit, but is not expected to. Therefore, the existence of 
profit may reflect an ‘ability to pay’ higher audit fees or lower price elasticity in more 
profitable organizations. The difference between the results of the current study and 
previous research as well as the difference between larger and smaller auditors in the 
current study can help identify the conditions under which the ‘ability to pay’ signal leads to 
increased audit fees. First, the audit risk environment (litigation and commercial risk) needs 
to be taken into consideration. When risk is low, profitability is less important in assessing 
audit risk and audit effort which gives room to ability to pay effects. Second, the market 
characteristics define the bargaining power of both parties. In a nonprofit market where 
audit is mandatory but the choice of the auditor is at the discretion of the client, pressure on 
prices will be high. Since we do not observe the positive relationship between profitability 
and audit fees for larger auditors, this may indicate that these auditors have sufficient 
bargaining power to be able to charge ‘standard’ fees which makes the ability to pay less 
important. Further research is needed to determine whether this observation is the result of 
an ‘ability to pay’ effect in which non-dominant auditors charge higher fees to nonprofit 
clients who seem more likely to be able to afford higher fees whereas dominant auditors do 
not take this into account.  
In none of the models, dependence on subsidies (and donations) is significant in explaining 
audit fees. Therefore, the results do not support hypothesis 4 that fees are higher when 
nonprofits depend on subsidies.  
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The delay of the audit report is not significant (consistent with the findings in Van 
Caneghem, 2010), whereas the type of audit report is highly significant in 4 of the 5 models, 
in the expected direction. Similar to profitability, the type of audit report is no longer 
significant when the sample only consists of large auditors.  
Models testing the relationship between auditor size and audit fees 
SAMPLE ALL 
auditors 
ALL 
auditors 
ALL 
auditors 
BIG4 and 
LARGE 
Non-
BIG4 
Non-
BIG4 
auditors 
Variables Expect. Model 
1a 
Model 
1b 
Model 
1c 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
CONSTANT  3.356*** 3.287*** 3.335*** 2.964*** 3.741*** 
LNTA + .304 *** .303*** .297*** .333*** .277*** 
ARINV + .471*** .452*** .441** .406** .470*** 
LEVERAGE + .016 .026 .033 .061 -.036 
PROFITAB. - .834* .804* .826* .255 .841* 
LNCURRENT - .009 .007 .010 .031 -.010 
PERCSUBS + -.015 -.004 .001 -.088 .019 
DONAT  .070 .060 .069 .136 .049 
SECTOR1  .372** .404** .391** .359 .319** 
SECTOR3  .292** .295** .305** .333** .255** 
SECTOR4  .110* .116* .113* .151* .092 
SECTOR5  .157* .161* .148 .092 .163* 
SECTOR6  .323** .329*** .314** .396** .257** 
DELAY - .000 .000 .000 -.001 .000 
UNQUALIFIED - -.147** -.129** -.138** -.063 -.146** 
BIG4 + .240***   .120*  
LARGE +  .214***   .186*** 
LNSTAFF +   .061***   
R²Adj.  .411 .417 .418 .435 .367 
F   35.328 36.291 36.431 21.202 25.253 
Max VIF  1.81 1.81 1.81 1.90 1.93 
N  740 740 740 395 629 
TABLE 4-7. OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR AUDITOR SIZE  
(where p<0.05 is *, p<0.01 is ** and p<0.001 is ***) 
108 
 
Next, the auditor characteristics are tested separately for different sizes of auditors to 
ensure multicollinearity problems do not influence the results. The following regression 
model is tested: 
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Due to the fact that the variable ‘FEE_HOUR’ is not available for the BIG4 auditors, the 
model is extended with this variable only in samples that consist entirely of Non-BIG4 
auditors. In the sample of BIG4 auditors only, the variable JUNIOR was redefined as a 
dummy variable (0 for the lowest two percentages, 1 for the highest two) to mitigate the 
effect of multicollinearity. Using the actual percentages leads to very high VIF-values. The 
results of the regression are shown in Table 4-8. 
The explanatory power (R²a) of the models ranges from .334 to .516 depending on the 
samples. Overall, the results strongly support the second hypothesis that nonprofit sector 
specialization is negatively related to audit fees. Whether this is the result of lowballing or 
experience effects cannot be determined in the current research setting. If the coefficient of 
LN_ENGAG is capturing a learning or experience effect, the learning curve involved ranges 
from 80 to 92 percent (depending on the type of auditor). The coefficient ‘b13’ is the result of 
log r/log 2, with r= the learning rate. In this case, log 0,8/log 2 is approximately 0.3, the 
coefficient of LN_ENGAG in the BIG4 model. A learning rate of 80 percent indicates that the 
price of the last unit is 80 percent of the price of the first unit every time production is 
doubled. However, some caution is needed when interpreting these results. First, the 
experience curve is usually expressed in terms of the cost of production. Since audit price 
does not fully reflect audit cost, the former may be a crude proxy of the cost depending on 
how strongly cost reductions are reflected in price reductions. Second, as explained before, 
we cannot determine whether the negative coefficient of LN_ENGAG is the consequence of 
lowballing or experience.  
As explained in section 4, we tested LN_WEIGH, a weighed measure of auditor specialization 
according to a market share as well as a portfolio share analysis (not tabulated). The 
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weighed measure (number of engagements x percentage of nonprofit audit fees in total 
audit revenue of the firm) was not significant in all models, except for the models including 
BIG4 firms. This confirms our expectation that when audit fees are negatively correlated to 
the number of audits, the second term of the weighed factor is a weak measure for 
specialization. Only when the number of audits is very high (as in the case of the BIG4 
auditors), the first factor will be strong enough to capture the (negative) specialization 
effect. Therefore, the result is consistent with the existence of an experience curve. 
The third hypothesis regarding the percentage of junior auditors is not supported by the 
data. There are several possible explanations for this insignificant result which may be 
explored in further research. First, the percentage of junior auditors in the firm may not 
reflect the percentage of auditors in the nonprofit audit team. Second, the percentage of 
juniors may be strongly driven by the size of the firm. Third, the lower expense of junior 
auditors may not be reflected in audit pricing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Models testing auditor characteristics 
  LARGE 
auditors 
SMALL 
auditors 
SMALL 
auditors 
BIG4 
auditors 
NonBIG4 
auditors 
NonBIG4 
auditors 
Variables Exp. Model4 Model5a Model5b Model6 Model7a Model7b 
CONSTANT  3.456*** 4.087*** 3.209*** 4.162 3.845*** 3.493*** 
LNTA + .324*** .253*** .282*** .394*** .271*** .286*** 
ARINV + .401** .460** .455** .185 .441** .435** 
LEVERAGE + .120 -.030 -.027 .397 .061 .048 
PROFITAB. - .085 1.651** 1.94** .177 .869* .758 
LNCURRENT - .014 -.003 .005 .131 .000 .003 
PERCSUBS + -.037 .075 .120 -.299 .060 .072 
DONAT  .152* -.016 .049 .194 .052 .099 
SECTOR1  .281 .341** .458** .773 .242* .245 
SECTOR3  .327** .292** .184 .486* .238** .209** 
SECTOR4  .114 .098 .065 .352 .052 .011 
SECTOR5  .114 .225* .341** .099 .153 .221** 
SECTOR6  .379*** -.008 -.113 .398* .207** .184 
DELAY - .000 .001 .001 .000 .000 .000 
UNQUALIFIED - -.024 -.163* -.200** -.195 -.115* -.108 
 JUNIORS - -.196 .292* .199 .190 .048 .048 
LN_ENGAG - -.211*** -.137*** -.135*** -.305** -.123*** -.137*** 
LNSTAFF + .122** .044 .109 -.147 .136*** .145*** 
FEE_HOUR +   .005***   .002 
R²Adj.  .456 .334 .397 .516 .383 .409 
F   20.438 11.132 11.300 8.333 23.902 21.755 
Max VIF  2.88 2.10 2.23 2.43 1.98 2.02 
N  395 345 283 111 629 540 
TABLE 4-8. OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR AUDITOR CHARACTERISTICS 
(where p<0.05 is *, p<0.01 is ** and p<0.001 is ***) 
 
In sum, the data on Belgian nonprofit organizations largely support a price premium for large 
auditors and a price reduction for nonprofit sector specialists. The audit fee does not seem 
to be driven by resource dependence. Neither subsidies nor donations affect the audit fee. 
And finally, the structure of the audit firm as a whole is not reflected in individual audit fees. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper is the first to analyze pricing models in the Belgian audit market of nonprofit 
organizations. The specific characteristics of the audit environment enable us to test 
previous audit fee models when (i) the BIG4 auditors are not as dominant, (ii) clients as 
well as auditors are relatively inexperienced with the audit process in a nonprofit setting, 
(iii) the market is newly reformed, small and developing. Since there is only a limited 
number of studies on audit fees in the nonprofit sector, the current paper extends 
previous research on two important dimensions. First, we tested whether or not known 
determinants of audit fees identified in previous (mostly for-profit sector) research are 
also reflected in nonprofit organisations’ audit fees.   
Measures of client complexity are highly important in explaining audit fees and 
comparable to for-profit studies, suggesting that auditors duplicate knowledge on for-
profit audit complexity in non-profit audit fees.  
Measures of audit risk, however, are not used in the same manner. Liquidity and 
leverage are insignificant in explaining audit fees. Although the meta-study by Hay et al. 
(2006) shows that there is a positive (negative) relationship with leverage (liquidity), 
non-significant results are also often the case. We also need to take into consideration 
that (i) the litigation risk and commercial risk is quite low when auditing a (small) 
nonprofit organization, (ii) this is even more so the case in Belgium, where litigation risk 
is traditionally lower than in e.g. the US or the UK.  
The relationship between audit fee and profitability is positive for smaller auditors. This 
result, which prima facie is unexpected and opposite to theoretical expectation, can help 
to shed light on previously mixed results reported by Hay et al. (2006). Since this 
relationship is not the key research question in the current paper, we suggested that 
follow-up research addresses the relationship between market characteristics (maturity 
of the market, mandatory versus voluntary audit, bargaining power of audit clients and 
audit firms) and profitability as a determinant of audit fees. 
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In contrast to earlier studies (non-significant) but in line with theoretical expectations, an 
unqualified audit report is negatively related to audit fees. One possible explanation for 
the negative relationship is the fact that clients are not yet familiar with accounting 
regulations, internal control systems and auditing procedures resulting in more complex 
audits, qualified opinions and higher fees. Follow-up research can look into this effect by 
analyzing whether or not this variable remains significant when the audit market 
becomes more mature and clients as well as auditors get more experienced. 
The test of auditor characteristics shows that, similar to previous research, larger 
auditors charge higher fees. The size of the auditor does not necessarily needs to be 
reduced to a dichotomous BIG4 versus NonBig4 variable, since results show that 
continuous measures of size are equally important in explaining differences in audit fees.  
Auditor specialization is negatively associated with lower audit fees. Whereas the 
relationship between specialization and fees is ambiguous in a for-profit setting, the 
expectations in a non-profit setting are negative. The signaling effect of hiring a specialist 
auditor is smaller due to the absence of stockholders. Therefore, the willingness to pay 
higher fees for a specialist will also be lower. From a supply-side view, since this is a 
newly established market, learning effects may play an important role and drive fees 
downwards. On the other hand, the negative relationship between the number of audits 
and the fees may also be caused by lowballing in a price-conscious market. Our inability 
to disentangle learning effects from lowballing effects is therefore a drawback of the 
paper and a suggestion for further research. 
Second, the effect of resource dependence (tested previously by Beattie et al. (2001) and 
Vermeer et al. (2009)) is tested in an environment where governmental grants are an 
important source of revenue. Although previous research shows that dependence on 
subsidies is positively correlated with financial reporting compliance and financial audit is 
deemed important by nonprofit organizations in order to justify subsidies, the 
percentage of subsidies is not significantly correlated with audit fee (even when 
controlling for differences between sectors). This is also the case for donations, which 
could be expected, due to the low importance of donations in the Belgian setting. At this 
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point in time, we still need to identify why there is no relationship. Several explanations 
are possible: (i) the government does not pay attention to financial audit information in 
the procurement process of subsidies, (ii) subsidies do not increase the audit effort, (iii) 
subsidies are audited by governmental auditors, not by financial auditors, (iv) audit 
clients are not convinced that higher quality audits are important in receiving/justifying 
subsidies. 
The current paper extends knowledge on nonprofit audit fees and is important to 
practice as well. Overall, the results show that the audit fee model of a non-profit 
organization differs from a for-profit client due to the characteristics of the client and the 
audit market. The comparison with former research has helped to either confirm or 
refine previous findings. First, the study confirms the conclusion in previous research 
that larger firms charge higher fees and that measures of client complexity are strong 
determinants of audit fee levels. However, the results alos show that audit fee models 
need to be refined under differing circumstances. Lower litigation and/or commercial 
risk, the absence of shareholders which induces lower agency problems and signaling 
effects are possible explanations for differences in the audit fee determinants (the 
absence of client risk determinants, the ability to pay effect of profitability, and the 
negative relationship between price and specialization). Dependence on governmental 
subsidies, a key difference in the financing of for-profits and non-profits is not significant 
in explaining audit fee levels.  
The relatively low explanatory power of the audit fee models (when compared to 
previous for-profit research) indicates that further research is needed to better explain 
nonprofit audit fees. A comparison with for-profit audit fees in a similar market may 
further help to clarify differences in the determinants of audit fees. Furthermore, future 
analysis of audit fees may help to distinguish lowballing from experience curve effects in 
the specialization variable.  
The results of the current study are important to audit clients as well as auditors. First, 
audit clients need to be aware of the difference in pricing between smaller and larger 
auditors, between specialists and non-specialists and the effect of profitability on the fee 
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level. Given the fact that previous research (Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2004) did 
not identify differences in quality between large and smaller audit firms, this information 
is relevant in their auditor choice decision. Second, if the relationship between audit fees 
and specialization can be explained by learning effects, the presence and shape of such a 
curve is important to auditors.  
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ABSTRACT 
Nonprofit organizations often rely on governmental grants to finance their social programs. 
Under certain circumstances, the procurement of these grants causes an agency-relation 
between the board of directors and the management of the organization. Using archival data 
from a substantial number of nonprofit organizations’ financial statements, the influence of 
different types of government grants on the agency-relation between board and management is 
tested. The study reveals an increase in the agency-relationship depending on the level of 
efforts necessary to attain the grants. 
 
  
121 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is little discussion on the importance of nonprofit organizations in today’s economy. The 
number of organizations, their employment figures, as well as their economic importance is 
growing in several countries (Marée et al. 2008, U.N. Statistics Division 2003). The academic 
debate on the reasons for existence, management and efficiency of nonprofit organizations is 
ongoing.  
Nonprofit entities differ from their for-profit counterparts in several aspects. In terms of 
financing, there are three major differences: nonprofits are bounded by a non-distribution 
constraint, they do not have formal owners and, therefore, they have different sources of 
funding. Unlike for-profit firms, organizations quite often heavily rely on donations and grants to 
finance their operations. Contrary to a commonly held belief, nonprofit organizations are 
allowed to make profits. This surplus, however, cannot be distributed to anyone who exercises 
control over the firm (Hansmann 1980). Equity is not raised through owner contributions, but 
built through profit accumulation, which are basically excess donations and grants. Tuckman 
and Chang (1992) argue that this accumulation of equity is a goal of the nonprofit organization.  
Due to the lack of formal ownership and the absence of residual claimants, agency problems 
(Fama and Jensen 1983) are shaped differently in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit 
firms. In a very broad sense, agency problems can arise when one person (the agent) is hired to 
take actions or make decisions on behalf of the other (the principal). Difficulties in this 
relationship can arise when two conditions are met: (i) the objectives of the principal differ from 
the objectives of the agent and (ii) the actions taken by the agent are hard to observe (so-called 
hidden actions). In for-profit settings, agency problems have been documented where 
managers act as agents and shareholders are principals. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) pointed 
out, the interest of these managers is different from the interest of the owners. As explained, in 
a nonprofit organization, there is no ownership in the sense that a founder, board member or 
member of the organization holds the right to residual claims. Du Bois et al. (2004) and Olson 
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(2000) argue that, although there is no legal ownership, the nonprofit board does have the right 
to monitor and control, serving as a principal in an agency-relation with management.  
Although academics agree on the existence of agency problems in nonprofit organizations, 
scientific research in this area is less prevalent than in for-profit corporations. In this paper, we 
consider the agency-relation between nonprofit board and nonprofit executive staff. We argue 
that time-consuming applications for governmental grants (as part of the fundraising activities 
of the board) increase the distance between board and management, due to decreased 
monitoring activities by the former. This increased distance results in discretionary spending by 
the agent, similar to previously documented agency costs in a for-profit setting.  
This paper contributes to the literature in different ways. First, while there is ample research on 
financial implications of agency-related issues in for-profit companies, this aspect has received 
little attention in non-profit organizations. Second, this paper focuses on the impact of 
governmental funding on agency issues whereas former research by Core et al (2006) has dealt 
with donations. In contrast to large private or corporate donors, government is (as a rule) not 
represented in the board of directors. Third, rather than focusing on a specific nonprofit sector 
such as health care or education, the nonprofits in the current paper stem from a variety of 
sectors.  
This paper is structured as follows: after a brief survey of related research in the next section, 
we spell out testable hypotheses. This is followed by a methodological discussion and the 
analysis of the results. The paper ends with a conclusion and issues for further research . 
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
In this paper, we use a financial measure (level of cash and equivalent) as a proxy to measure 
the extent of agency problems between non-profit board and management. We argue that this 
agency problem is elicited by government grants. Therefore, this section addresses two issues: 
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(1) governmental funding and non-profit board and management, (2) financial consequences 
and measures of agency problems. 
THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNDING ON BOARD, MANAGEMENT AND AGENCY 
ISSUES. 
Several authors have documented the effects of growing reliance on government grants on the 
composition of and relationship between the board of directors and executive staff of the 
nonprofit organization. There seems to be a sharp contrast between two streams of literature. 
Some authors argue that the board provides direction in such key areas as financial 
management and management of relationships with the government (Harlan and Saidel 1994, 
Saidel and Harlan 1998, Olson  2000, Provan 1980). Others argue that nonprofit boards are 
insignificant participants in the process of contracting with the government (Bernstein 1991a, 
Gronbjerg 1991).  
More recently, Alonso et al. (2006) discussed the consequences of reliance on governmental 
funds in terms of the tasks and composition of the board. They argue that the function of the 
board becomes highly important in providing financial resources for the future. The board has 
to take care of the strategic forecasts and the alliances with these providers. Guo (2007) 
examined the effect of higher levels of government funding on the representative power and 
strength of the board. In order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the government and in search of 
(increased) government funding, nonprofit boards may consist largely of ‘corporate, 
professional and social elites – who are more likely to have linkages with public funding 
agencies, as well as expertise in grant writing’ (p. 461). This is consistent with the findings of 
Stone et al. (2001) that heavily subsidized nonprofit organizations tend to have more 
professional boards, consisting of businesspeople rather than community representatives.  
Guo (2007) also states that dependence on government funding generally shifts organizational 
power from the board to the chief executive. The reasons for this shift are threefold. Firstly, 
government grants can increase the size of the organization, making it more difficult for the 
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board to monitor daily management. Secondly, applying for grants may demand more time than 
board members are willing to spend. Applying for these grants requires specialized skills and 
knowledge, increasing the information gap and the distance between the board and executives. 
Finally, when government funding is associated with defined program goals, the role of the 
board in program planning and goal setting is minimized. Bernstein (1991a) found that 
government funding led to higher ambiguity in the roles and responsibilities of boards and staff. 
To summarize, board composition, strength and involvement may vary according to the level 
and form of governmental aid to the organization. There is some agreement about the fact that 
increased governmental funding tends to lead to a more professional board of directors that is 
involved in government contracting. Whether or not agency problems are to a greater or lesser 
extent present in nonprofit entities compared to for-profit corporations is beyond the scope of 
this paper. The essence is that the different levels of efforts necessary to attain government 
funding can affect the monitoring role of the board as well as shift power from the board 
towards management and thus elicit agency problems.  
 
F INANCIAL ASPECTS  OF AGENCY PROBLEMS 
Research on the effect of agency problems on nonprofit organizations’ financial status is scant, 
although Jensen (1986) stated that the decision on how to use internal funds is a central 
element in the conflict between principal and agent. Whether (self-interested) managers 
choose to spend cash quickly rather than stockpile it as cash reserves is subject to some 
discussion. According to the flexibility hypothesis, self-interested managers will prefer to hoard 
cash in order to have more flexibility in future investment decisions (Jensen 1986). Hansmann 
(1990) also suggests that nonprofit managers will build cash reserves rather than provide 
services in order to ensure their self-interest such as a lower workload and higher job security. 
The spending hypothesis however states that managers will choose to spend cash quickly to 
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realize firm growth (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This last hypothesis is the basis for a commonly 
used measure of agency problems: higher management pay (Core et al., 2006; Du Bois et al., 
2004; Fisman and Hubbard, 2005, Gore, 2009). Harford et al. (2008) conclude that ‘self-
interested managers choose to spend cash quickly rather than gain flexibility through stockpiling 
it’ in their research on the relation between corporate governance, agency problems and firm 
cash holdings. These authors use the level of cash as a proxy for increased spending due to 
agency problems. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Former research (Jensen, 1986) clearly identified the existence of an agency relation between 
the board of directors and the management of nonprofit organizations. However, the two 
existing views on the role (and strength) of the board are conflicting. Some authors state that 
the board is essential in attaining resources for the organization (Harlan and Saidel, 1994; Saidel 
and Harlan, 1998; Olson, 2000; Alonso et al. 2006). As such, boards take on the role of facilitator 
and ‘political advocate’. Harlan and Saidel (1994) state that ‘they serve important procurement 
functions when they participate in grant preparation and press for support of grant applications 
in meetings with government funders.’ Other authors suggest that managers are more involved 
in these processes and boards tend to fulfill an almost ceremonial function. For instance, 
Bernstein (1991a, p. 187) found that ‘managers seem to view the Board as irrelevant in terms of 
the major political issues regarding contracted services’. 
According to the first stream of arguments, boards will be actively pursuing government 
funding, which often is a technical and time-consuming effort. These efforts by the board can 
decrease the amount of time and effort to monitor management, thus increasing board-
management distance and agency related problems. In the second line of arguments, boards 
play no role in contracting governmental funds.  
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In fact, these seemingly opposite views can be combined, once one allows for a more detailed 
analysis. Specifically, one can argue that the involvement of the board depends on the nature of 
governmental grants. In the Belgian case, for instance, two major types of grants can be 
distinguished. The first type is a yearly renewable, operational grant. Grants received by schools 
that depend on the number of students are one such example. Once a nonprofit organization is 
operational and has received these grants, the next application can be considered to be a 
‘routine’ (although time-consuming) job, and can be dealt with by daily management. In the 
light of the previous discussion, there is little or no need for the board to be involved in this type 
of government contracting. The second type of grants can be called a ‘capital grant’. It 
fundamentally differs from the first type in the sense that it is awarded to a nonprofit 
organization for important investments. Therefore, the application for these grants as well as 
the follow-up and procurement are complicated processes that require board intervention. In 
our example of schools, the purchase of a new building by the school might give rise to the 
application for capital grants. It seems obvious that the board is involved in such a process. This 
reconciliatory view is supported by Gronbjerg (1991, p. 14): ‘The type and amount of work and 
the nature of decisions nonprofits face in managing funding relationships differ considerably 
depending on how restrictive the funding source is and also on whether the contract or grant is 
new or continuing.’ Frumkin and Kim (2002) also support this view, stating that there are 
differences in the amount of oversight that is attached to government funding.  
In conclusion, we combine differing views on board involvement and management power in 
light of the type of funding. We identify two types of governmental grants that are very 
different in terms of the effort needed to procure them. Operating grants are yearly renewable 
grants for which the involvement of the board is unnecessary. Therefore, the procurement of 
these grants is in the hands of management. The second type, capital grants, are often 
associated with large investments in fixed assets and thus with high-level decisions. Here, the 
board is actively involved in the process. In the first case, the board has time to monitor 
management, who have a ‘sense of ownership’ of the received funds. In the latter case, the 
board is involved as a facilitator, leaving less time for their monitoring role. This indicates that 
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the agency-relation between board and management is influenced by the type of funding by the 
government. Whether this self-interested  behavior of the agent results in higher pay or higher 
administrative expenses is not the main question of this paper. Higher expenses lead to 
decreased cash (and equivalent) levels. Therefore, lower cash levels are used as a proxy for self-
interested behavior by management. Furthermore, since management is less involved in the 
process of contracting with the government, a sense of ‘ownership’ may go lost, making it easier 
for management to be less parsimonious contrary to funds attracted by their own efforts. Once 
again, the increased spending is proxied by a lower level of cash and cash equivalent. Figure 5-1 
depicts the hypothesized relationship between governmental funding and the level of cash (and 
cash equivalent).  
 
 
FIGURE 5-1. HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNDING ON CASH LEVELS  
Government grants
Capital grants: board as 
facilitator
-Decreased monitoring
-Less ‘sense of 
ownership’ 
Increased spending by 
management
Lower levels of cash and 
cash equivalent
Operating grants: board 
as monitor
-Increased monitoring
-‘sense of ownership’ 
No increased spending
Higher levels of cash 
and cash equivalent
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The argumentation and hypothesis brought forward are built on the spending hypothesis, while 
discarding the flexibility hypothesis which states that managers rather save money to assure 
future investments. There are several reasons for this choice. Firstly, in nonprofit organizations, 
future investments that serve the personal interest of the manager are less available than in 
corporations (e.g. take-overs). Secondly, the evidence brought forward by Core et al. (2006) 
suggests that the flexibility hypothesis holds in cases where large donors are members of the 
board. In this study, donations are very limited and the sponsor at interest is the government, 
not holding a seat on the board. The arguments of Hansmann (1990) in favor of the flexibility 
hypothesis are a lower workload and higher job security. This paper does not look into the 
purpose of the spending (i.e. extra program expenses versus personal expenses) and therefore 
cannot take the effect on workload into account. As for higher job security, except in cases 
where spending is so dramatic that it causes the failure of the organization, management is 
quite well protected by Belgian social laws. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that government funding of nonprofit organizations affects agency 
problems between board and executive staff. We argue that capital grants will increase the 
distance between board and management, leading to increased spending by the latter and 
lower levels of cash and cash equivalent. This is in contrast with operating grants, for which 
management is responsible, leading to increased monitoring by the board, lower levels of 
spending and higher levels of cash. Formally stated, the two hypothesis are as follows: 
H1: higher capital grants are associated with lower levels of cash and cash equivalent. 
H2 : higher operating grants are associated with higher levels of cash and cash equivalent.  
 
METHODOLOGY  
In contrast to a large number of former studies using survey or case study data to capture 
contextual and organizational characteristics, data from financial statements are used to 
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examine the effects of an agency-relation between board of directors and management of 
nonprofit organizations. Correlation coefficients and multivariate (OLS) regression analyses of 
financial ratios are used to assess the existence of agency problems. For three important 
reasons, the current study uses data from Belgian nonprofits. First, the Belgian nonprofit sector 
is hardly a suis generis case, as it is similar to that observed in other modern economies. Second, 
Belgian nonprofit organizations often rely on governmental grants. Nevertheless, donations, 
membership fees and commercial income can also be identified as a funding source in the 
financial statements of these organizations. Finally, and importantly, two very distinct forms of 
governmental grants can be singled out: capital grants and operational grants. The respective 
characteristics of these grants are precisely such that they are likely to affect the roles and 
responsibilities in the organization, in the way indicated in the previous section. As indicated 
above, we need a proxy to test for the existence of agency-relations, given that the latter are as 
such non-observable. This is the weakest point of all agency-related studies, since any 
observable effect of the ‘hidden’ actions would result in the disappearance of the actual agency 
problem. Whereas levels of management pay are used in earlier nonprofit research, the current 
paper uses the level of cash and cash equivalent as an indicator of agency-related problems. 
This approach is similar to the methodology used by Harford et al. (2008). The level of cash and 
cash equivalent is scaled by total assets in order to correct for the size of the organization 
(C&CE). As a sensitivity analysis, we also performed regressions on cash and cash equivalent 
scaled by other factors, namely total assets minus cash and cash equivalent (Harford et al 2008, 
Opler et al. 1999) and total revenue (Harford et al. 2008).  
The main independent variable to test the influence of governmental grants on agency behavior 
is the importance of capital grants. Capital grants (reported in the balance sheet of nonprofit 
organizations) are scaled by total assets (CAPgrant). As the argument is that these grants are of 
such importance that intensive board involvement is needed, at the expense of the latter’s 
monitoring role, a negative relationship with the dependent variable is expected. Similarly, 
given the hypothesis that yearly renewable, operating grants demand less involvement by the 
board and are mainly procured by management, a second independent grant-related variable is 
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introduced. This variable measures the importance of these grants on the statement of activities 
(similar to profit and loss account or income statement) of the organization and is computed as 
operating grants scaled by total revenue (OPERgrant).  
Since the level of cash and cash equivalent can evidently be influenced by other factors, a 
number of control variables are added to the model.  A first group relates to the availability of 
funding sources, which influences the level of cash regardless of the existence of agency 
problems, a second group refers to the need to re-invest in fixed assets, as we now explain. 
The level of cash and cash equivalent does not merely depend on current decisions by the 
organization to save or spend money. Past decisions (which can themselves be subject to 
agency problems) influence the structure of the balance sheet. When organizations have 
accumulated wealth in the past, building equity through excess donations, fees and subsidies, 
cash levels will probably be higher. We therefore expect a positive relationship between the 
importance of equity (defined as assets minus liabilities and minus capital grants) and the level 
of cash and cash equivalent. In order to correct for size, equity is scaled by total assets 
(SELFFIN).  
Next to equity, liabilities can be an important funding source. Therefore, we added long-term 
financial liabilities to the OLS-model. The variable (scaled by total assets) serves as a control 
variable (FINDEBT). However, in line with previous arguments, it can be expected that boards 
are actively involved in the procurement of important and long term commitments of a financial 
loan. Therefore, a negative relationship with cash levels can be expected (Opler et al. 1999). 
Furthermore, a more prudent nonprofit organization will be reluctant to this type of 
commitments, using it as a last resort when cash is unavailable to finance long-term 
investments. This is also indicative of a negative relationship between long-term loans and cash 
levels. 
To measure the need to re-invest in new fixed assets, the percentage of accumulated 
depreciation is added to the model. When accumulated depreciation divided by the historical 
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purchase price of the assets (AGEassets) is high, the need to reinvest in new assets is high as 
well, which may lead to stockpiling cash reserves in order to finance future investments. 
Therefore, a positive relationship between the age of the assets and cash levels is expected. 
The OLS-regression model as well as the definitions of the variables can be found in Table 5-1. In 
order to control for sector-related differences, the independent variable is corrected with the 
median level of cash and cash equivalent per sector (Harford et al. 2008). To avoid influence of 
outliers, all explanatory variables are winsorized at the one percent level of each tail of the 
distribution. Former studies identified variability in revenue as an explanatory factor of the level 
of cash hoarding (Fisman and Hubbard 2005; Core et al. 2006). Therefore, the standard 
deviation of revenue divided by the mean revenue over the past three years (VARrev) is 
included as a control variable. Since the direction of the variability may be of importance, two 
more variables are added to the model. A dummy variable (DUMdecrease) for the change in 
subsidies and donations (one is a decrease in 2007, zero is an increase in 2007) as well as an 
interaction term (VARrev x DUMdecrease) control for negative versus positive changes in 
revenue. Due to data availability since 2006, these variables can only be computed for the last 
year of the three year time horizon. It can be expected that higher variability and a former 
decrease in subsidies and donations is positively related with high cash levels as a result of a 
more parsimonious policy.  
For a full understanding, we have also extended the model by using interaction terms of 
CAPgrant and the control variables SELFFIN, FINDEBT and AGEassets. As such, we investigate the 
possible moderating effects of the control variables on the agency-effects induced by capital 
grants. Assuming that CAPgrant is negatively correlated with the level of cash, we expect that 
this effect may be mitigated when there are substantial financial debts or when assets are older. 
In these cases, monitoring levels of the board may be increased due to the need for repayment 
of the loan and reinvestment, so weakening the information asymmetry between board and 
management. Furthermore, the outside monitoring by the creditor may also decrease the 
possibilities of the agent to spend cash quickly. Therefore, a positive interaction effect can be 
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expected. The opposite is expected when the level of self-financing is high and the organization 
can be considered to be financially stable. In these cases, monitoring efforts of the board may 
be low, even more so when a lot of effort is needed to attain capital grants. Therefore, we 
would expect the interaction effect to be negative.  
Regression 
model 
C&CE = α + β1CAPgrant + β2OPERgrant + β3 SELFFIN  
                   + β4 FINDEBT + β5 AGEassets + β6 VARrev  
                   +β7DUMdecrease +β8 CAPxSELF+β9 CAPxFIN+β10   CAPxAGE+ ε 
Variable Expected 
sign of β 
Definition 
C&CE  Cash and Cash equivalent  
(Cash at bank and in hand + Short term financial investments) / 
Total assets 
CAPgrant - Importance of capital grants 
Capital grants / Total assets 
OPERgrant + Importance of operating grants 
Operating grants / Total revenue 
SELFFIN + Control variable 
Equity build with past excess revenue and own funds 
(Own funds + reserves + retained earnings)/ total assets 
FINDEBT - Control variable 
Long-term financial loans / total assets 
AGEassets + Control variable 
Accumulated depreciation / historical cost of depreciable fixed 
assets 
VARrev + Control variable 
Standard deviation of revenue (t-2 to t) / mean revenue (t-2 to 
t) 
DUMdecrease + Control variable 
1 if subsidies and donations decreased in t-1 versus t-2, 0 
otherwise 
VARxDECR + Control variable 
Interaction term of VARrev and DUMdecrease 
 
 
CAPxSELFDUM - Interaction term  CAPgrant x SELF financing  
 
CAPxFINDEBT + Interaction term CAPgrant x FINancial debt  
 
CAPxAGE + Interaction term  CAPgrant x AGEassets  
 
TABLE 5-1. REGRESSION MODEL AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
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DATA DESCRIPTION AND BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
In 2006, Belgian nonprofit organizations were confronted with a new obligation to use accrual 
accounting techniques and to make financial reports publicly available. Depending on the size of 
the organization, the standard format of financial reports is either a ‘full report’ (very large 
organizations) or an ‘abbreviated report’ (large organizations). Small nonprofits are not 
obligated to publish standardized financial reports. Data regarding operating and capital grants 
are only available in full financial reports. In September 2006, 925 full financial reports were 
electronically available (eighty percent of the population of full report filers). Additional data for 
this list of organizations were gathered for 2007 and 2008.  Since some organizations ended 
their activities in this period, or switched from a full report to an abbreviated report, some data 
regarding grants are missing.  
The organizations are active in twenty sectors. Similar to other countries (see e.g. Core et al. 
2006), the largest sectors are education (59.5% of the sample) and health care (18.6%). Smaller 
sectors are – amongst others- sport and leisure (3.7%), business-related activities (3.7%), 
tourism (1.1%), research and development (0.5%). For 54 organizations (5.8%), the sector is 
undefined.  
The mean, median and standard deviation of all variables are shown in Table 5-2. The mean 
level of cash and cash equivalent relative to total assets is 30.8 percent. The median of 23.2 
percent is significantly lower, indicating a skewed distribution. To take sector differences into 
account, cash levels are corrected by the median per sector. This correction is only performed 
for sectors with at least 5 observations per year. The mean level of sector-corrected cash levels 
is 6.3 percent.  
For all explanatory variables, descriptive statistics are reported before and after winsorizing at 
the one and 99 percentile. Differences in the means of all variables due to winsorizing are 
limited. Obviously, standard deviations are reduced by omitting the extreme values of the 
distribution.  
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Variable Number  Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
C&CE  
(corrected by sector median) 
2695 
(2475) 
,3079 
(,0633) 
,2322 
(,0000) 
,2512 
(,2374) 
CAPgrant  
(winsorized at 0.00 and 0.62) 
2721 
(2721) 
,1061 
(,1049) 
,0204 
(,0204) 
,1564 
(,1517) 
OPERgrant  
(winsorized at 0.00 and 0.99) 
2500 
(2500) 
,4251 
(,4258) 
,3196 
(,3196) 
,3903 
(,3884) 
SELFFIN  
(winsorized at -0.30 and 0.99) 
2701 
(2701) 
,4187 
(,4268) 
,4102 
(,4102) 
,4128 
(,2758) 
FINDEBT  
(winsorized at 0.00 and 0.84) 
2706 
(2706) 
,1594 
(,1575) 
,0455 
(,0455) 
,2209 
(,2130) 
AGEassets  
(winsorized at 0.00 and 0.98) 
2549 
(2549) 
,4723 
(,4721) 
,4694 
(,4694) 
,2346 
(,2342) 
VARrev 
(winsorized at 0.01 and 0.85) 
840 
(840) 
0,1037 
(0,1003) 
0,0632 
(0,0632) 
0,1564 
(0,1321) 
DUMdecrease 925 703 cases with increase (76%), 
222 with decrease (24%) 
TABLE 5-2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 (all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels) 
 
The distributions of CAPgrant, FINDEBT, OPERgrant and VARrev are skewed. The mean value is 
(significantly) higher than the median value. It can be noted that, on average, 10.6 percent of 
total assets are financed by capital grants. About 40 percent of the organizations do not receive 
capital grants, but for three percent of the organizations it is the main financing source (not 
tabulated). This is similar to the importance of financial debts. More than 38 percent of 
organizations do not have financial long term and short term debts (not tabulated), leading to 
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an average of 16 percent of total assets. Only in ten percent of the cases are financial debts the 
main source of financing (not tabulated). The analysis of revenue shows that operating grants 
make up 43 percent of total revenue on average. The degree of self-financing and the 
percentage of accumulated depreciation (AGEassets) are normally distributed with a mean of, 
respectively, 41 and 47 percent.  
Since the differences between the original and winsorized data are very limited, the latter  are 
used in the univariate analysis as well as in the OLS regression to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. The correlation coefficients are tabulated in Table 5-3. All correlation coefficients of the 
dependent variable with the explanatory variables have the expected sign, with the exception of 
the variability of revenues. Prior research (Core et al. 2006) shows that a greater variability in 
revenue leads to accumulation of cash as a ‘rainy day reserve’. Here, the negative coefficient is 
insignificant. The negative sign might be induced by the fact that variability does not take the 
‘direction’ of the change into account. The correlation of the interaction terms and the 
dependent variable do not have the expected sign, except for CAPxSELF. All interaction effects 
have a negative correlation with the level of cash and equivalent. The correlations between 
explanatory variables are modest and do not suggest exclusion of variables for reasons of 
multicollinearity except for the interaction terms.  
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C&CE 1           
CAPgrant -.339 1          
OPERgrant .089 .163 1         
SELFFIN .493 -.298 -.020 1        
FINDEBT -.338 -.022 .168 -.421 1       
AGEasset .237 -.204 -.156 .039 -.317 1      
VARrev -.001 -.142 -.122 .098 -.043 .113 1     
DUMdecrease .062 -.149 -.062 .037 .043 .086 .222 1    
VAR x DECR .059 -.125 -.125 .043 -.056 .173 .720 .548 1   
CAPxSELFFIN -.179 .723 .141 .066 -.179 -.152 -.150 -.164 -.130 1  
CAPxFINDEBT -.364 .583 .020 -.380 .396 -.225 -.074 -.077 -.058 .179 1 
CAPxAGE -.261 .871 .120 -.251 -.065 .032 -.133 -.102 -.095 .655 .433 
TABLE 5-3. PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS.  
Correlations that are significant at the 1% (5%) level are shown in bold (italic) 
 
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
We performed an ordinary least squares regression on the cash levels (cash and cash equivalent 
scaled by total assets) corrected for sector differences (by subtracting sector median). To 
present a full analysis of the data, the parameter estimates of six models are summarized in 
Table 5-4. For a full understanding, we first estimated the effects of the main variables (model 
one) and control variables (models two and three) separately to explore the explanatory power 
of the main variables. All models are well-specified, as is evidenced by the F-value.  
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Variable Expect. Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
6 
Stand. 
Constant  .081 *** -.160 *** -.199 *** -.073 *** -.107 ** -.111**  
CAPgrant - -.542 ***   -.390*** -.364*** -.323*** -.215 
OPERgrant + .090 ***   .103*** .104*** .103*** .168 
SELFFIN +  .383 *** .391*** .274*** .287*** .309*** .344 
FINDEBT -  -.103 *** -.074 * -.221*** -.188*** -.188*** -.168 
AGEasset +  .173 *** .244*** .116*** .185*** .182*** .174 
VARrev +   -.281 **  -.304  ** -.312** -.152 
DUMdecrease +   .036       .022           .020 .031 
VARxDECR +   .321 **  .347 ** .352** .145 
Year 2007  .011 .001  .006    
Year 2008  .005 -.009  -.004    
CAPxSELFDUM -      -.213** -.070 
CAPxFINDUM +      -.019 -.008 
CAPxAGEDUM +      .000 .000 
R² adjusted  .137 .276 .316 .345 .374 .375  
F-value  85.378 
*** 
163.80 
*** 
55.87 
*** 
161.33 
*** 
54.11 
*** 
39.82 
*** 
 
N  2133 2133 711 2133 711 711  
TABLE 5-4. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION OF SECTOR-CORRECTED CASH LEVELS.   
(*** P < .001, ** P < .05, *   P < .1) 
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Models four, five and six are the main models of interest, since they combine the main variables 
with the control variables. For model six, unstandardized as well as standardized coefficients are 
reported. The difference between the models consists in (i) the inclusion of variability of 
revenue and decrease in revenue in models five and six, which reduces the dataset to a one-
year period and a lower number of observations and (ii) the inclusion of interaction terms to 
test for moderating effects of the control variables on the agency-effect induced by capital 
grants. In models one, two and four, year dummies are added to the model as control variables. 
The explanatory power of the full models is satisfactory: the adjusted R² ranges from 34.5 
(model 4) to 37.5 (model 6) percent. The F-value is significant, indicating a good fit of the model.  
The coefficients of both main variables are highly significant, in the predicted direction. Higher 
capital grants (operating grants) are linked with lower (higher) cash holdings. These findings 
confirm the hypothesis that the type and importance of grants influences the cash levels of a 
nonprofit organization, which, in turn, is affected by the existence of agency problems.  
As hypothesized, the level of self-financing and the state of the assets (percentage depreciated) 
give rise to higher cash levels, whereas the level of debt financing is related to lower levels of 
cash and cash equivalent. Earnings variability has a significant and negative relationship with the 
independent variable. This is in line with the univariate findings, but in contradiction with 
previous research (Core et al. 2006). The negative relationship can be explained by the direction 
of the changes in revenue, not merely the extent of the changes. When organizations are 
confronted with large declines in revenue, they act differently than in the case of large growth 
of revenue. In the first case, more parsimonious behavior occurs, leading to higher cash levels. 
In the second case, organizations are more inclined to spend cash more quickly. This is 
confirmed by the significantly positive coefficient of the interaction term (variability x decrease), 
This indicates that a decrease in strongly varying revenue in the previous period is consistent 
with higher cash levels in the current period.  
The last model also includes interaction variables to test for the moderating effects of financial 
debts, self-financing and the need to reinvest on the relationship between CAPgrant and the 
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level of cash and equivalent. Including all interaction variables in the model (not tabulated) 
leads to multicollinearity problems (indicated by Variance Inflation Factors larger than 10). 
Therefore, we changed the control variables to dichotomous variables taking the value of 1 
when it is larger than the mean value and 0 otherwise. Only the variable CAPxSELF is significant, 
in the expected negative direction. This suggests that the agency effect of higher discretionary 
spending is increased by high self-financing. In other words, outside monitoring by creditors and 
possibly increased inside monitoring due to financial debts or older assets do not seem to be 
present or at least not to a significant degree. 
Overall, the regression analysis is consistent with the hypotheses formulated in section 3 of this 
paper and therefore supports the argument that time-consuming applications for capital grants 
influence the relationship between board and management of the nonprofit organization. This 
effect is not present when operating grants are concerned. Similar to the results of Hughes and 
Luksetich (2004) who find that 85% of government support is going into an increase in net 
assets , we find that higher operating grants are related to higher cash balances. 
Four types of sensitivity analyses were performed to test the robustness of the model for 
different definitions of the variables. Firstly, a regression analysis on cash levels (cash and 
equivalent scaled by total assets) that are not corrected for sector differences showed very 
similar results. The direction and level of significance of the dependent variables are exactly the 
same as for models four to six. Dummies were added to these models to test for the effect of 
different subsectors. Several sectors have significantly higher cash levels (business related 
services, tourism, recreation/arts/sports, recycling), whereas cash levels tend to be lower in 
educational nonprofits. These sector dummies are not significant when added to the original 
models, indicating that the correction with the sector median is effective. Secondly, in the 
original model, total assets were used as a deflator for all variables except operating subsidies. 
As a sensitivity analysis, operating grants were scaled by total assets without changes to the 
results and conclusions. Thirdly, total revenue was used as a deflator on all variables. In those 
models, financial debts and operating grants are not significant in explaining the level of cash 
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and equivalent, resulting in a lower explanatory power (R² adjusted 27.6 percent in model 4 and 
29.5 percent in model five). Finally, we tested model five adding the original interaction terms 
(i.e. using the continuous instead of the dichotomous interaction term) one-by-one to avoid 
multicollinearity. Similarly to model six, only SELFxCAP was significant in explaining cash levels.  
Overall, the sensitivity analyses result in very similar conclusions as the original OLS models.  
CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A central hypothesis of this paper is that government funding of nonprofit organizations can 
increase the distance between board and management and result in agency problems, 
depending on the level of involvement of board and management in the procurement of the 
grants. We use data on a substantial number of organizations and differentiate between two 
types of grants: capital and operating grants. The first type of grants are received for 
(substantial) investments in fixed assets, for which the involvement of the board is needed. 
Consistent with the often used spending hypothesis, this would lead to higher management 
spending and decreased cash levels. The second type of grants, operational grants, are not 
expected to be a source of agency problems since they are recurring grants for which no effort 
of the board is needed.  
Consistent with the hypothesis that managers choose to spend cash quickly and consistent with 
the idea of increased agency problems in the case of capital grants, we find (using OLS)  that 
cash levels (when controlled for funding choices and sectoral differences) are lower when 
capital grants are important and higher when operating grants are more important. This 
indicates that contracting with the government can change the internal relations of an 
organization, creating distance between nonprofit board and nonprofit management. As such, 
we contribute to the research on nonprofit agency problems and their financial consequences. 
We also shed light on the influence of governmental funding on spending patterns. This can be 
important for scholars as well as practitioners. Nonprofit board members need to be aware of 
the consequences of a trade-off between their role as monitor vis-à-vis their role as political 
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facilitator. When we conclude that the type of grants and their respective influence on spending 
patterns within nonprofit organizations differ, this can also be important information for 
subsidizing governments and their role as an alternative monitor in the use of the funds.  
This paper is, to our knowledge, the first to examine the effect of subsidies on agency 
relationships within nonprofit organizations and we end it by pointing at some limitations that 
need to be addressed in further research. Agency problems are the result of hidden actions 
which, by definition, are not observable. Therefore, a proxy is needed to measure the influence 
of the agency relation. In the current paper, the level of cash and equivalent was used as a 
measure of (increased) spending by management. Follow-up research may further look into this 
by using a different measure, such as management pay (which is typically not publicly available).  
Alternatively, cost efficiency (using data envelopment analysis, as in Callen and Falk, 1993) 
might also be used as an indicator of the existence of agency problems.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this dissertation, the accounting and financial reporting of nonprofit organizations are 
scrutinized. Four broad research questions were formulated: 
• What is level of quality of the first nonprofit annual accounts and can we explain 
differences in quality? 
• Do Belgian nonprofits manage their accounting earnings towards zero and is this driven 
by their dependence on subsidies? 
• What are the determinants of nonprofit financial audit fees? Does auditor specialization 
and resource dependence play a role? 
• Are subsidies a source of agency problems? 
In chapter two, the first question is examined using a large sample of Belgian nonprofit financial 
statements. The effects of resource dependence and coercive isomorphism (institutional 
theory) on the willingness of nonprofit organizations to deliver high quality financial reports is 
tested in an environment characterized by (i) a recent legislative obligation to publish financial 
accounts, (ii) high levels of governmental subsidization and (iii) discretionary levels of 
commitment to reporting quality. The results showed that the quality of the reports is high, but 
that variation in quality exists. This variation is explained by resource dependence: organizations 
that are highly dependent on subsidies or on financial loans tend to show higher quality levels of 
financial reporting. External auditing of the reports (made mandatory by the government) is 
also significant in explaining the quality of financial reporting.   
The second research question is the main focus of chapter three. We hypothesized that 
nonprofit organizations use flexibility in accounting to manage earnings towards zero profit. We 
also hypothesized that this type of earnings management increases with the level of 
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subsidization. To test these arguments, two methodologies were used: a single accruals 
measure (unexpected depreciation) as well as an aggregrate accruals measure (Jones model). 
Whereas the specific accrual is not able to capture earnings management, the Jones model 
results in some interesting conclusions. First, earnings management seems to be present in all 
nonprofit subsectors. However, the sector of education and research has distinct features: there 
is a distinct trend of downwards earnings management when compared to other subsectors. 
Second, the hypothesis that earnings are managed towards zero profit is substantiated. 
Furthermore, this process is intensified when there are higher levels of subsidization but only 
for downwards earnings management in case of unmanaged profits.  
Combining these two views on financial reporting quality shows that high levels of subsidization 
increase the formal aspects of financial reporting (chapter two) but can hamper the quality of 
earnings reporting (chapter three). The evidence also suggest that there is no clear view on how 
the government uses financial reports in the decision process of subsidies. More research is 
needed in that area to make sure that financial reports serve their goals and to guide standard 
setters on how to improve the usefulness of the financial statements. Donations (individual or 
corporate) are a relatively unimportant source of funding in Belgium at this point in time. 
However, given the budgetary constraints of the government and the professionalization of the 
nonprofit sector, nonprofit organizations may become increasingly aware of the opportunities 
and importance of donations. It would be interesting to investigate whether the results of the 
current studies change if donations were to become increasingly important. 
Since one of the results in chapter two showed that external auditing increases the formal 
quality of the nonprofit financial statements, we turned our attention to the audit of nonprofit 
financial statements in chapter four. We tried to develop a model that explains audit fees in a 
setting that is different from former research in several ways. We tested known determinants of 
audit pricing in an environment that is characterized by (i) relatively small clients, (ii) low 
commercial and litigation risk, (iii) low dominance of Big Four auditors and (iv) the absence of 
formal shareholders. We found that determinants related to auditor size and client complexity 
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are important factors in explaining audit fee levels, which is a confirmation of prior developed 
theory and empirical findings. However, we also identified differences in audit fee models: the 
positive association between profitability of the client and audit fee levels may be explained by 
an ‘ability-to-pay’ effect for smaller auditors that do not have the same negotiation power as 
large auditors. We also found a negative relationship between the number of audit 
engagements in the sector and audit fee levels. This negative association may be due to learning 
effects, lowballing or the unwillingness to pay higher fees to a specialist in the absence of 
shareholders (less agency conflicts and lower need for signaling). To separate lowballing from 
experience effects, follow-up research is needed. Over time, the first effect will theoretically 
disappear in the case of unchanged auditors whereas lower fees will persist when the learning 
curve is at work. In contrast to chapters two and three, we did not identify a resource 
dependence effect of subsidies on audit fee levels. As mentioned previously, the use of financial 
reports and audit reports by governmental agencies can be important follow-up research. 
Finally, a possible agency effect of subsidies was examined in chapter five. We hypothesized 
that the procurement of subsidies can influence the agency relationship between nonprofit 
board and management. When the board is responsible for or involved in contracting with the 
government, the monitoring role may be hampered. This may lead to increased distance 
between board and management and higher levels of self-interested behavior by the latter. We 
hypothesized that this is not the case when management is involved in the procurement of the 
subsidies. Then, the board can execute its monitoring role and management may have a 
stronger sense of ownership of revenue, leading to more parsimonious behavior. This 
hypothesis is tested using two different types of subsidies: capital and operating grants. The 
results show that the first type of subsidies can lead to increased agency problems between 
board and management, captured by lower levels of cash and equivalent.  
Overall, this dissertation sheds light on different aspects of nonprofit financial reporting. Given 
the Belgian setting, in which subsidies are an important source of revenue, additional insights 
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were gained in the relationship between governmental funding and financial accounting, 
reporting and auditing. 
 
 
